

Reportativity, (not-)at-issueness, and assertion

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1 Introduction

Evidential meaning (of grammatical evidentials) is generally analyzed as a type of not-at-issue meaning.¹ But what kind of not-at-issue meaning is it? The current contenders are: presupposition (of an otherwise modal operator) (e.g., Izvorski (1997), Matthewson et al. (2007)), illocutionary modifier (Faller 2002), or conventional implicature (Potts 2007b; McCready 2010). This paper reviews the empirical properties of each of these types of meaning and evaluates the Cuzco Quechua reportative against them. It argues in particular against a recent proposal by McCready (2010) to recast Faller’s (2002) illocutionary analysis of the reportative as a conventional implicature. The reason a conventional implicature analysis cannot work is that a sentence with the reportative does not assert p —the speaker does not convey that they believe p —but nevertheless proffers p as at-issue content.

The Cuzco Quechua enclitic *=si* (allomorph *=s*) is part of a paradigm consisting of three² enclitics with evidential functions, illustrated in (1) and (2).

- (1) a. Para-mu-sha-n=**si**.
rain-CISL-PROG-3=REP
 p ='It is raining.'
EV=*s* was told that it is raining
- b. Para-mu-sha-n=**mi**/**=chá**.
rain-CISL-PROG-3=BPG/CONJ
 p ='It is raining.'
EV=*s* has direct evidence for the claim that it is raining/conjectures that it might be raining
- (2) Mana=**s** phalay-ta ati-n=**chu**, ichaqa qucha-man=**si** apa-n-ku urqu
not=REP fly-ACC can-3=NEG but lake-ILLA=REP take-3-PL mountain
pata-cha-man.
top-DIM-ILLA

¹In giving the translations of the Quechua examples, the evidential value EV is presented on a separate line from the propositional content p . Abbreviations used in glosses: 1,2,3: 1st, 2nd, 3rd person; 1O: 1st person object; 3S2O: 3rd person subject 2nd person object; ABL: ablative; ACC: accusative; ADD: additive; AG: agentive; AUG: augmentative; BEN: benefactive; BPG: best possible grounds; CAUS: causative; CERT: certainty; CISL: cislocative; COM: comitative; COND: conditional; CONJ: conjecture; CONTR: contrastive; DIM: diminutive; DISC: discontinuative; FUT: future; HORT: hortative; ILLA: illative; IMPR: impressive; INCL: inclusive; INCH: inchoative; LIM: limitative; LOC: locative; NEG: negation; NMLZ: nominalizer; NX.PST: non-experienced past; PL: plural; POL: polarity; PP: past participle; PROG: progressive; PST: past; REP: reportative; TOP: topic.

²Faller (2011) also includes the enclitic combination *chu-sina* in the set of evidential enclitics.

p ='It cannot fly, but they take it to the lake, to the top of a small mountain.'
 EV: s was told that p (Conversation)

The arguments against analyzing the Cuzco Quechua reportative as contributing at-issue meaning or a presupposition have mostly been made before, but it is useful to have these repeated to allow direct comparison with the argument against analyzing it as contributing a conventional implicature. Taken together with its ability to take question acts in its scope (see section 2.3), the impossibility of analyzing this evidential as contributing neither a presupposition nor a conventional implicature strengthens my analysis of it as an illocutionary modifier (Faller 2002). Apart from making this point for the Cuzco Quechua reportative, the main aim of this paper is to demonstrate the need to study the empirical properties, in particular the projection behavior, of an element carefully before classifying it as a particular meaning type. Indeed, just as Potts (2005, 2007a) has (re-)established conventional implicatures as a distinguished class of meaning based on their empirical differences with presuppositions, I believe a case is to be made for distinguishing illocutionary meaning as a separate type of not-at-issue meaning based on empirical differences with both presuppositions and conventional implicatures.

In the remainder of this introduction, I briefly review my basic theoretical assumptions. I assume a fairly traditional view of speech acts, according to which there is a grammatical level of meaning that encodes aspects of illocutionary force, F (Searle 1969; Vanderveken 1990). F applies to propositional content p to form a speech act $F(p)$. Linguistic devices, including sentence mood, intonation, performative verbs, and particles contribute to F , although what speech act is performed in any particular utterance situation will also depend on context and speaker intentions. Declarative sentence mood typically correlates with assertive illocutionary force (Sadock and Zwicky 1985; Vanderveken 1990), and so a typical utterance u of the sentence *It is raining* will be an assertion. In Searle and Vanderveken's framework of speech acts, F consists of six components, including illocutionary point and a set of felicity conditions. I will here only refer to sincerity conditions SINC, which require the speaker to have a particular attitude towards p in order for the speech act to be sincere. For example, an assertion of *It is raining* by speaker s has the sincerity condition that s believes p . Schematically, we can represent these different components as in (3).³

- (3) a. u : "It is raining."
 b. $p = It\ is\ raining$
 c. ASSERT _{s} (it is raining)
 d. SINC: speaker believes p

Illocutionary modifiers can add additional conditions to the speech act. For example, the adverb *alas* adds the sincerity condition that the speaker laments that p (Vanderveken 1990: 150):

- (4) a. u : "Alas, it is raining."
 b. $p = It\ is\ raining$

³I display the sincerity conditions on a separate line in (3) for better readability, though they should be considered a component of ASSERT.

- c. ASSERT_s(it is raining)
- d. SINC: speaker believes p , speaker laments that p

Faller (2002) develops an analysis of the CQ evidentials in (1) as illocutionary modifiers which contribute a sincerity condition. For example, the reportative adds a sincerity condition that the speaker has been told that p by someone else. Because the relationship between F and p is that of functor(argument), this analysis makes the prediction that evidentials have wide scope with respect to elements that contribute to p . It also allows for the possibility of scope interactions with other illocutionary operators.

In recent years, the term **at-issue** has been used to refer to p , the proposition expressed, or Grice's 'what is said' (Potts 2005: 7). This term captures the idea that at-issue content carries the main theme of the discourse or controversial propositions, while propositions conveyed as presuppositions or conventional implicatures are backgrounded or deemphasized and not taken to be controversial. Simons et al. (2011) make this idea more precise by linking it to Roberts' (1996) question under discussion (QUD) as in (5) (simplified, as it only considers assertions, not questions).

- (5) A proposition p is at-issue relative to a question Q iff it entails a partial or complete answer to QUD.

For example, in the context of the question in (6a), only the proposition expressed by the main clause of (6a), *I spent part of every summer . . . with my grandmother* entails an answer to the QUD. This proposition is therefore at-issue. But the proposition expressed by the relative clause *My grandmother lived in . . . Boston* does not entail an answer to (6a), so is not at-issue.

- (6) a. Where did you spent your summers as a child?
- b. I spent part of every summer until I was ten with my grandmother, who lived in a working-class suburb of Boston. (Judith Thurman, 'Doing it in the road'. The New Yorker, June 10, 2002 (p. 86), cited in (Potts 2005: 6)).

There are various types of not-at-issue meanings, including presuppositions, conventional implicatures, and conversational implicatures. I will not discuss conversational implicatures in this paper as the meaning conveyed by the CQ evidentials is uncontroversially lexically encoded and so analyzing it as a conversational implicature is out of the question. In contrast, presuppositions⁴ and conventional implicatures are, like at-issue meaning, encoded by lexical items or constructions.

Presuppositions are propositions that, under normal circumstances, are taken by the speaker to be part of the common ground, that is, taken as true by both speaker and addressee.⁵ As such, they convey old information and this information is backgrounded with respect to the at-issue content. For example, (7a) presupposes (7b).

- (7) a. Conner **stopped** smoking.

⁴Conventional presuppositions, to be precise. Potts (2005) also distinguishes a class of conversationally triggered presuppositions.

⁵If a presupposition is not in the common ground, it can often be accommodated, that is, the addressee will accept it as true despite being new information to them.

- b. Conner used to smoke.

Conventional implicatures, first identified as a separate class of meanings by Grice (1989), have experienced a renewed surge of interest in linguistics after Potts (2005) convincingly demonstrated that they are indeed a distinguishable class of meanings. Potts identified a set of properties, to be discussed in more detail in section 2, that set them apart from both at-issue content and presuppositions. Conventional implicatures are commitments that are made by the speaker of the utterance,⁶ and are logically and compositionally independent of the at-issue entailments (Potts 2005: 11). Moreover, conventional implicatures typically convey new information. Potts identifies two broad classes of conventional implicatures that exhibit these characteristics: supplements, exemplified in (8), and expressives, (9).

- (8) a. *As*-parentheticals:

Ames was, **as the press reported**, a successful spy.

- b. Supplementary relative:

Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, is now behind bars.

- (9) a. Expressive adjectives:

I have to mow the **damn** lawn.

- b. Honorifics:

Sensei-wa eigo ga o-wakari-ni nar-u.
the.teacher-SUBJ English NOM HON-understanding-DAT become-IMP

‘The teacher understands English.’

(Toribo (1990), cited in Potts (2005: 180))

In the next section, I will look in detail at the empirical properties that distinguish the three types of conventional not-at-issue meanings from each other and from at-issue content.

2 Properties of conventional implicatures, presuppositions, illocutionary modifiers (vs. at-issue meaning)

Illocutionary modifiers, conventional implicatures, and presuppositions all have distinct characteristics that follow from their particular way of contributing meaning. They have in common that they are not at-issue, that is, they do not answer the QUD, and as a consequence, none of them are directly deniable. Presuppositions, as commented above, contribute information that is assumed to be known already by the interlocutors, and as a consequence are backgrounded with respect to at-issue content. However, the truth of the at-issue content is dependent on the truth of any presuppositions in as much as the truth of the at-issue content cannot be evaluated (that is, is undefined), when the presuppositions are false. Because presuppositions are assumed to be shared knowledge, they cannot “simultaneously be presented as denied, or hypothesized or queried” (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000:

⁶The properties identified by Potts as classifying conventional implicatures, especially speaker-orientation, are not uncontroversial (Amaral et al. 2007), but for the purposes of this paper, I will assume that an element that meets these can be classed as a conventional implicature.

352). This explains why they **project** from so-called holes like negation, questions, and the antecedents of *if*-clauses. However, presuppositions do not project from so-called plugs like verbs of saying or propositional attitudes.

In contrast, conventional implicatures are truth-conditionally independent of the truth value of the at-issue content. They are speaker-oriented and cannot be backgrounded like presuppositions. They are scopally inert, that is they do not interact with at-issue elements at all, resulting in them projecting from both holes and plugs. As we will see in section 3, Potts captures these properties by postulating that conventional implicatures occupy a meaning dimension that is independent from the at-issue dimension: <at-issue content, conventional implicatures>.

Illocutionary modifiers contribute felicity conditions to the speech act level meaning. Speech act level meaning F is at a hierarchically higher level of meaning than at-issue content p in that F takes p as its argument: $F(p)$. It follows from this that illocutionary modifiers have wide scope over any at-issue level operator. That is, they cannot embed (unless, one admits, with Krifka (2014), embedded speech acts). If, as in the case of sincerity conditions, they index someone's attitude/mental state, it will be that of a speech act participant, that is, speaker or addressee.

I will look at each of these properties for the Cuzco Quechua reportative in comparison with English illocutionary modifiers such as *alas*, and typical conventional implicature and presuppositional elements. It will emerge that the reportative behaves in the same way as recognized illocutionary modifiers and that both types of element share key properties with conventional implicatures, which makes an analysis of these elements as conventional implicatures not implausible. However, there are also significant differences, especially regarding their projection behaviour, which argue against assimilating them to conventional implicatures. Moreover, I will argue in section 3 that existing analyses of conventional implicatures cannot account for the Cuzco Quechua reportative because they either require that the speaker is committed to p , or that the proposition conveyed by p is not at-issue. The speech act analysis of this evidential captures that p is not asserted but still proffered as at-issue content.

2.1 Answering the QUD and direct denial

By definition, not-at-issue elements cannot provide an answer to the QUD. As they do not contribute to what is under discussion, they can also not be the target of direct disagreements such as *That's not true*. In order to disagree with not-at-issue content, more specialised forms need to be used, such as, *Well, yes, but ...* (Karttunen and Peters (1979), cited in Potts (2005: 51)), *hey, wait a minute*, etc. The 'Hey, wait a minute' test is illustrated for the existence presupposition of the definite NP *the king of France* in (10) (von Stechow 2004). As indicated, only the presupposition of (10a) that there is a King of France can be denied with *Hey, wait a minute*', whereas *That's not true* can only access the at-issue content that he attended APEC.

- (10) a. A: The king of France attended the APEC conference this week.
b. B: Hey, wait a minute—I had no idea that France is still a monarchy.
c. B': #Hey, wait a minute—I had no idea that he was at that conference.

- d. C: That's not true—He wasn't at that conference.
 e. C': #That's not true—France isn't a monarchy.

Applying this test to conventional implicatures and illocutionary modifiers confirms that they also do not contribute to at-issue content. Consider (11a). The supplementary relative *who stole from the FBI* and the illocutionary modifier *alas* cannot be denied with the direct rebuttal *That's not true*, but can be questioned with *Hey, wait a minute*.⁷

- (11) a. **Alas**, Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, is now behind bars.
 b. That's not true—He's not in prison./#He didn't steal from the FBI./#You're not really sad about him being in prison.
 c. Hey, wait a minute—He didn't steal from the FBI./ You're not really sad about him being in prison./#He's not in prison.

The Cuzco Quechua reportative =*si* is also not at-issue, as it does not entail an answer to the QUD. Thus, only the proposition *It cannot fly* in (12b), not the claim that the speaker was told this, entails an answer to the QUD in (12a).

- (12) a. Phalay=ta atin=chu?
 fly-ACC can-POL
 'Can it fly? (Constructed)
- b. Mana=s phalay-ta ati-n=chu ... ,
 not=REP fly-ACC can-3=NEG
p='It cannot fly ... ' (Conversation)
 EV: *s* was told that *p*

As expected, the reportative meaning can also not be directly denied. (13b), but not (13a), is a felicitous denial of (12b).⁸

- (13) a. Mana-n chiqaq=chu, ni pi=pas chay-ta willa-ra-sunki=chu.
 not=BPG true=NEG, no who=ADD this-ACC tell-PST-3S2O=NEG
 'That's not true. Nobody told you this.'
- b. Mana-n chiqaq=chu, phalay-ta=puni=n ati-n.
 not=BPG true=NEG, fly-ACC=CERT=BPG can-3
 'That's not true. It can definitely fly.'

Having established that the Cuzco Quechua reportative is not at-issue, let us now turn to the other properties.

⁷Though see Potts (2012) for examples in which a conventional implicature can also be denied directly.

⁸I have currently no data that would correspond to the 'Hey wait a minute' test. However, the inability to be targeted by direct denials seems sufficient for concluding that the reportative is not at-issue.

2.2 (In)dependence of truth values

One of the hallmarks of conventional implicatures is that their truth value is completely independent of that of their host sentence. In contrast, presuppositions must be assumed to be true in order for their host sentence to have a truth value. Thus, as shown in (14) it is not possible to deny the truth of a presupposition while at the same time assenting to the truth of the at-issue content.

- (14) a. A: Conner **stopped** smoking.
 b. B: #That's great news, but he didn't actually smoke.

In contrast, it is fine to deny the truth of a conventional implicature while assenting to the truth of the at-issue proposition, as shown in (15).

- (15) a. A: Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, is now behind bars.
 b. B: That's great news, but he stole from the CIA, you know.

The illocutionary modifier *alas* and the Cuzco Quechua reportative pattern with conventional implicatures, as shown in (16) and (17) respectively, that is, it is possible to assent to *p* while denying the contribution of these two markers.

- (16) a. A: **Alas**, Jo couldn't come.
 b. B: Right, so we're only 5 then. But be honest, you are not really sad that she's not here.

- (17) a. A: Juan=**si** vaka-ta=qa suwa-sqa
 Juan=REP cow-ACC=TOP steal-NX.PST
p='Juan stole the cow.'
 EV: *s* was told that Juan stole the cow
- b. B: Ari, pay=mi ka-rqa-n. Ichaqa, ni pi=pas willa-ru-sunki. Qan kiki=yki
 Yes, he=BPG be-PST-3 but, no who=ADD tell-HORT-3S2O you self=2
 riku-ra=nki, riki.
 see-PST-2 right
 'Yes, it was him. But nobody told you this. You saw it yourself, didn't you.'

2.3 Speaker-orientation

Conventional implicatures are, according to Potts, necessarily speaker-oriented,⁹ while presuppositions are not. We can test this by checking whether the meaning of a conventional implicature or presuppositional element embedded under a propositional attitude can be denied by the speaker. If it can be denied, then it follows that the element in question is not (necessarily) speaker-oriented. As shown in (18), this is not possible for the expressive conventional implicature of *jerk*, but it is possible for the presupposition triggered by *stop*.

⁹This claim has been argued to be false, see, for example, Amaral et al. (2007), and in later work, for example Potts (2007b), Potts has revised this, allowing for perspective shifts to salient attitude holders/judges in the context.

- (18) a. Sue wrongly believes that that **jerk** Conner got promoted. #In fact, he isn't a jerk.
 b. Sue wrongly believes that Conner **stopped** smoking. However, he never smoked in the first place.

This test applied to illocutionary modifiers, as in (19), shows that they, like conventional implicatures, are speaker-oriented.

- (19) Sue believes that Conner, alas, was made redundant. #But I'm happy that he was made redundant.

However, this test only shows speaker-orientation for illocutionary modifiers in assertions. Some illocutionary modifiers, for example, *honestly* in (20), change their orientation to the addressee in questions (this has become known as interrogative flip (Tenny and Speas 2003)), and so are then not speaker-oriented. The restriction for such illocutionary modifiers is therefore better described as orientation towards a speech act participant. This still distinguishes them from presuppositions, which can be oriented towards the subject of an attitudinal verb, which is the main contrast we are interested in here.

- (20) Honestly, who asked who out? (Internet (Faller 2002: 237))

Note that not all illocutionary modifiers participate in the interrogative flip. For example, *alas* remains anchored to the speaker in (21).¹⁰

- (21) Is it, alas, raining?

Thus, illocutionary modifiers pattern again with conventional implicatures for this property, although for some, speaker-orientation has to be broadened to speech act participant orientation.

Applying this test to the Cuzco Quechua reportative is not straightforward, as it cannot, in general, embed. For example, it cannot occur in the antecedent of conditionals or in the complements of perception verbs (Faller 2002). However, the reportative can occur in the complement of the verb *niy* 'say', if this complement is a fully finite clause,¹¹ and so we can apply the test with this verb. Consider the naturally occurring examples in (22).

- (22) a. Chhaynata=taq ni-mu-n-ku kay wiraqocha Carlos Ferrero, kay
 then=CONTR say-CISL-3-PL this gentleman Carlos Ferrero this
 wiraqocha-wan=**sis** rima-yu-nqa-ku kunan p'unchaw
 gentleman-COM=REP speak-AUG-3.FUT-PL now day
 'Then they say (that) this gentleman Carlos Ferrero, with this gentleman, reportedly, they will talk today.' (Radio)

¹⁰Moreover it seems to introduce a bias, such that the speaker expects the answer to be positive (cf. Rett 2013). This seems to be due to the fact that in order for a speaker to lament *p* they have to believe *p*.

¹¹The reportative is not possible within the complement of *niy* if it is a nominalized clause (Faller 2002: 222). Note that it is not entirely clear whether the examples in (22) constitute true embedding. According to Lefebvre and Muysken (1988: 12), non-nominalized complement clauses contain the complementizer *chay* 'that', which is however not present in (22a,b). It is therefore possible that these contain two independent clauses.

- b. [...] chay faena-pi ni-ra-n Inka Qosqo-ta hatari-chi-sha-qti-n=**si**
 this *faena-loc* say-PST-3 Inka Cusco-ACC raise-CAUS-PROG-NMLZ-3=REP
 machula-nchis-kuna tiya-q hina=**s** lliw=**si** panpa.
 ancestor-1PL.INCL-PL sit-AG like=REP all=REP plain
 ‘At this *faena* he said that when the Inka built Cusco, where our ancestors lived,
 everything was plains, like this.’
 (Valderrama Fernandez and Escalante Gutierrez 1982: 19)

In both examples, and all the other examples I have been able to find, the reportative seems to be interpreted only in concord with the verb of saying, that is, they jointly convey the meaning that someone else related the information in the complement clause. While it is of course possible that the subject of *niy* ‘say’ in turn also heard this from other people, this is, according to the speaker I have consulted, not necessarily so.¹² This would suggest that the reportative is speaker-oriented in assertions.

The reportative can participate in the interrogative flip, that is, in questions, it can be interpreted with respect to the addressee. An example is given in (23).

- (23) Context: A son announces to his father that a young man has come to see him. The father sends him to let him in and asks:

May-manta=**s** chay runa ka-n-man.
 where-ABL=REP this man be-3-COND

‘Where could this man be from?’ (Itier 1995: 290)

That is, as with illocutionary modifiers, it is better to describe this property for the Cuzco Quechua reportative as orientation towards a speech act participant.

In addition to the flip reading in questions, the Cuzco Quechua reportative has a reading in which it is still speaker oriented, as shown in (24).

- (24) Context: Martina asks the mother-in-law of her consultant how she is. The mother-in-law doesn’t hear her, so the consultant asks her the following:

Imayna=**s** ka-sha-nki.
 how=REP be-PROG-2

‘(She says) How are you?’ (Conversation, reconstructed from memory)

Under this reading, the question is asked by the speaker on someone else’s behalf. The question as a whole is reported. Faller (2002) takes this as strong support for the illocutionary analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative, as it has scope here over the entire question speech act.

¹²I have only checked this with one speaker so far, and only by talking about it with them at a meta level, by asking them whether the unspecified subject of *niy* could have first hand knowledge of *p*. This claim therefore requires further support from a proper investigation with more than one speaker.

2.4 (Anti-)Backgrounding

Presuppositions are propositions that under normal circumstances are taken by the speaker to be part of the common ground. As such, they convey old, backgrounded information. For example, the verb *know* presupposes its complement. In (25), the complement conveys the old information that Lance Armstrong is a cancer survivor; the new information is the claim that most riders know this.

- (25) Most riders know that Lance Armstrong is a cancer survivor.

In contrast, conventional implicatures tend to introduce new information, albeit in a de-emphasized manner (Potts 2005: 33). Thus, in (26), the information that Ames stole from the FBI would normally be new information.

- (26) Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.

According to Potts (2005:33), conventional implicatures are not only not backgrounded, but have a stronger requirement: antibackgrounding. That is, conventional implicatures are infelicitous in contexts in which their content is already known. The second sentence of (27a) is infelicitous in the context of the first, which asserts the content of the nominal appositive. The parallel discourse in (27b) with a presupposition is perfectly fine.

- (27) a. Ames stole from the FBI. #When Ames, **who stole from the FBI**, was finally caught, he was put behind bars.
b. Ames stole from the FBI. When they realized that he stole from the FBI, they put him behind bars.

Illocutionary modifiers vary with regard to backgrounding. Illocutionary modifiers expressing preparatory conditions are presuppositional and therefore backgrounded. For example, in making a request, the speaker takes for granted that the addressee has the ability to perform the ordered action; in making a promise or concession the speaker assumes that the addressee wants the promised/conceded thing to happen. The adverbial phrases in (28, in *italics*) express these preparatory conditions overtly.

- (28) a. *Since you are so good at this*, let's try it one more time with our eyes closed. (google.co.uk)
b. Ok then, I'll make it an editable *since you want it so much*. (google.co.uk)

As shown in (29), the sentences in (28) are felicitous in a context in which the content of the illocutionary adverbials has been previously asserted.

- (29) a. You are really good at this. So, *Since you are so good at this*, ...
b. You really want it to be editable, don't you? Ok then, *since you want it so much*, I'll make it an editable.

However, other illocutionary modifiers do not require backgrounding nor antibackgrounding. For example, *alas* in (30a) conveys new information, but it is also felicitous in a context in which its meaning has already been established, (30b).

- (30) a. Alas, it is raining.
 b. It's very lamentable, but, alas, it is raining.

The Cuzco Quechua reportative also requires neither backgrounding nor antibackgrounding. For example, the question posed in (31a) does not anticipate that the answer might be based on reportative evidence. It is possible that one of the addresses could have seen a train for themselves when visiting a region that already had trains or that an addressee would make a conjecture. Thus, the reportative in (31b) and (31c) conveys new information.

- (31) Context: the speaker describes the reactions of people when the train first came to their region.
- a. Tren, tren, imayna=**chá**?
 train, train, how=CONJ
 'The train, the train, how might it be?'
- b. Kuru hina=**s** suchu-n.
 bug like=REP crawl-3
 'It crawls like a bug (they say).'
- c. Yana animal=**si** [...]
 black animal=REP
 'It's a black animal.'

(Valderrama Fernandez and Escalante Gutierrez 1982: 30)

However, the reportative is also felicitous in contexts in which it is already established that the current statement is based on reportative evidence. Thus, in (32), the first sentence asserts that the speaker was told something, namely what follows. The reportative is then still used in the recounting of the news story.

- (32) Chaymanta-pas willay-man-chis [...] qaynuchay p'unchay-taq=**sis** huk wayna
 then-ADD tell-1O-PL yesterday day-CONTR=REP one young.man
 arma-ntin=**sis** ka-n-man ka-ra-n hinaspa wañu-ra-chi-pu-sqa
 weapon-INCL=REP be-3-COND be-3-PST then die-CAUS-BEN-NX.PST
 enamorada-n-ta.
 girl.friend-3-ACC
 'We are also told (the following). Yesterday there was a young man with a weapon,
 he then killed his girlfriend.' (Radio news)

Illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative are therefore distinct from both presuppositions and conventional implicatures with respect to (anti-)backgrounding.

2.5 Projection from holes

Because a presupposed proposition is already assumed to be true, it cannot "simultaneously be presented as denied, or hypothesized or queried" (Chierchia and McConnell-Ginet 2000: 352). This explains why they **project** from holes like negation, questions, and the antecedents of *if*-clauses (Karttunen 1973). The so-called family of sentences test which

involves these constructions is applied to the presupposition trigger *stop* in (33). Like the simple assertion in (33a), its negation, corresponding question and conditional with the trigger in the antecedent in (33b–d), all still presuppose (33e).

- (33) a. Conner stopped smoking.
 b. Conner didn't stop smoking.
 c. Did Conner stop smoking?
 d. If Conner stopped smoking, Sue will stop, too.
 e. Conner used to smoke.

As shown in (34), conventional implicatures also project in the same way. That is, each of (34a–d) presupposes (34e).

- (34) a. Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars. .
 b. Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now not behind bars.
 c. Is Ames, who stole from the FBI, now behind bars?
 d. If Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars, we can all relax.
 e. Ames stole from the FBI.

Applying the family of sentences test to illocutionary modifiers yields results that are somewhat difficult to interpret, though especially the interaction with negation shows that they do not project in the expected way. (35) replicates the family of sentences test for *alas*.

- (35) a. Alas, it is raining.
 b. It is not, alas, raining. / Alas, it is not raining.
 c. Is it, alas, raining?
 d. If it is, alas, raining, we won't go for a hike.
 e. Speaker laments that it is raining.

Alas in (35b) has wide scope over negation. What is lamented is the fact that it is *not* raining. However, this is not projection. If it were, the meaning conveyed by *alas* should still be (35e), that the speaker laments the fact that it is raining. With polar questions and conditional antecedents, *alas* seems to add a biased assumption that it is raining, and it is this assumption that is lamented. That is, (35c,d), arguably still convey (35e), though this does not seem projection in the usual sense, as whether or not the speaker laments *p* depends on whether the truth of *p* is confirmed.

Turning now to the Cuzco Quechua reportative, *=si* does not project in the expected way either. Like *alas*, it scopes over negation, rather than projecting from under it. That is, as shown in (36b), negating a sentence with the reportative results in the interpretation that the speaker was told *not p*, not, as expected if it did project, that they were told *p*.

- (36) a. Phalay-ta=s ati-n.
 fly-ACC=REP can-3
 'It can fly.'
 EV = speaker has reportative evidence that it can fly.

- b. Mana=s phalay-ta ati-n=chu.
 not=REP fly-ACC can-3=NEG
 ‘It can not fly.’
 EV= (i) speaker has reportative evidence that it cannot fly.
 (ii) #speaker has reportative evidence that it can fly.

In questions, =*si* can give rise to two readings (as already discussed in section 2.3). In the first, it is anchored to the addressee in questions, resulting in the meaning that the speaker assumes that the addressee knows the answer based on reportative evidence. This is shown in (37), repeated from (23).

- (37) a. Context: A son announces to his father that a young man has come to see him.
 The father sends him to let him in and asks:
 b. May-manta=s chay runa ka-n-man.
 where-ABL=REP this man be-3-COND
 ‘Where could this man be from?’ (Itier 1995: 290)

In the second, illustrated in (38), repeated from (24), =*si* conveys that the speaker asks the question on behalf of someone else.

- (38) Imayna=s ka-sha-nki.
 how=REP be-PROG-2
 ‘(She says) How are you?’ (Conversation, reconstructed from memory)

Neither reading constitutes a projection of the meaning of =*si* in questions, as that would mean that the speaker should be committed to having reportative evidence for *p*. We cannot test projection from conditional antecedents, as =*si* cannot be embedded.

Again, illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative differ from both presuppositions and conventional implicatures with respect to projection from holes.

2.6 Projection from plugs

While conventional implicatures behave like presuppositions with respect to holes, they differ with respect to plugs. Plugs are constructions that prevent presuppositions from projecting (Karttunen 1973), such as propositional attitudes. Presuppositions do not project from plugs, whereas conventional implicatures do. We already saw this in examples (18), repeated here as (39).

- (39) a. Sue wrongly believes that that jerk Conner got promoted. #In fact, he isn’t a jerk.
 b. Sue wrongly believes that Conner stopped smoking. However, he never smoked in the first place.

If conventional implicatures were plugged by propositional attitudes, we would expect it to be possible for the speaker to distance themselves from the conventional implicature, but as (39a) shows, this is not the case. In contrast, the presupposition that Conner used to smoke

is in (39b) attributable to Sue, the subject of *believe*, allowing the speaker to express their non-commitment to it. The presupposition is therefore not inherited by the entire sentence.

Presuppositions moreover evaporate from conditionals with a presupposition trigger in the consequent, if their presupposition is entailed by the antecedent (Karttunen 1973: 177), as shown in (40a). This is not the case for conventional implicatures, which cannot be bound in this way, resulting in overall oddness, (40b).

- (40) a. If Ali has a brother, then Ali's brother is a spy.
 b. ??If Ames stole from the FBI, then Ames, who stole from the FBI, is now behind bars.

Turning to illocutionary modifiers, *alas* is not plugged by propositional attitudes, as the speaker cannot distance themselves from the meaning of *alas* even when it is embedded under a propositional attitude, cf. (41), repeated from (19).

- (41) Sue believes that Conner, *alas*, was made redundant. #But I'm happy that he was made redundant.

And like conventional implicatures, the meaning of *alas* cannot be plugged in conditional consequents by making its meaning the antecedent proposition, (42).

- (42) ??If I lament that Conner was made redundant, then he was, *alas*, made redundant.

The reportative implication of *=si* is not plugged by verbs of saying either, (43), repeated from (22a), and does also not evaporate from conditional consequents if it is hypothetically assumed in the antecedent, (44).

- (43) Chhaynata=taq ni-mu-n-ku kay wiraqocha Carlos Ferrero, kay
 then=CONTR say-CISL-3-PL this gentleman Carlos Ferrero this
 wiraqocha-wan=**sis** rima-yu-nqa-ku kunan p'unchaw
 gentleman-COM=REP speak-AUG-3.FUT-PL now day
 'Then they say (that) this gentleman Carlos Ferrero, with this gentleman, reportedly,
 they will talk today.' (Radio)

- (44) Sichus ni-wa-rqa-n Juan hamu-na-n-ta chay=qa Juan=qa
 if say-1O-PST-3 Juan come-NMLZ-3-ACC then=TOP Juan=TOP
 hamu-nqa=s.
 come-3.FUT=REP
 'If I was told that Juan will come, then Juan will come.'
 EV: s was told that Juan will come.' (Faller (2002: 118), elicited)

Thus, illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative pattern with conventional implicatures with respect to plugs and contrast with presuppositions.

2.7 Summary

Table 1 summarises the results of the tests for each of the types of meaning looked at in this section.

| | at-issue | P | CI | IM | = <i>si</i> |
|--------------------------------|----------|---|----|----------|-------------|
| answers QUD | + | - | - | - | - |
| target of assent/dissent | + | - | - | - | - |
| truth-conditional independence | - | - | + | + | + |
| SAP-oriented | - | - | s | s (or h) | s or h |
| taken for granted | - | + | - | varies | - |
| antibackgrounding | + | - | + | - | - |
| escape from holes | - | + | + | - | - |
| plugged by plugs | + | + | - | - | - |

Table 1: Properties of (not-)at-issue meaning types

The first main observation here is that the Cuzco Quechua reportative =*si* patterns mostly with illocutionary modifiers (IM) like *alas*, and that both of these are clearly distinct from both at-issue content and presuppositions (P). *Alas* and =*si* differ from each other in two respects: First, in questions, *alas*, seems to be still conveying that the speaker laments *p*, which is assumed to be true, but the meaning of =*si* is either that the speaker asks the question on someone else’s behalf or that the addressee is expected to know the answer based on reportative evidence. The latter, interrogative flip reading, can, however, be observed with other illocutionary modifiers, so this suggests that *alas* is subject to additional restrictions in questions. The first reading, which involves =*si* taking the entire question act in its scope, is, however, not observed with any illocutionary modifier, as far as I know. Second, the two types of element differ in whether or not they are necessarily taken for granted. Certain, but not all illocutionary modifiers, have this requirement, namely those illocutionary modifiers that specify preparatory felicity conditions, but the reportative does not.

Illocutionary modifiers and the Cuzco Quechua reportative pattern with conventional implicatures (CI) in a good number of properties, but there are also significant differences, which suggest that they should not be analyzed as conventional implicatures. In particular, conventional implicatures escape from holes, whereas illocutionary modifiers and the reportative do not, and conventional implicatures, but not illocutionary modifiers and the reportative, require antibackgrounding. Thus, I suggest the addition of a further type of entailed not-at-issue meaning to taxonomies of meaning types, namely that of illocutionary entailments.

3 Conventional implicature analyses of reportatives

In the previous section, it was shown that the Quechua reportative and other illocutionary modifiers are empirically distinct from conventional implicatures. In this section, I will argue that existing analyses of the reportative as a conventional implicature are inadequate also on theoretical grounds. Potts (2005) develops a typed logic that deals with at-issue content

and conventional implicatures as two different meaning dimensions. The two dimensions are truth-conditionally independent of each other, except for the fact that conventional implicatures take elements from the at-issue dimension as their arguments. The dimensions can be represented as a tuple of meanings such as (45).¹³

(45) $\langle p, CI(p) \rangle$

Potts (2007b: 195) suggests that a conventional implicature analysis of evidentials, in particular one that classes them with expressives, might be fruitful to explore. Such an analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative would result in the tuple in (46).

(46) $\langle p, Rep(p) \rangle$

However, Potts himself is aware that this analysis would not be appropriate for evidentials like the Cuzco Quechua reportative, as he asks: “But to what extent do they manifest the independence property? It is generally hard to determine whether a sentence containing a hedging evidential counts as an assertion of its core propositional content. This judgment can vary from language to language, even from morpheme to morpheme; see Faller (2002) and Garrett (2001) for descriptions that are well attuned to the difficulty of this issue.”

The problem identified here by Potts is illustrated by (47).

- (47) a. Pay-kuna=**s** ñoqa-man=**qa** qulqi-ta muntu-ntin-pi saqiy-wa-n,
 she-PL=REP I-ILLA=TOP money-ACC lot-INCL-LOC leave-1o-3
*p*₁=‘They leave me a lot of money’
 EV₁: *s* has reportative evidence for *p*₁
- b. mana=**má** riki riku-sqa-yki ni un sol-ta centavo-ta=**pis**
 not=IMPR right see-PP-2 not one Sol-ACC cent-ACC=ADD
 saqi-sha-wa-n=**chu**
 leave-PROG-1o-3=NEG
*p*₂=‘(But) that’s not true, as you have seen, they don’t leave me one sol, not one cent.’
 EV₂=*s* has direct evidence for *p*₂ (Conversation)

The speaker of (47) first introduces the proposition that they have left her money into the discourse under the scope of the reportative and then goes on to deny the truth of this proposition. It is therefore clear that the speaker is not committed to the truth of the proposition in (47a), and indeed is committed to its falsity. As speaker commitment to *p* is a sincerity condition for an assertion of *p*, it follows that *p* in (47a) is not asserted. Potts assumes that the at-issue content of declarative sentences is asserted. (46) is therefore not an adequate analysis of the Cuzco Quechua reportative.

Note that Potts takes this to be a violation of the requirement for independence of truth values for conventional implicatures. However, if we take the possibility of assenting to *p* while dissenting with a not-at-issue expression as a test for truth-conditional independence, then, as shown in section 2.2, the evidential contribution of the Cuzco Quechua reportative

¹³For simplicity, (45) assumes a conventional implicature that takes the entire proposition as its argument—there are conventional implicatures whose scope is only a phrase.

is truth-conditionally independent of p . Unlike with presuppositions, the truth of p is not in any way dependent on the truth of the evidential contribution. Without the continuation in (47b), it is also conceivable that the proposition that they gave her money in (47a) is true while at the same time it might be false that the speaker was told about it. What is at issue here is not truth-conditional independence but rather whether or not the speaker presents p as true. That is, the evidential affects the assertability of p by the speaker, not the truth of p .

Another expression Potts excludes from the set of conventional implicatures based on this criterion is the parenthetical *it seems*, as, despite it being intonationally isolated and syntactically similar to *as*-parentheticals, *it seems* cannot be removed from (48) and leave “the at-issue core unaffected” (Potts 2005: 92).

(48) Max, it seems, is a Martian.

Again, a better characterization of what is affected by *it seems* is not the at-issue core itself, but rather whether or not this core is asserted. The conventional implicature analysis is not adequate for the Cuzco Quechua reportative or for *it seems*, because it does not allow any reference to the illocutionary level of meaning, not because the truth of the at-issue content is dependent on the truth of the evidential.

That the basic analysis of evidentials as conventional implicatures in (46) does not work for all evidentials because it assumes that the at-issue content is asserted has also been observed by Portner (2006), and similar considerations have led Zimmermann (2004) to reject the conventional implicature analysis for the German speech act level epistemic modal *wohl*. Being aware of this fundamental problem, McCready (2010) proposes a conventional implicature analysis for the CQ evidentials based on his extension to Potts’ logic which introduces a new logical type, namely that of a shunting type. Shunting types are needed for sentences which contribute only conventional implicature content but have no at-issue content. An example from English is single-word utterances of expressives such as *man* in (49b).

- (49) a. A: What’s the weather like outside?
b. B: Man!

McCready (2010) assumes that *man* here applies to a contextually supplied proposition and expresses a strong feeling towards this proposition. However, this proposition is not asserted. Shunting types are “types for those semantic objects [such as *man*] that ‘shunt’ information from one dimension to another, without leaving anything behind for further modification” (McCready 2010: 18). He stipulates “that in cases where a sentence lacks asserted content it is still interpreted as a 2-tuple, but one with a first (left) element which is always satisfiable. I will denote this trivial assertion by T” (McCready 2010: 32). Thus, (49b) can be represented as in (50).

(50) $\langle T, man(p) \rangle$

Shunting types are not only useful for sentences consisting of only a conventional implicature element, but also for elements that take a proposition as their scope, but rather than leaving this proposition in the at-issue dimension, they take it with them into the conventional implicature dimension. The Japanese adverbial *yokumo*, (51), is a case in point.

- (51) Yokumo Dallas to kekon sita na!
 YOKUMO Dallas with marry did PT
 ‘He did an amazingly stupid and shocking thing by marrying Dallas.’

Yokumo expresses the speaker’s negative feelings towards the propositional content and that it is unexpected.¹⁴ Most importantly, p = ‘He married Dallas’, in (51), is not at-issue, which is evidenced by the fact that it cannot provide new information and that it cannot be directly denied. Thus, (51) cannot serve as the answer to the question *Who did Austin marry?* (McCready 2010: 39), and direct denials such as *That’s not true* or *That’s a lie!* are infelicitous as responses. Thus, in McCready’s terminology, *yokumo* shunts the at-issue content into the conventional implicature dimension, and consequently, the conventional implicature content is the only content conveyed by *yokumo* sentences, that is, the resulting meaning is (52).

- (52) <T, bad(p) \wedge surprise(p)>

McCready (2010: 48f) suggests that the Cuzco Quechua reportative can be analyzed along the same lines, and proposes (53) as its semantics.

- (53) <T, Hearsay(p)>

This analysis correctly accounts for the fact that p in the scope of the reportative is not asserted. However, it wrongly predicts that it should not be possible to target p with denials or for p to serve as the answer to a question. Neither of these predictions is borne out. Denials of utterances with the reportative are felicitous and only target p , as shown in (54).

- (54) a. Mana=s phalay-ta ati-n=chu . . . ,
 not=REP fly-ACC can-3=NEG
 p = ‘It cannot fly . . . ’
 EV: s was told that p (Conversation)
- b. Mana-n chiqaq=chu, phalay-ta=puni=n ati-n.
 not=BPG true=NEG, fly-ACC=CERT=BPG can-3
 ‘That’s not true. It can definitely fly. (Constructed)

And (55) shows that reportative utterances can serve to answer questions.

- (55) a. Hasta illarimuy=kama?
 until dawn=LIM
 ‘Until dawn?’
- b. illamuy-ta=ña=s riqcha-ri-sqa-ku
 dawn-ACC-DISC=REP wake.up-INCH-NX.PST-PL
 ‘They woke up at dawn.’
 EV: s was told that they woke up at dawn. (Conversation)

¹⁴ *Yokumo* also presupposes that p has to be believed by the speaker to be in the common ground. This, incidentally, shows that there are also elements that convey both presuppositional and conventional implicature content.

Recall also that, according to Potts (2005), at-issue content carries the main theme of the discourse or controversial propositions. In Cuzco Quechua, stories are told with the reportative present in almost every sentence, be that traditional folk tales or stories from everyday life for which the speaker only has second-hand evidence, see for example the short excerpt from a news story in (32).

We therefore must allow for the propositions conveyed with the reportative to act as at-issue content, without however, requiring that this content be asserted. That is, we must not identify at-issueness with assertion. Any analysis that achieves this would have to allow the Cuzco Quechua reportative to have an effect on illocutionary force. The basic idea of Faller (2002) is that utterances with the Cuzco Quechua reportative do not ASSERT p , but PRESENT or PUT FORWARD p , that is, p is introduced into the discourse without however the speaker committing to the truth of it. The speech act performed by (1a) would have the following components (where I have here chosen PUT for ‘putting forward’ to name this speech act):

- (56) a. u: Para-mu-sha-n=**si**.
b. $p = It\ is\ raining$
c. PUT_s(it is raining)
d. SINC: someone else said that p

To maintain compositionality, some modifications to traditional speech act theory are required. In particular, Faller (2012) suggests that declarative sentences are associated with PUT rather than ASSERT, and that the sincerity condition for assertions that the speaker believes p is only added to PUT by default when there is no illocutionary modifier (such as the Cuzco Quechua reportative) that overrides this default. I will not go into the details of this analysis, as the point for the current paper is to show that the resulting speech act in (56) correctly captures that the at-issue content introduced under the reportative is at-issue but not asserted.

4 Conclusion

The main aim of this paper has been to show through a detailed comparison of the empirical properties of the Cuzco Quechua reportative evidential with those of typical presupposition and conventional implicature triggers that it cannot be subsumed under either of these categories. It was also shown that previous proposals of analyzing this evidential as a conventional implicature fail to capture that the proposition it introduces into the discourse is at-issue, yet not asserted. The Cuzco Quechua reportative behaves in most respects like elements that are widely assumed to operate on the illocutionary level such as the adverbs *alas* and *honestly*. An analysis of it as an illocutionary modifier (as first proposed in Faller (2002)) therefore still seems the most appropriate for this marker.

Potts (2005) develops an *upper-layer* logic to account for utterance modifiers such as *frankly*. The *lower-level* logic dealing with at-issue content and supplements and expressives is embedded within this. This architecture is therefore not unlike the hierarchical structure $F(p)$ of traditional speech act theory. It is conceivable that this upper-layer logic can be

extended to account for elements like the Cuzco Quechua reportative =*si*. Doing so would however not alter the fact that it is an illocutionary modifier. In our taxonomies of conventional meaning types, we should therefore include a category of illocutionary entailments, as opposed to at-issue entailments on the one hand, and to the other types of not-at-issue entailments, presuppositions and conventional implicatures, on the other.

The Cuzco Quechua reportative differs from *alas* and *honestly* in two respects: (i) utterances containing it are not assertions but a weaker form of putting forth a proposition into the discourse which does not require the speaker to be committed to its truth; (ii) it seems to be able to take an entire question speech act in its scope, resulting in an interpretation that a question is asked on someone else's behalf. Regarding (ii), only an illocutionary analysis of this evidential would be able to account for this observation, thus providing a further argument against the conventional implicature analysis. A fully compositional analysis of this reading as well as the flip reading in questions is still outstanding.

The analysis proposed in Faller (2002) and Faller (2012) captures (i), but it leaves open the question of how the at-issue content is dealt with in subsequent discourse, that is, whether and how it affects the common ground. If the speaker does not express their commitment to *p*, then what is the point of presenting *p* at all? Clearly, the speaker still intends to convey some information. This is especially clear when questions are answered with reportative utterances or in news reporting contexts. We therefore need to develop an analysis that separates speaker commitment to *p* from the ability of *p* to advance the discourse in an informative way. Murray (2010, 2014) has studied how Cheyenne evidentials update the common ground and so her analysis might be applicable to the Cuzco Quechua reportative as well. (Faller 2007) also provides some discussion of these issues within the framework of SDRT (Asher and Lascarides 2003), and it would be worthwhile to explore this further. Most promising for capturing the above observations, however, seems to me the recent dynamic theory for speech acts developed by Farkas and Bruce (2010), as it allows the separation of commitments, what is under discussion and what enters the common ground. In particular their notion of a Table, which is a stack of propositions currently under discussion/at-issue, would allow us to capture the idea that propositions under the Cuzco Quechua reportative are introduced into the discourse for further discussion, that is, put on the table. The individual discourse participants' commitments are tracked in separate stacks, and are also distinct from the common ground, the set of propositions that all discourse participants are publicly committed to. So, the speaker's commitment can be kept distinct from the common ground as well as from the contribution the at-issue content makes to the discourse. Before such an analysis can be developed, however, the empirical facts about how the at-issue content is treated in subsequent discourse remain to be established.

5 References

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