

THE EVIDENTIAL AND VALIDATIONAL LICENSING CONDITIONS FOR THE CUSCO QUECHUA ENCLITIC *-MI*

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Abstract

This paper investigates the meaning of the Cusco Quechua enclitic *-mi*. It is argued that it cannot be classified as a pure evidential or as a pure validational, but encodes both notions. It is however too simplistic to identify its evidential value with ‘direct evidence’, since it can be used to describe situations which the speaker could not have witnessed. I propose analyzing the evidential licensing condition for *-mi* as variable relative to the observability of the event and the type of information, personal vs. encyclopedic information, conveyed by the utterance. This analysis might also be appropriate for so-called direct evidentials in other languages.

1. Introduction

This paper investigates the meaning of the Quechua enclitic *-mi*, which has been classified as an evidential by some researchers and as a validational by others, and argues that *-mi* combines both functions—at least in the variety studied here, the Quechua spoken by bilinguals in Cusco, Peru.*¹ It is furthermore argued that in determining the licensing conditions for *-mi*, it is important to take into account the type of event as well as the type of information conveyed by an utterance.

I use the term *evidential* to designate a grammatical element that indicates the speaker’s source of information (Anderson 1986), and the term *validational* for an element that indicates the speaker’s degree of certainty that the proposition expressed is true (Weber 1986).

In most articles on the coding of evidentiality in a particular language one finds at least a short discussion of whether a given morpheme should be classified as an evidential, a validational or a combination of both. Such discussions presuppose that the speaker’s source of information and the speaker’s degree of certainty that the proposition expressed is true are not only conceptually but also linguistically distinct categories. Not all researchers take this view. For example, Chafe (1986) uses the term evidentiality in a broad

sense to cover the linguistic encoding of attitudes towards knowledge in general. While this broad use of the term might be justified by the fact that cross-linguistically many grammatical elements do mark more than one kind of epistemic attitude—including Cusco Quechua *-mi*, I find it more useful to maintain a terminological distinction. There are clear examples of pure evidentials (e.g. the Reportative in Quechua and other languages), and there are clear examples of pure validationals (e.g. the enclitic *-puni* in Quechua). Thus, the two concepts are linguistically distinguished by some languages (see de Haan (1999) for an in-depth argument in favor of this view). However, making a theoretical distinction between evidentials and validationals does not imply that it is always possible to categorize an element as one or the other, as is testified by a variety of language-specific and cross-linguistic studies (see e.g. Willett (1987) and Chafe and Nichols (1986)). Researchers dealing with elements that express both notions sometimes try to establish one as its basic or invariant meaning and derive the other. This has also been attempted by at least two investigators for the Quechua enclitic *-mi* (Weber 1986 and Nuckolls 1993). Here, I argue that it is in fact not possible to assign *-mi* to a single category.

The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. I will first give a very brief overview over the (alleged) evidentials of Cusco Quechua in section 2. Section 3 discusses previous analyses of *-mi*, including the analysis proposed by Weber (1986) of *-mi* as a pure evidential, section 3.1, Nuckolls' (1990) analysis of *-mi* as a pure validational, section 3.2, and Floyd's (1999) prototype analysis of *-mi*, section 3.3. In section 4, I argue that the licensing conditions of *-mi* in Cusco Quechua are both validational and evidential, and that the evidential conditions have to be relativized to the type of event and information conveyed by the utterance. I conclude in section 5 with some suggestions for further research.

2. Evidentials of Cusco Quechua

Cusco Quechua, as well as most other Quechua varieties, has three enclitics that have been claimed to be evidentials: the *Direct* evidential *-mi* (with allomorph *-n*), which is the focus of the present study, the *Reportative* evidential *-si* (with allomorph *-s*), and the *Conjectural* evidential *-chá*. These three enclitics form a subset of the larger set of so-called focus enclitics (Cusihuaman 1976). The relation between their evidential and information packaging function still awaits in-depth study. In addition, Cusco Quechua has two past tense morphemes, *-rqa* and *-sqa*, the latter of which is used for past events the speaker did not experience directly (Cusihuaman 1977, Cerrón-Palomino 1994).² The examples in (1) illustrate the typical uses of the Quechua evidentials.³

- (1) a. Pilar-**mi** llalli-rqa-n.
 Pilar-**mi** win-PST-3
 ‘Pilar won.’ EV: Speaker saw that Pilar won.
 VV: Speaker is certain that Pilar won.
- b. Pilar-**si** llalli-**sqa**.
 Pilar-**si** win-**sqa**
 ‘Pilar won.’ EV: Speaker was told that Pilar won.
 VV: neutral.
- c. Pilar-**chá** llalli-rqa-n.
 Pilar-**chá** win-PST-3
 ‘Pilar won.’ EV: Speaker conjectures that Pilar won.
 VV: Speaker is not certain that Pilar won.

In order to fully understand the meaning of *-mi*, it is necessary to study it within the context of the entire evidential system, which is however beyond the scope of this paper (but see Faller (2002)), and I will limit the discussion to those aspects that can be studied in relative isolation of the other evidentials.

3. Previous analyses of *-mi*

Studies on Quechua evidentials are few, and those that exist are on varieties other than Cusco Quechua (Weber 1986, Floyd 1999) or pan-dialectal studies (Nuckolls 1993). In the following, I will discuss whether these analyses can be applied to Cusco Quechua. My conclusions do not necessarily carry over to other varieties.

An example such as (1a) is usually interpreted to convey both that the speaker has direct evidence for the proposition expressed, *p*, in this case that the speaker saw that Pilar won, as well as that (s)he is convinced that *p* is in fact true.⁴ We therefore have to ask whether or not both these values are lexically encoded by *-mi*. This question has been addressed by Weber (1986) for Huánuco Quechua, by Nuckolls (1993) who proposes an invariant meaning for *-mi* across varieties, and by Floyd (1999) for Wanka Quechua. How each of these researchers answers this question will be discussed in the following.

3.1 *-mi* as an evidential

According to Weber (1986) the basic or invariant meaning of *-mi* in Huánuco Quechua is to indicate that the speaker’s source of information is direct. Weber is of course also aware that sentences with *-mi* convey that the speaker is convinced of the statement’s veracity. In his account, this validational meaning is not directly encoded by *-mi*, but is derived by means of an extralinguistic, cultural axiom that states that one’s own experience is reliable. Having a

reliable source of information in turn leads speakers to believe the proposition expressed. This principle can schematically be stated as (2), where *Direct Evidence(s,p)* means that speaker *s* has direct evidence for the proposition *p*, and *Believe(s,p)* that *s* believes *p*.

(2) *Direct Evidence(s,p) → Believe(s,p)*

The principle in (2) seems intuitively correct. Having direct evidence is usually taken to mean having witnessed the described event *e*, and it is indeed the case that people normally believe what they witness. Having said this, there are some questions regarding the validity of (2) that arise if we think about cases of partial direct evidence or mistaken perception. I will come back to these more philosophical issues below, and concentrate here on the linguistic problems that arise if one attempts to apply Weber's account to Cusco Quechua. The data in (3) show that it is not possible to say that *-mi* marks direct evidence and derive certainty by means of (2).

- (3) a. Paqarin Pilar-qa Qusqu-ta-**n** ri-nqa.
 tomorrow Pilar-TOP Cusco-ACC-**mi** go-3FUT
 'Pilar will go to Cusco tomorrow.'
 EV: Pilar told speaker that she will go to Cusco tomorrow.
 VV: Speaker is certain that Pilar will go to Cusco tomorrow.
- b. Pilar-qa llakiku-n-**mi**.
 Pilar-TOP be-sad-3-**mi**
 'Pilar is sad.' EV: Pilar told speaker that she is sad.
 VV: Speaker is certain that Pilar is sad.

Though the examples in (3) are not typical uses of *-mi*, they are felicitous (cf. Floyd (1999)). It is clear that the speakers of (3) cannot have had direct evidence, if this is understood as witnessed or experienced. In (3a), the described event takes place in the future, in (3b) the internal state of another person is described. Neither of these events can be witnessed. I cannot say whether examples like (3) are felicitous in Huánuco Quechua, but it is clear that Weber's analysis cannot be adopted for Cusco Quechua *-mi*.

3.2 *-mi* as a *validational*

Nuckolls (1993) takes the opposite view. In her account, *-mi* is primarily a *validational*. The evidential meaning usually associated with sentences containing it is implied because it is often the case that one is certain about things that one has experienced. That is, the evidential interpretation arises as a generalization over the most frequent case, which can be represented as (4).

(4) Believe(*s,p*) --> Direct Evidence(*s,p*)

The use of a different arrow here is meant to capture the following difference: For Weber (1986), (2) is an axiom with the inference being one of material implication. However, the implication in (4) is not a material implication—that would clearly be false since there are many cases in which a person is certain without having direct evidence. (4) is perhaps best viewed as an abductive inference based on (2)—though Nuckolls does not talk about it in these terms.

Under Nuckolls' analysis the occurrence of *-mi* in the examples in (3) is expected, since *-mi* only indicates a degree of certainty, and does not require the speaker to have direct evidence. However, this analysis runs into the following problem with the Cusco data: given that *-mi* is a pure validational, it should be licensed regardless of the speaker's type of evidence, i.e. it should be possible to use *-mi* in (1a), for example, even if the speaker has not witnessed Pilar winning—perhaps someone trustworthy witnessed and told the speaker about it. In this situation, however, *-mi* would not be licensed, i.e. being certain that one's source is reliable and having no reason to doubt the report is not enough to license the use of *-mi* (not even if the source is a close family member).

Furthermore, the use of *-mi* in the examples in (3) is also restricted by evidential considerations: they are only felicitous, if Pilar herself told the speaker about her plans and emotions, but not if the speaker obtained this information from someone else.

In order to account for (1a), Nuckolls' account might be modified so as to require that the evidential implication is obligatory for *-mi* in all cases *where possible*. In (1a) it is possible that the speaker has direct evidence for the described event, in (3) however, it is not. This modification of Nuckolls' analysis will however not account for the evidential requirement in (3). Furthermore, this modification is equivalent to making evidentiality a necessary condition for the use of *-mi* in some cases, i.e. a purely validational analysis of *-mi* is not viable either.

3.3 Floyd's prototype account of *-mi*

Floyd (1999) analyzes the evidential enclitics of Wanka Quechua within the framework of cognitive grammar (Langacker 1987) and prototype theory (Rosch 1978). In his analysis, the evidential enclitics constitute radial categories, the meanings of which are represented as semantic nets. Each evidential has a so-called schematic meaning which is a fairly abstract characterization of the invariant meaning present in all its uses. This schema has more or less direct instantiations, one of which is the prototype. For *-mi*,

the schematic meaning is that a relation of certainty holds between a speech act participant and a circumstance in some mental space. The prototypical instantiation of this schema is that a relation of certainty holds between the speaker and a circumstance in the space of reality, where the speaker's certainty is corroborated by direct, visual experience. Simplifying somewhat, we can say that the schematic meaning of *-mi* is *validational*, and its prototypical meaning *evidential*. Floyd's account is not unlike Nuckolls, who, as was shown above, derives the evidential meaning as a generalization over typical cases in which the speaker is certain. However, Floyd differs from Nuckolls in making the evidential meaning of *-mi* a central meaning component of *-mi*.

The examples in (3) illustrate the schematic meaning of *-mi*. In Floyd's words, the speaker "imposes certainty on the scene in the absence of direct evidence". This account faces a similar problem as Nuckolls': there is nothing in Floyd's system that restricts the application of the non-evidential schema in any way, i.e. (1a) for example should be possible if the speaker does not have direct evidence, and simply imposes certainty.

And, although Floyd observes that *-mi* is usually only used in examples like (3) if it was the subject who told the speaker about his or her plans or emotions, this is not a formal requirement. That is, here too, it should be possible to use *-mi*, if the speaker simply wants to express that (s)he is certain. Like Nuckolls' account, Floyd's could be modified so as to make the application of the prototype obligatory whenever possible, but again, this would not account for the evidential requirements of (3).

To summarize, it is clear that an account that claims that *-mi* is a pure evidential indicating direct evidence is too restrictive to capture all uses of *-mi*. However, by analyzing *-mi* as a pure *validational*, or even by allowing purely *validational* uses of *-mi*, one cannot account for the fact that a high degree of certainty is not sufficient to license *-mi* in cases such as (1a) and (3).

4. *-mi* as an 'evidential validational'

In this section, I propose a characterization of the licensing conditions for *-mi*, which maintains Nuckolls' (1993) and Floyd's (1999) insight that *-mi* conveys a high degree of certainty in all its uses, and which furthermore recognizes that evidentiality is not an optional but a necessary licensing factor.

4.1 Relativizing the evidential licensing condition for -mi

In section 2, I pointed out that by postulating purely *validational* uses of *-mi*, both Nuckolls' (1993) and Floyd's (1999) accounts permit *-mi* to be licensed in any sentence by high certainty alone. However, *-mi* is only licensed in

sentences like (1a) and (3), if certain evidential requirements are met. A possible modification of these accounts is to make the implication from certainty to direct evidence in (4), and the application of Floyd's prototype obligatory in all cases where possible. But what exactly does this mean? It means that if it is possible to have direct evidence for the described event *e*, then the speaker is required to have direct evidence in order to use *-mi*. Otherwise, the evidential licensing condition (ELC) is relativized as described in the following. In other words, the ELC is variable relative to the observability of *e*, or, more generally, relative to the type of information conveyed.

This, I will argue, is the key to understanding the licensing conditions for *-mi*, not only in (1a), but also in (3) and other examples. Compare (1a) with the examples in (3). It is possible *in principle* to have direct evidence for the first, but not for the latter, i.e. *winning* is very much an observable event, but *being sad* or *going to Cusco tomorrow* is not — at least not directly. What appears to license *-mi* in (3) is the fact that the speaker has the next best thing to direct evidence, namely the report of Pilar herself, which is a more direct source of information than a report by someone else. Thus, a first approximation to describe the ELC of *-mi* is to say that *-mi* is licensed if the speaker has the most direct source of information possible for the described event. Events cannot only be categorized as observable and not observable, observability is a gradable property. For example, an eating event is probably widely agreed to be fully observable, but the event in *All birds have feathers* is not. A normal person can only observe a limited number of birds and check whether they have feathers. When a speaker uses *-mi* to assert that all birds have feathers, (s)he asserts that (s)he has observed a sufficient number of birds to make that generalization (see also the discussion below on encyclopedic information). Thus, in the case of more or less observable events, *-mi* is licensed when the speaker has observed the event to the required extent. That is, the notion of most direct evidence correlates directly with the degree of observability of the event. But what constitutes the most direct source of information for a non-observable event? In the discussion of the examples in (3), I suggested that the report of the actor of a future action or the experiencer of an emotion is more direct than the report of some other person. To use Garrett's (2001) term, the actor/experiencer of certain events has *privileged access* to that information. For these examples, it is probably also fair to say that the report of the actor/experiencer is more direct than the speaker's inference about that person's plans or emotions. Thus, in the case of an unobservable event, a report by the person with privileged access constitutes the most direct source of information.

However, it is not possible for all unobservable events to identify a person with privileged access. For example, no particular person has privileged access to the information conveyed by *It will rain tomorrow*. Here, *-mi* would for example be licensed if the speaker is an expert in interpreting

meteorological signs, i.e. in this case the speaker's inference constitutes the most direct source of information. More research is needed to determine whether or not it is possible to predict for any type of event what type of source of information is considered the most direct. My hypothesis is that this is not possible, and that determining the most direct source of information for a given event is a highly subjective process. For some events, the most direct source of information might not even be a source of information in the usual sense. For example, it is possible to use *-mi* to express one's belief that God exists as in (5).

- (5) Dius kan-**mi**.
 God be-**mi**
 'God exists.' EV: ?
 VV: Speaker is certain that God exists.

For religious beliefs, there is no "most direct source" other than the speaker's belief.

4.2 *Most direct source of information and validation*

Given this relative conception of the ELC of *-mi* as indicating that the speaker has the most direct source of information possible for the event described, one might think that the validation licensing condition (VLC) that the speaker be certain that *p* is true, can be derived via the modified version of Weber's (1986) axiom in (6).

- (6) MostDirectEvidence(*s,p*) → Believe(*s,p*)

However, (6) is not a valid inference, because for unobservable events it is not the case that when one has the most direct source of evidence, one is always or even in the majority of cases convinced that one's statement is true. Consider again the examples in (3). As was argued above, a report from Pilar constitutes the most direct source of information, since she is the person having privileged access. However, the speaker might know from previous experience that she is likely to change her plans, and will therefore not be certain *p* is true.

Not only is the inference in (6) invalid, the speaker could not use *-mi* in the described situation. Instead, *-si* would have to be used, which as indicated in (1b) is validationally neutral. This clearly shows that the indication of a high degree of certainty is an integral component of the meaning of *-mi*, which cannot be derived from its evidential meaning by means of an axiom such as (6). This conclusion is furthermore supported by considering examples of

partial or mistaken perception. Consider for example the case in which the speaker sees a person approaching in the fog, witnesses a magic trick or is presented with an optical illusion. In all these cases, the speaker has direct evidence in the literal sense, but the evidence is partial or misleading. Now, *-mi* can only be used to describe what the speaker sees in these cases, if (s)he is actually convinced that what (s)he see corresponds to reality. Thus, if the speaker thinks that the person approaching in the fog is Pilar, but has some doubts because of the fuzzy view, (s)he cannot use *-mi*. Similarly, if the speaker has seen the magic trick before and knows that what (s)he sees only appears to be one thing, but in reality is something else, *-mi* is not licensed. Likewise, if the speaker knows that an optical illusion is only an illusion. If *-mi* were a marker for direct evidence only, one would expect that it can be used even in these cases.⁵

4.3 Further observations in support of the evidential nature of *-mi*

In the previous section I have argued that evidentiality is a necessary meaning component of *-mi*, by showing that a purely validational analysis cannot account for the data. Here, I would like to make two further observations which support this claim.

The first observation is based on the comparison of sentences with *-mi* and the same sentences without an evidential enclitic. Consider the examples in (7a)(=1a) and (7b).

- (7) a. Pilar-**mi** llalli-rqa-n.
 Pilar-**mi** win-PST-3
 ‘Pilar won.’ EV: Speaker saw that Pilar won.
 VV: Speaker is certain that Pilar won.
- b. Pilar llalli-rqa-n.
 Pilar win-PST-3
 ‘Pilar won.’ EV: Speaker saw that Pilar won.
 VV: Speaker is certain that Pilar won.

As indicated, the EV and VV of the two sentences are identical. So, what is the difference between the two? In my fieldwork I found that *-mi* is in normal conversation primarily used in situations of real or anticipated argument, i.e. in situations in which the speaker wants to make a particular strong point. My consultants observe that (7a) is more emphatic than (7b). This observation supports primarily the claim that *-mi* indicates a high degree of certainty. Further comparison of examples with and without *-mi*, however, supports the claim that *-mi* is evidential. Floyd (1994) observes for Wanka Quechua that

reportative information is often conveyed without using an overt reportative marker, and the sentence is nevertheless understood to be reportative. The same is true for Cusco Quechua, as the following example shows. In a conversation among friends, a woman is telling the story of a co-worker whose tricycle was stolen, but who in the end found it again. Most of the story is told with the reportative *-si*, but (8)⁶, which is part of the story, does not contain any evidential marker.

- (8) ... ichaqa triciclu-n-ta-qa tarirakapu-n.
 ... but tricycle-3POSS-ACC-TOP find-3
 ‘... but he found his tricycle.’

Thus, the context can override the EV of sentences without an evidential. Out of context, (8) would, like (7b), be interpreted to mean that the speaker witnessed *e*. In the context of the story, however, it is clear that the speaker has reportative information for (8). This suggests that sentences without an evidential only implicate the same value as the same sentences with *-mi*. It is important to note is that the EV of sentences containing *-mi* cannot be overridden in the same way. Thus, *-mi* lexically specifies its evidential value.

A further observation in support of the evidentiality of *-mi* is the following. As mentioned briefly, Quechua has a suffix *-puni* which in one of its uses is a pure validational, meaning more or less *definitely, certainly*.⁷ As shown in example (9) *-puni* can co-occur with the evidential enclitics (often even on the same word).

- (9) Papa-ta-n/-s/-chá wayk'u-nqa-puni.
 Potato-ACC-**mi/-si/chá** cook-3FUT-**puni**
 ‘(s)he will definitely cook potatoes.’
 EV: Speaker was told by the actor/ actor or someone else/speaker
 conjectures that (s)he will cook potatoes.
 VV: Speaker is certain that (s)he will cook potatoes.

Assuming a templatic morphology for Quechua (Cusihuaman 1976, Cerrón-Palomino 1987), *-mi*, *-si*, and *-chá* compete for the same morphological slot, and can therefore not attach to the same word. But if *-mi* were a pure validational, it should be possible to have both *-mi* and *-si* or *-chá* in the same sentence. This is however not possible, witness (10).

- (10) *Papa-ta-s wayk'u-nqa-n.

The ungrammaticality of (10) is expected if *-mi* is evidential, because a sentence can only have a single evidential value.⁸

To summarize briefly, I have argued that there are two necessary licensing conditions for *-mi*: (i) the speaker has to have the most direct source of information possible for the event described, and (ii) the speaker has to be convinced that the proposition expressed is true. However, this is not yet the whole story. There are plenty of examples in which *-mi* is used without the speaker having the most direct source possible. One class of examples fits into the general picture painted in the preceding sections that relativizes the ELC of *-mi*. A second class of examples involves sentences containing both *-mi* and the evidential past tense marker *-sqa*. I will not discuss the interaction of *-mi* with *-sqa*, but see Faller (2002) for a discussion of this issue.

4.4 *Personal vs. Encyclopedic Information*

Most of the examples discussed so far fall under what I will call *personal information*. By that I mean information pertaining to the speaker's personal life and environment. I contrast this with *encyclopedic information*, which includes knowledge that is taken for granted within a culture (Givón 1982), and knowledge that is typically taught in school or found in encyclopedias. While there is no clear-cut categorical distinction between these two types of information, to make such a distinction is nevertheless useful in talking about the meaning of *-mi*. Consider the examples in (11).

- (11) a. Yunka-pi-**n** k'usillu-kuna-qa ka-n.
rainforest-LOC-**mi** monkey-PL-TOP be-3SG
'There are monkeys in the rainforest.'
- b. 1945 wata-pi-**n** segunda guerra mundial-qa tuku-rqa-n.
1945 year-LOC-**mi** second war worldwide-TOP end-PST-3
'World War II ended in 1945.'

That there are monkeys in the rainforest can be considered a fact of Quechua culture, even for a Quechua speaker from the highlands, and that World War II ended in 1945 is something a Quechua speaker might have learnt in school, read in an encyclopedia, heard on the radio etc. According to the current characterization of the ELC, *-mi* should only be licensed in (11) if the speaker has seen monkeys in the rainforest or was personally involved in the war, as that would constitute the most direct evidence for the described events. However, the examples in (11) are perfectly acceptable, even if the speaker cannot claim such a direct source.

Thus, for encyclopedic information, the most direct evidence condition for *-mi* is suspended. The VLC, however, remains the same. Does that mean that *-mi* is a pure validational when used to convey encyclopedic information? I would like to suggest that this is not the case, because there is still an evidential

component to the use of *-mi* even in these examples: the speaker has to have obtained the information from a source of *authority*. This might appear to be a circular argument, as I defined encyclopedic information as information which was learnt in school etc., i.e. as information that is normally acquired from authorities. However, this kind of information might also be obtained from a non-authoritative source, in which case *-mi* would not be licensed. In addition to having obtained the information from an authority, the speakers of (11) must also have assimilated the conveyed information, i.e. (s)he must be able to relate these facts to other relevant facts. It would be very strange for someone to utter (11b) and not be able to also say for example when World War II started.⁹

That the licensing conditions for *-mi* should be different for personal and encyclopedic information is not very surprising, given the different ways in which these types are usually acquired: personal information through personal experience, and encyclopedic information through the teachings of knowledgeable people. Furthermore, speakers are not normally *expected* to have obtained encyclopedic information directly. The common requirement for the use of *-mi* with these two types of information might be said to be the requirement that the speaker have strong evidence, where this requirement is met for personal information if the speaker has the most direct source possible for the described event, and for encyclopedic information if the speaker has obtained the information conveyed from a source of authority.

5. Conclusion

In this paper, I have argued that it is not possible to analyze the Cusco Quechua enclitic *-mi* as either a pure evidential or a pure validational. The licensing conditions for *-mi* make reference to both validational and evidential notions. With respect to the ELC, it is however too simplistic to identify it with direct evidence. Rather, it should be considered a condition that is relativized to the type of event (observability) and to the type of information (personal vs. encyclopedic) conveyed. This account of *-mi* raises a number of further research questions both for the study of Quechua as well as for the development of a cross-linguistic theory of evidentiality, some of which I will bring up here.

As pointed out, the full meaning of *-mi* can only be understood within the context of the entire evidential system of Quechua. That is, more research is needed on the other (alleged) evidentials, in particular on their validational meaning aspects. Such research is already in progress: Floyd (1999) also discusses the enclitics *-si* and *-chá* for Wanka Quechua within the framework of prototype theory, and Faller (2002) discusses the corresponding enclitics as well as the evidential past tense morpheme *-sqa* for Cusco Quechua. It is also important to investigate both for Quechua and other languages in more detail

the use of purely validational markers such as *-puni*, and how they interact with evidentials.

The main claim of this paper is that the ELC of *-mi* is variable relative to the type of information conveyed, which allows it to be used also for knowledge that Givón (1982) identifies as the “shared knowledge of the universe as coded in the lexicon”. According to Givón, this type of knowledge does not require evidentiary justification because it is not obtained via evidence but by definition. Given that Quechua *-mi* is possible in these cases, it is a reasonable hypothesis that so-called direct evidentials of other languages can also be used for this type of knowledge. One candidate is the Colombian language Tuyuca as described by Barnes (1984), which has a so-called visual evidential. Despite its name, this evidential can also be used for what Barnes calls time-less expressions that fall within the speakers experience, e.g. *She is named Ana* and *We call them woodpeckers*. If it turns out that the Quechua range of meanings associated with the direct evidential enclitic is not an exception but the rule, we will have to reconsider the standard conception of direct sources of information as necessarily involving perception.

Notes

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¹ The data presented in this paper were collected by the author in Cusco, Peru. Many of the examples have been elicited, and all have been checked repeatedly with several native speakers for their grammaticality and pragmatic felicity in given contexts.

² The past tense morpheme *-rqa* has also been claimed to be evidential in nature, marking the evidential value *experienced* (Cusihuaman 1976, Cerrón-Palomino 1994). However, I argue elsewhere (Faller 1999, Faller 2002) that *-rqa* is unmarked for evidentiality.

³ I do not translate the evidential and validational values of the examples in the glosses, but separate them as EV and VV. See Faller (2002) for a discussion of the EV and VV associated with *-si* and *-chá*. Other abbreviations used: 3: 3rd person, 3FUT: 3rd person future, 3POSS: third person possessive, ACC: accusative case, LOC: locative, PL: plural, PST: past tense, TOP: topic.

⁴ Throughout the text, I use *'p'* to stand for the proposition expressed, and *'e'* to stand for the event variable in *p*. I use the term *event* in a fairly loose way, including both events and states.

⁵ This kind of example raises a number of questions concerning belief formation and revision, and how exactly the evidence at hand interacts with previous beliefs and experiences. These issues, and the related question of whether we ever have full evidence for anything do not belong into the field of linguistics, but philosophy and psychology. But it would be interesting to study how evidentials are used in statements that the speaker presents as belief revisions.

⁶ The example in (8) is not marked for tense, which is usually interpreted as present tense, but which is often also used for past events. It is not clear to me whether this use is equivalent to the historical present in other languages, or whether perhaps the unmarked form is

underspecified for a tense value, with present tense being the default value. The internal make-up of the main verb is more complex than glossed: the root is *tari-*, and it has several derivational morphemes attached to it.

⁷ *-puni* is also a quantifier, meaning *always*, as in *Pilar hamunpuni*—*Pilar always comes*. When attached to proper names it means *-self*, as in *Pilarpuni rirqan*—*Pilar herself went* (Cusihuaman 1976).

⁸ An alternative explanation is to say that (10) is ungrammatical because both *-mi* and *-si* are focus markers. I cannot refute this hypothesis at this point, because too little is known about information packaging in Quechua. Note also that the fact that *-mi*, *-si*, and *-chá* occupy the same morphological slot, is *not* an argument in favor of analyzing *-mi* as an evidential. This slot is the so-called focus slot, and is occupied also by other, non-evidential enclitics (Cusihuaman 1976).

⁹ The concept of assimilation has been brought into the discussion of evidentiality by Aksu-Koç and Slobin (1986) for Turkish. A discussion of its relevance for the analysis of evidentiality in Quechua lies outside the scope of this paper.

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