SOCIAL HOUSING IN POST-WAR MANCHESTER: CHANGE AND CONTINUITY.
Context

- National framework – legislation and economy
- Inter-war period surveys
- Slumland – private and municipal
- Overcrowding, dampness, leaking roofs, broken doors and windows, crumbling plaster work, rats and beetles
- Poor sanitation – lack of water supply, shared toilets
- Shame and stigma
Post-war challenges

- Bomb damage, slums, growing demand
- Land-trap
- Overspill – Langley, Hattersley, etc
- Resistance from other local authorities
- Limited expansion – barriers
- Socio-cultural opposition – stigma
Housing policy was industrial scale
Problems and pressures were mounting
Solutions were industrial
Policies reinforced social division
Estates and the ‘inner city’ – residualization
New inner city, monolithic structures
Presented as an extension of civic pride – modernism, clean, new, communal.
Beswick, Harpurhey, Ardwick
Hulme – the new Bath
The New Slums

- ‘Fort Beswick’ - Poor design, cost cutting, rapid decay, dampness, vandalism, noise and condensation
- Hulme Crescents- broken lifts, which also suffered from poor lighting, the pungent smell of urine, inadequate refuse disposal, rubbish left rotting on landings, excrement, noise
- Bloomsbury to Colditz
- Economic crisis, moratorium, financial crisis
- New slums for old - demolition
never had dis problem in Saigon’ screamed the graffiti. The blood red letters were splashed across a metal door panel in William Kent Crescent in Hulme. The warzone imagery is everywhere. On William Kent Crescent, named after the great architect, a broken washing machine blocks the first floor walkway like some discarded military hardware. The ‘streets in the sky’ walkways are minefields of dog excrement decomposing under spadefuls of treated council sand.
Economy – housing policy determined by the national economy.

National legislation provides a framework which determines the shape of policy, but local problems, challenges and issues provided a series of obstacles.

Housing policy was always a top-down process. Tenants were recipients.

Policy was ‘area’ driven.’ The choices made resulted in a new type of Slumland – the inner city estate. Culturally as well as spatially, the ‘inner city’ replaced the ‘slum.’

A process of residualization was reinforced by policy.

Until the early 1990s, at no stage were people empowered with choice or involvement in the decision-making process.

No alternatives to the industrial scale, area approach.

Housing policy reinforced social exclusion.
Social Housing in Post-war Manchester: Change and Continuity.

**Introduction**

What I want to do today is revisit research on housing policy in post-war Manchester by considering the broader implications and assumptions underpinning those policies. Although there was obvious change, physical and environmental change, the opportunity to link this to lasting social change was lost. Municipal housing promised to sweep away the old slums but the local authority faced a series of barriers. Legislation, economic performance, local barriers like the land-trap as well as the sheer scale of the housing crisis provided a number of complex challenges. On one level, their efforts can be applauded. Slums were cleared and Manchester managed to curtail the high rise horror that proved a disaster for other cities. Yet, on another level, in the end municipal housing policies re-created the same problems which they had inherited. They built estates, cleared entire areas and, in central areas, redeveloped old slum areas. They used new modern designs and building techniques. However, many of these were not only wasteful, unattractive, badly designed and deeply unpopular but they reinforced social segregation. The buildings changed but the social problems and cultural perceptions remained. Although economic problems and changes underpinned the process, housing policy did nothing to challenge the social divide. Rather, it combined with the social and economic issues to reinforce resident isolation.

This paper will consider public housing policy across the post-war period. It will look at the problems faced by the local authority, their attempts to frame the building programme as an extension of civic pride and the reality which soon unfolded as the ‘inner city’ replaced ‘Slumland.’ It will consider the process the underlying assumptions behind that process.

**Context**

There isn’t time to give too much detail, but the first thing to remember is that social housing developed against a backdrop of shifting national economic fortunes and national legislation, from 1919 and the subsequent scaling back of the home for heroes programme, through to economic decline and the 1980 moratorium on house building, local authority housing policies have been framed by forces outside their control. But they still retained some room for creating and managing policy.

Now, in order to understand the impact of social housing programmes in the post-war period, we need to consider the old Slumland. A number of surveys were carried out by the
University and voluntary groups during the inter-war period. Conditions in Chorlton-on-Medlock were replicated in other surveys across the city. In 1931, the Manchester and Salford Better Housing Council investigated Angel Meadow. They described the entire district as being unfit for habitation, that it was so bad that “no blade of grass exists in the whole area,” and that all the houses suffered from dampness, leaking roofs, crumbling plaster work, badly fitted doors and another army of rats and beetles. Some of the most dire conditions were in rooms let as furnished. These were characterised by drab walls, broken plaster, dark stairs, broken or cordless windows, absence of any water supply (except for a tap in the yard), and water-closets shared between four or five families (in one case two between well over 30 people). It reflected conditions across urban Britain. The Manchester University Settlement survey of the New Cross district of Ancoats revealed a similarly grim picture in which “almost all houses were worn out completely,” lacking basic amenities for food storage or even for washing. Despite some Council improvements in the late-nineteenth century, the fact remained that “they scarcely achieved redemption.” Slums had not been removed; they had merely been patched up. The entire area remained “sordid and ugly,” and over a quarter was still officially designated as overcrowded. The University Settlement carried out research into the city’s tenement blocks. Municipal schemes were seen as dour, ugly and featureless and privately owned schemes were even worse. One block in Ancoats was described as being of “unparalleled hideousness.” Life for the tenants was “reduced to a dull dead level from which much of the spring and interest in life has gone,” a life “without a vestige of beauty, with little privacy and constant noise.” Tenants felt stigmatised at living in the tenement blocks where they felt “oppressed by their grim aspect.” One claimed that, “this place feels like a prison…every time I turn into it I feel ashamed; it looks such a dreadful-looking place...you’ve no heart for your work here.” Many were afraid to let their employers know where they lived and felt shame at the prospect of showing their home to relatives and friends.

So, tenants, some of the poorest, in the inter-war period felt stigmatised by their homes, whether private-rented or municipal-social housing. Now, the progressive members of Manchester city council had a grand plan. There were attempts by the council to build new, quality cottages to meet general needs. Influenced by Howard and the garden city movement, Lord Simon led the campaign to build a new satellite town in Wythenshawe, a town which would be laid out to high standards and which would include quality cottages. Despite tenants expressing concern about moving to Wythenshawe, the Better Housing Council found that 90
per cent of tenants were generally satisfied with their houses. Many felt there had been a marked improvement in health and enthusiasm was expressed for the houses, gardens, fresh air, and the “country surroundings of the estate.” However, up to this point, nearly all the residents were from the more affluent working classes. Policy did not challenge social divisions. Even here, it was reinforcing them. You take an ‘area’ and you build in that ‘area’ largely for a particular social group. The housing market created and reinforced social division. Council policies, effectively, did the same thing.

**Post-war- challenges and change**

Now, Manchester’s immediate priority after the war was to provide homes for those displaced by bombing raids. In November 1944, the Housing Committee agreed to build 3,000 temporary homes. The real problem, however, was far greater. The 1942 Housing Committee Report estimated that 68,837 houses were needed to slums while a total of 76,272 houses were needed in the long-term to meet increasing demand.

Large-scale re-development could not be achieved within the existing city boundaries. The land trap pushed the council into looking for land outside the city boundaries to build overspill estates. Estates were built in several surrounding areas. They included the largest at Langley near Middleton, which was started in 1953 and which eventually had 4,500 new homes. Initially, the Council had bought land on the Bowlee Estate in 1937. However, the council’s aims were constantly frustrated by other local authorities. Their problems were illustrated with their plans to build large estates at Mobberley, Knutsford and Hattersley (all in Cheshire), and Westhoughton in Lancashire. Small-scale developments had been built around the outskirts of the city, but officials were still insisting that they needed one or two larger developments. They were continually frustrated in Cheshire and areas like Westhoughton, where they continual resistance.

Although rarely stated in public, the fact was that people did not relish the thought of having thousands of inner city slum dwellers dumped on their doorsteps. There was an undercurrent of feeling against slum dwellers that had echoes of the pre-war perceptions of them as socially inferior and even a little dangerous. They were often described by anti-overspill protestors as ‘immigrants.’ Objectors in Cheshire, for example, were deeply worried about the “immigration” of 80,000 Mancunians. *Cheshire Life* bemoaned the fact that in Partington, near Lymm, Manchester had “unloaded a large alien community on to a hostile
countryside,” leading to an increase in the crime rate.\textsuperscript{xiv} Similarly, Cheshire resident Morton Forrest claimed that a projected “immigration of 80,000” would destroy the county’s contribution to the nations food supplies and would strike at the roots of “England’s heritage, the land and its people.”\textsuperscript{xv} There was a similar response from residents in Marple. Over 2,500 signed a petition in protest against a scheme to build 400 houses. Members of the Petitioners Committee exclaimed that tenants should “go elsewhere,” and that “the place would be ruined.”\textsuperscript{xvi} Slum dwellers were associated with trouble, with lower standards, and, if they were being honest, most people did-not want them living in their backyards. When the Hattersley plans were announced the Mayor of Hyde was so worried that he hoped to “make them into good citizens before they come to Hyde”\textsuperscript{xvii} In the south of the city, Councillor Frank Hatton reacted angrily when, after the completion of one estate in Sale, existing residents were given a large £10 reduction on the gross rateable value of their homes because it was felt they were so close to the overspill estate that their sale price had been significantly reduced. He claimed that this obviously suggested that the tenants were “inferior because they happen to live in a different type of house.”\textsuperscript{xviii} Alderman Elizabeth Yarwood added that this was a deplorable situation because it “stigmatised council tenants.”\textsuperscript{xix} Stigmatisation was a serious problem. Slum dwellers still carried connotations of crime and grime. They were associated with their physical environment. These had been embedded in many depictions of slum life since the Victorian period. Residents in some of the reception districts were filled with a sense of dread at the influx of slum dwellers. A group of homeowners in Bredbury Green cut themselves off from their overspill neighbours by building a six-foot ‘iron curtain’ between themselves and the council houses.

**Slum clearance and System built designs**

Socio-cultural reactions underlined the divisions and prejudice towards residents from slum areas. The problem was that local authority policies, and attitudes, failed to challenge these perceptions and divisions. If anything, they reinforced the common assessment. There was no thought of mixed tenure or phased redevelopment. Of course, people lived in slum areas because the housing market was shaped, historically, by how much people could afford. This determined the area and the type of home in which they could live. ‘How much’ was determined by their position in the job market. Housing was shaped by economic structures. Yet, municipal housing was meant to challenge the dominance of the market by providing affordable subsidised homes which, by-and-large, it did. However, it didn’t break down the class barriers. If you like, their management of urban space reinforced divisions.
Now, in many respects, the local authority was hamstrung by circumstances, by national policy, legislation, the economy and, as I’ve said, by geographical and political barriers. Although they did build a number of overspill estates, they were also limited. The scale of the problem remained huge and it demanded an industrial scale response. The slums, finally, had to be cleared and replaced. Post war slum clearance effectively began in Manchester from 1954. Although an estimated 70,000 houses were declared unfit for human habitation in 1955, the five-year slum clearance programme planned to demolish only 7,500 houses. By 1960, their completion rate had dropped below 1,000 homes per year. In 1961, the Council attempted to address the problem with a radical new plan. They announced a £21 million programme, aimed at building nearly 10,000 new homes over four-years. The programme was to continue increasing until they were building 4,000 a year. Completions had declined during 1953-1960, from 2,634 a year to only 954. This was crippling the slum clearance programme. Now, the plan was to increase completions and, in so doing, drastically increase slum clearance. By 1962, both the Council and government had agreed to clear and build 4,000 houses a year.

Again, this was a top-down, industrial scale process, but it was also a process that reinforced social residualization. Low grade housing, inhabited by low-income groups, were replaced by, well, low grade homes, lumped together and inhabited by low income groups. Broader economic changes pushed skilled and other aspirational workers out of the city. Housing policy did not attempt to attract anyone back. It only served to provide homes for those left behind, those unwanted by other local authorities.

Both Conservative and Labour governments came to view the modern solutions of tower blocks and system built designs as offering a quick and affordable solution to the continuing problems of inner city slums. Many designers had promoted new modern ideas from the late-1940s. Both governments actively promoted industrialised systems. Even housing subsidies favoured the new large scale building techniques. Led by Austen Bent and his team of architects and designers, together with J.S. Millar, who was appointed City Planning Officer in 1966, the Council was pressed towards using modern designs, especially the deck-access system. Bent’s Chief Assistant Architect, Robert Stones, was responsible for one of the first schemes built at Gibson Street in Longsight by Bison (Concrete Northern) in 1968. The pessimism about clearance and completion rates of the early-1960s was gradually replaced by a bold optimism. Hulme was going to be the jewel in the council crown. The area was in desperate need of redevelopment. By 1962 the Council was at last ready to unveil its
vision for a better and brighter Hulme. Further plans continued to be announced into 1964. The total cost of the development increased to £20 million. In total, there were five phases to the entire development of Hulme. Lord Mayor Dr. W. Chadwick opened the first block with a golden key, proudly claiming that while earlier blocks of flats were monstrosities to be ashamed of, the new blocks had improved beyond all recognition.xxv The entire programme was so vast it was to take seven years to complete.

While it was admitted that this scheme would be more economical in building costs and would allow for greater densities, it was also optimistically hoped that it would provide social advantages, including “greater choice of friends amongst neighbours,” whilst also giving elderly people the advantage of “easy contact with the passing world.”xxvi It was claimed that they were using Georgian planning method, though in reality they were using Scandinavian style industrial building techniques.xxvii The architects maintained that the plans would achieve a solution to the problems of twentieth century living, which they believed would be the “equivalent in quality of that reached for the requirements of the eighteenth century in Bloomsbury or Bath.”xxviii Growing confidence snowballed throughout 1965, reaching a new climax in October with the announcement that the Council was to build four multi-deck blocks of flats. The plans for Hulme V were outlined by the Manchester Evening News under the wildly optimistic headline ‘A Touch of Bloomsbury.’ The report could not conceal its enthusiasm for what it believed to be a new and exciting programme. It claimed that of all the redevelopment schemes designed to rejuvenate modern Britain, Manchester’s £20 million plan for Hulme “stands out boldly.” It was described as “unique” and as a “fascinating concept that should make proud not only the planners but the citizens.” The design for a thousand maisonettes in long curved terraces would give a “touch of eighteenth century grace and dignity” to municipal housing, and they believed that the plans were not only realistic but that they also showed “both imagination and common sense in planning homes.”xxix Even The Guardian applauded the promise that there would be “no tower block”, just “Georgian elegance.”xxx The old 300 acre mess was now replaced by a development scheme of “superlatives,” the biggest of its kind in Europe and by far the “most imaginative housing project in the city, many will say the most imaginative city scheme in the country.”xxxi Similarly, the Manchester Evening News could not hide its enthusiasm for the mixture of Georgian elegance and ultra modern design. It described how the Regency style terraces being built by the Council would eventually look just as good in their twentieth century fashion as the terraces of Bath and Bloomsbury.xxxii
The final cost of the Crescents was estimated at £4 million and the final topping out ceremony took place on 14 January 1971. Hulme and Beswick were not the only areas to benefit from the new designs. Two other large deck access developments were built at Coverdale Crescent in Ardwick and Turkey Lane in Harpurhey. Bison Concrete gained a strong reputation throughout the 1960s, winning the Queen’s Award for industry. Its chairman, Sir Kenneth Wood, became adviser to the Ministry of Housing in 1966.

**Failures – the New Slums**

The reality soon emerged. The new developments became new slums. They concentrated poorer residents into what rapidly became the ugliest and most defective housing units in the city. Beswick was to become one of the most notorious of all redevelopment programmes. Poor design and cost cutting at the Wellington Street flats led to early decay, dampness, vandalism, noise and condensation. At first, the Council blamed bad tenants, the government ignored the problem and Bison simply chose to keep quiet. In Hulme, after only four years of the completion of the Crescents, tenants were demanding to be re-housed. Problems included broken lifts, which also suffered from poor lighting and the pungent smell of urine, inadequate refuse disposal (with rubbish left rotting on landings), litter, excrement, noise and vandalism. In 1973, Bernard Spilsbury described how conditions were so bad that tenants had told him bluntly that they preferred the old slums.**xxxiii** Spilsbury described the scene with litter, broken glass, piles of excreta and lifts used as toilets. In 1978, only a few years after trumpeting the Hulme Crescents as the new Bath, the *Manchester Evening News* labelled them as the new “Colditz.”**xxxiv** By the late-1970s, it was clear that the flats had a number of serious structural faults. Problems had started to arise at the Turkey Lane development in Harpurhey only six years after its completion in 1973. The cost of demolition and replacement was put at £20-22 million, rising to £35-40 million in four years. Nevertheless, in 1981 a Joint Report of the City Architect, City Treasurer and Director of Housing to the Housing Committee phased demolition of Fort Beswick was finally recommended. It was a bitter pill to swallow. Millions of pounds had been pumped into the development, but they realised that spending money on continued maintenance would be even more wasteful.**xxxv**

The problems were compounded by two political and economic problems. First, the city was plunged into recession. Traditional industries, such as engineering, had collapsed and unemployment increased. Second, just as the Council needed more resources to help it cope, the new government decided to impose financial constraints on all spending and to introduce a moratorium on new building. They were soon forced to face up to political and economic
realities. The Thatcher cut backs were staring to bite. Financial problems and mounting costs were threatening to cripple the Council. The situation was so dire that, although some homes had new windows fitted, they could not afford to paint them. The housing situation throughout the 1980s was always at crisis point. Manchester Council’s compiled a dossier of major structural faults affecting flats across the city and published their own booklet, *Housing Defects in Manchester*, in which they claimed that faults were running right through the stock - deck access, tower blocks, post war maisonettes and traditional style housing. In many cases, cracks had started to appear in the concrete coverings posing a real danger of pieces breaking off and falling to the ground. Steel links were rusting and cracks were appearing in the concrete. Vandalism on some of the balconies had exposed asbestos. Loose pieces fell onto the decks below the balconies. Asbestos cement panels had been used throughout the Crescents. Structural problems with four-storey balcony access maisonettes on twelve sites around the city were so bad that they decided to start offering tenants voluntary transfers. The scale of human misery was underlined in 1985 in *The Guardian* by Michele Hanson. By now, Beswick had become a “desolate looking place.” The problems that had been highlighted in 1981 were multiplied by the fact this was a condemned estate and, therefore, had no money spent on it for repairs, even though it would still have tenants living in it until the final stage of demolition. Hanson claimed that the decision to demolish the flats “was only the beginning of a whole new crop of horrors for tenants.” Over the following years the estate deteriorated rapidly. Lighting, heating, plumbing and general repairs were ignored. Gypsies were blamed for stealing pipes, tanks and fittings. The lifts were either broken or “full of drunks, vomit and excrement (human and dog).” Drug addicts and prostitutes moved into the empty flats. With echoes of the reports in the 1930s, one family she interviewed stopped asking friends and family to visit because they were too embarrassed. Their flat was plagued by “cockroaches, maggots, bugs and fleas.” In 1985, the *Manchester Evening News* published a full-length report on the awfulness of Hulme. They detailed the “horrors of the concrete jungle,” and how the heady dreams of the 1960s had “turned into a human nightmare.” The whole area was a “housing disaster” that had entered the mythology of post-war planning. They detailed the complaints of damp condensation, fungus on the walls, poor ventilation, vermin, cockroaches, shoddy workmanship, serious structural faults, crumbling concrete panels, cracked walkways and rotting window frames. The report described:
‘I never had dis problem in Saigon’ screamed the graffiti. The blood red letters were splashed across a metal door panel in William Kent Crescent in Hulme. The warzone imagery is everywhere. On William Kent Crescent, named after the great architect, a broken washing machine blocks the first floor walkway like some discarded military hardware. The ‘streets in the sky’ walkways are minefields of dog excrement decomposing under spadefuls of treated council sand.

Economic problems continued to restrict their scope for action. But this ignores the underlying problem with post-war housing policy. Choices were made which reinforced social division. Inner city programmes consisted of large modern often monolithic structures which were designed to house the poorest members of the community. They actually reinforced the process of residualization. The old slum dwellers became the new inner city tenant, the new slum dwellers.

**Conclusion: Issues to consider**

Manchester’s housing policies, although specific in detail to the area, reflected broader problems effecting social housing across the twentieth century. They were not, I should stress, unique to Manchester. The story of social housing in the city is illustrative of the broader national picture. Key points:

1. Economy – housing policy determined by the national economy. Other welfare policies suffer in times of economic down turn, but not to the same extent as housing. NHS cuts are never the same as social housing moratoriums
2. National legislation provides a framework which determines the shape of policy, but local problems, challenges and issues provided a series of obstacles.
3. Housing policy was always a top-down process. Tenants were and remain recipients. They never command the same position as someone able to buy their own home.
4. Policy was ‘area’ driven.’ Large areas were cleared and developed over a number of years. The choices made (design, standards etc) resulted in a new type of Slumland – the inner city estate. The same negative language, depictions and perceptions (reflected in the press) that were used to describe the old slums were then used for the new estates. Culturally as well as spatially,, the ‘inner city’ replaced the ‘slum.’
5. A process of residualization was reinforced by policy. The old slum dwellers became the problem families. The new inner city estates became their dumping grounds. Those with the jobs and resources could leave social housing to purchase their own homes. Those who remained tended to be low income groups (unemployed, reliance on benefits, elderly, single parents, low skilled workers). It was a process linked to
long-term economic decline, but one which became concentrated, but not exclusive
to, certain areas. Deprivation was as concentrated as it ever had been.

6. Until the early 1990s, at no stage were people empowered with choice or involvement
in the decision-making process. Even then, with the City Challenge, it was limited. At
no stage were alternative models used which might empower tenants – only limited
use of, for e.g. housing co-operatives. At no stage was the idea of phased
redevelopment possible (because of the size and scale of the problem and the limited
periods in which building was affordable). At no stage was mixed tenure considered.
Housing policy reinforced social exclusion.

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i Women were again prominent amongst the serving officers, with D.L. Pilkington acting as Honorary Treasurer and A. Trench as the Honorary Secretary.

ii Manchester and Salford Better Housing Council, Report of a survey undertaken in part of St. Michael’s and Collegiate Wards of the city of Manchester, the Red Bank Survey Group, 1931.

iii Manchester and Salford Better Housing Council, Report of a survey undertaken in part of St. Michael’s and Collegiate Wards of the city of Manchester, the Red Bank Survey Group, 1931.


vii Manchester and District Regional Survey Society No. 12, ‘Some Social Aspects of Pre-War Tenements and of Post-War Flats,’ Manchester University Settlement 1932.


ix See Miles Glendinning and Stefan Muthesius, Tower Block: Modern public housing in England, Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, New Haven, 1994, p. 158.

x Housing Committee Report to City Council 1942, p. 533.

xi Housing Committee minutes, 8 May 1937.

xii The Times, 20 February 1963.

xiii The Times, January 13, 1954.