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Networking Democracy: IT and Radical InfrastructuresDrew WhitworthPage 1 ¦ Page 2 ¦ Page 3 ¦ Page 4 ¦ Printer-friendly version IntroductionIt is now a generally accepted position in social science that artefacts have politics [1]. However, although this might seem obvious, we cannot forget that artefacts are inanimate, and whatever politics they have are there because they have been encoded into them by their designers and users. It seems fair to state, then, that technologies may take different forms depending on the assumptions and motivations which drove their creation. The aim of this paper is to explore a particular conception of democracy; one that emphasises individual activism aimed at building what have been called radical infrastructures. It identifies certain points, particularly in the 1970s, at which the emerging Internet absorbed relatively democratic values, which remain in place today. However, I also suggest that despite these democratic moments, the IT community as a whole has not generally helped with the construction of radical infrastructures. I therefore explore why this might be before offering some very tentative solutions (here see also this month's other feature essay and the links page). Democracy from the participants' perspectiveFor a long period, ending roughly in the 1960s, democratic theory adopted a ‘top-down’ approach, epitomised by theorists such as Michels and Schumpeter [2]. Their interest lay with large and essentially stable state institutions, self-perpetuating elites, and a highly limited definition of participation which effectively reduced legitimate political action to the vote. Other political activities, such as social movements, were either ignored or considered interruptions into the otherwise stable world of states and other large bureaucratic organisations which were the de facto solution to the problem of political organisation. In the 1960s, however, these assumptions were directly challenged via both theory and practice. These new politics were based around processes of free and fair deliberation, active citizenship, and a broad-ranging critique of existing values. The moral cores of democracy -— autonomy and self-motivated participation -- were reasserted through social movements and the small, micropolitical groups and organisations of which they were constituted [3]. The object of interest was no longer what political actors ought to be doing to maintain the stability of large bureaucratic organisations, but what they were actually doing to challenge them through forming their own decision-making fora. [Editor's note: for more detail on the interrelated ideas of autonomy and authority see this month's supplementary essay.] Like sex, each generation thinks it has discovered protest and dissent for itself. But democracy has a 2,500-year history, which throughout features grass-roots, ‘popular’ movements directly challenging entrenched elites and ways of thinking about organisation and institutionalised power. In ancient Greece, 17th century England (with the Diggers and Quakers) 1970s Poland (Solidarity) and dozens of other locations and times, there have been ‘outbreaks of democracy’ within which new values have been asserted, self-rule practised, and challenges posed. The very act of spontaneously organising in decentralised ways to promote autonomy is a challenge to institutionalised organisational forms. This is one reason why these institutions treat democratic outbreaks with such seriousness. Students of democracy should also note that it is less the origin of the critique which determines its impact than the means by which it is perpetuated. Acting politically does not involve the formation of an opinion, stance or critique as much as it involves sharing it and motivating others through communication and the formation of networks. These matter strongly, as people are more likely to take political action if they have access to such networks. Acting democratically is (an) experience in both senses of the word: one can learn where pressure is best applied, and in what ways, to help achieve given ends. Such knowledge is valuable when faced with a sense of frustration, or even futility, that are understandable when up against huge bureaucratic/legalistic structures which provoked anger in the first place. Social networks constitute reservoirs of social and political capital on which groups can draw in order to act democratically. [4]. External and internal pressures can serve to debilitate such outbreaks, however. States and other institutional locations for power resort to a variety of strategies from simply ignoring outbreaks, denying them resources and allowing them to peter out, through buying off supporters or activists, up to and including legislative or violent repression. An analogy is with flood defence. The destructive power of the flood cannot simply be made to vanish, but barriers can be built to block the single, initial, direct assault, and through further engineering, allow it to reduce to a trickle through many small channels. Just as significant, however, are internal pressures. When and if their initial energy begins to fade, there may be a re-emergence of old power structures which were dampened in the outbreak’s formation. Engaging with institutionalised power may require the outbreak to find delegates, spokespersons and ‘media stars’. If these interlocutors’ activities are not themselves democratically validated, conflicts may divide the movement. Groups which believed themselves free of hierarchy may realise that it remains, now based on one’s media profile, skills or access to funds [5]. They may crystallise into less anarchic, more formalised organisational structures, or their protests are aped but watered down by mainstream organisations or politicians. Some have suggested that these problems stem from the inevitability of hierarchy and oligarchy [6]. I think that a more useful analysis of these tendencies is that of Antonio Gramsci, with his idea of hegemony. [7]. Gramsci observed that institutionalised power maintained itself not only through direct control but also through their influence over interlocking systems of culture, employment, the media, etcetera. These helped manufacture consent to the existing order, and all worked to draw off the energy of democratic outbreaks. Gramsci suggested that constructing an alternative network which he called a counterhegemony was therefore a necessary element of social change. Through this broad network, a ‘subordinate culture’ may gradually strengthen itself and spread its sphere of influence until it becomes the ‘common sense’ of the culture. Landry et al [8] call such a network a radical infrastructure. A radical infrastructure could be considered one practical step on the way to a counterhegemony. In the first place it would act as a supplier of political resources such as financial support, technical expertise and so on, reducing the need to engage directly with the hegemonic ‘system’ to acquire these, as that invariably increases the likelihood of the co-option or corruption of the original democratic ideals. However, the best radical infrastructures also serve to disseminate new cultural norms. They lead by example as well as being sources of knowledge and expertise. They do not only offer services, but publicise their beliefs, critiques and organisational forms. The ‘fear’ of the democratic outbreak is pervasive, and not only amongst those threatened by it. Unfamiliarity with autonomous action is often exploited to cast doubt on the desirability of democracy. But participation in an outbreak, frustrating though it may be, is also empowering and educational. By bringing people into contact with them, a radical infrastructure makes autonomy and alternative organisational forms viable possibilities, not idealistic dreams. This might seem a utopian approach to politics. However Landry et al point out that some elements of a radical infrastructure are quite well developed: alternative media and publishing, for instance [9]. But others are not, such as networks supplying legal expertise or funding. I suggest later that from the late 1960s radical infrastructures also struggled to encompass IT expertise. Nevertheless, the possibility and potential benefits of radical infrastructures are the first important insights to be drawn here. Democracy may emerge spontaneously; but it requires a sympathetic environment to perpetuate and spread. A radical infrastructure may constitute a structural or material environment from which tangible and intangible resources can be drawn in order that democratic outbreaks can be sustained. Footnotes1. Winner, L. (1985) "Do artefacts have politics?" in Mackenzie, D. and Wajcman, J., eds., The social shaping of technology, Open University Press, Buckingham. return 2. Michels, R. (1962) Political Parties: A Sociological Study of the Oligarchical Tendencies of Modern Democracy, trans. Eden and Cedar Paul, London: Macmillan. Schumpeter, J. A. (1943) Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, London: Allen & Unwin. return 3. Pateman, C. (1970) Participation and Democratic Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. See also Jane Mansbridge's article Does Participation make better citizens? return 4. Diani, M. (1995) Green Networks: A Structural Analysis of the Italian Environmental Movement, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press: Melucci, A. (1996) Challenging Codes: Collective action in the information age, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. return 5. See Jo Freeman's influential essay, The Tyranny of Structurelessness. return 6. Michels, Political Parties. return 7. Gramsci, A. (1971) Prison Notebooks, London: Lawrence & Wishart: see also Adamson, W. L. (1980) Hegemony and Revolution: A Study of Antonio Gramsci’s Political and Cultural Theory, Berkeley: University of California Press. Also this Gramsci links page. return 8. Landry, C., Morley, D., Southwood, R. and Wright, P. (1985) What a Way to Run a Railrod: An Analysis of Radical Failure, London: Comedia. return 9. Landry et al, pp. 97-8. A good web-based example of this is Indymedia. return | |