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January '04: Menu
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Language, Knowledge and ExclusionDrew WhitworthPage 1 ¦ Page 2 ¦ Printer-friendly version 1. Limitations to access based on finance. This is not strictly a "social/informational" means of restricting access, but is nevertheless worth mentioning. As already stated, money is the quintessential proxy resource, in that it can substitute for a great many other resources. The reason it is included here is that it provides a good way into thinking how literal freedoms are not always translated into actual freedoms. Strict liberal political theory would inform us that we are all free to own whatever we wish. No-one is stopping us owning a Mercedes, or taking holidays in the Seychelles, or hiring an executive box in Covent Garden. Of course, these are all beyond the financial means of many. The "freedom" may be there in a literal sense, but on an everyday practical level it is meaningless for most people. It is not our intention here to enter the debate over whether this devalues the liberal idea of freedom, but one must remember that the ability to pay also strongly influences one's access to top-quality education, health care or other indicators of affluence (and correspondingly deprivation, if and when the quality of these services in one's community is low). These will, in turn, influence the factors mentioned below. 2. Limitations to access based on qualifications. We probably think it fair - indeed essential - that when we are being treated by a doctor, he or she has the proper qualifications. Or that the taxi driver transporting us across a city has a license both to run a taxi and drive at all. Selection for employment, further study, and so on are often made on the basis of qualifications, or particular grades. Again we might consider this fair. But this form of selection can also be used in more subtle ways. Should only "qualified" people be involved in setting government policy on genetically-modified foods, for instance? Who is "qualified" to judge this? Certainly biochemists should have a say, but why should organic farmers and consumers not get involved as well? Does one become "qualified" in the particular problems of deprived communities only when one gets a degree or PhD in economics or social policy? Isn't having lived in such a community for one's whole life ample qualification? Qualifications are excellent examples of compression, in that they reduce a complex course of study, or life experience, down to a single phrase or number. There are no degrees (pun not intended) of freedom here; one either has the qualification, or does not. They are badges of status which because of their very nature are inherently biased towards the sort of knowledge and skills which can be objectively, "scientifically" tested; often given precedence over experience, particularly when that experience itself was acquired in "less acceptable" fields (for instance, did someone become "experienced" in the workings of nuclear power plants because they worked for BNFL, or Friends of the Earth?). This type of judgment leads us into... 3. Limitations to access based on knowledge. What is the "right" kind of knowledge? Centuries of the Enlightenment have encouraged us to believe that knowledge is only firmly grounded if it has been "scientifically" tested. This is not intended to dismiss the rigour and power of scientific method. In many circumstances it works excellently. But precisely because it is time-consuming, expensive, and takes specialist knowledge in its own right, it provides a convenient recourse for those who wish to dismiss the opinions of the "wrong sort of people" because they are "less scientific". This can apply even when there are vast stores of "anecdotal" knowledge, and clear reasons why scientific investigations have not taken place. The best example of this in the current time are debates about the safety and efficacy of cannabis. In the first place, because cannabis is a natural product, pharmaceutical companies cannot patent it (although some have patented its derivatives) and therefore there is not much financial gain to be made from investigating the properties of the natural plant. Secondly, the political implications are widespread, so there is reluctance to undertake "scientific" study. Yet many users of cannabis "anecdotally" claim the drug is at least safer than alcohol. This is not intended to claim a belief one way or another in the desirability of cannabis use: but it is a good example of where "scientific" and "anecdotal" evidence are not pulling in the same direction. Policy-makers, however, will invariably claim that only the former provides a valid basis for policy. The result of this is often that policies are imposed from above on certain groups by the "qualified" scientific/social science establishment, rather than being developed in collaboration with the affected groups, whose experience will not usually be formalised by qualifications, or based in scientific research. Academic disciplines can serve as forms of exclusion, if the boundaries around them are drawn in certain ways. Scientists may claim that the moral and ethical consequences of their research are for the philsophers to establish: but if and when philosophers claim that a certain line of research should be stopped, they are told they are exceeding their authority. This sort of exclusion can also be practiced in less formal ways. In terms of its internal dynamics, one of the most intensely political organisations I've ever been involved with was an amateur dramatics society: amongst its many fractious debates were who did the lights, set design etc.: it was almost impossible for anyone to gain experience with any particular job because there was no desire to rotate tasks or share skills. Certain jobs thus became bottlenecks, and the people in possession of them acquired power in the organisation because there was no way to bypass them - and they knew it! An influential article called The Tyranny of Structurelessness by Jo Freeman discusses these tendencies in the womens' movement: groups believed themselves free of hierarchy but it was in fact exercised in more subtle ways, with those who had more (practical) experience, or certain skills, acquiring power because of them. 4. Limitations to access based on language. This is the most subtle exclusion of all. Some sub-groups or cliques may use jargon or codes which exclude others. Carey's paper noted how legal documents are often hideously difficult to read (again, access restricted to the qualified, whose training includes practice in how to access this type of writing). Importantly, this type of exclusion does not have to be malicious. The philosopher Wittgenstein observed the existence of what he called "language games", meaning ways in which different cultural contexts interpret identical terms. The term "king", for instance, has entirely different meanings depending on whether one is discussing government or chess. This is an obvious example but not really what is being meant here: the distinction between the uses of "king" here are clearly known, and dictionaries would clarify the distinction. But what of the many different "games" (situations) in which the word "democracy" is appealed to? Speaking of anti-motorway protestors in London in 1995, Stephen Norris said, "the road has the full authority of democracy, and any attempt to disrupt it is therefore an attack on democracy". Norris believed himself justified in making that statement because the road had been approved by the ("proper") method of the public enquiry. Protestors, of course, saw themselves (direct political activists) as truly "democratic", and planning enquiries as fundamentally "undemocratic" (biased in favour of big business and building interests). Regardless of one's opinion on democracy the fact is that this shows a fundamentally different usage of particular terms between which there is almost no possible reconciliation. What we need to realise is that some language games have the backing of powerful groups in society, whereas some do not. In combination with the other modes of exclusion mentioned above, the (deliberate?) use of language to exclude can be very insidious. As Tim Jordan says in his book Cyberpower, power is often little more than the means to determine the definitions of terms which affect the way we live. Hence the call made by Kevin Carey in this month's feature essay for technology to be used to flatten out ambiguity and exclusionary language in public documents. This should not be considered a call for an abandonment of the rich diversity of English, which makes it such a fruitful language for artists. We do not want to descend into some kind of Orwellian "Newspeak". But Orwell (in Politics and the English Language) also bemoaned the tendency of authors, particularly when making political points, to resort to tired, meaningless euphemisms and deliberate obfuscation. Clarity in writing is not only easier to read, it is more accessible. We should be fully aware of the means by which language can be used to exclude, and the way this interlocks with other exclusions based on money, qualifications and knowledge. | |