Qatar 2022 World Cup: Expect Amazing Infrastructure

On February 8, 2012, Jacque Rast, made President of the International Division of CH2M HILL Companies a month before, finally sealed the CH2M HILL deal with the 2022 Qatar Supreme Committee (Q22SC). The Qatar Supreme Committee had selected the CH2M HILL-led consortium as the Programme Management Consultant (PMC) for the 2022 FIFA World Cup™. And as Jacque put pen to paper, she asked herself how CH2M HILL could best approach this job [Exhibit 1]. The global full-service consulting, programme management, design, construction, and operations firm, headquartered in Denver, Colorado, had a long track record of involvement in infrastructure development programmes ahead of international sport events. Five years ago, they had been awarded the delivery partner role to the London 2012 Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) as part of CLM, a consortium of three firms. And when CH2M HILL got involved in the bidding process for a similar role in Qatar in 2011, its reputation as a leading global provider of programme management was quite well established. The 6-year programme to regenerate a dilapidated swath of land in East London, which involved a public investment of over £9 billion to modernize London’s old transport infrastructure and £6 billion to deliver an Olympic park was on time and within budget. And commercially, CH2M HILL was being rewarded handsomely since most of its profit in the London2012 contract was tied up to meeting pre-specified milestones and target costs.

As the worlds’ richest country on a per capita basis, the Qatar government was a desirable client. The government had plans to invest £180bn over the next ten years to modernize its infrastructure before 2022. Unsurprisingly, Qatar’s 6-month procurement process for a delivery partner had been competitive. After a pre-qualification process, six multi-national firms were invited to submit bids for a proposed USD 3bn programme to deliver twelve stadiums and associated facilities. The job also entailed influencing a raft of other non-World cup infrastructure development projects to ensure they would all be delivered before 2022, including new hospitals, schools, highways, railways, and airport developments. To manage the bidding process and ensure transparency, the Q22SC sought assistance from independent consultants. At the appointment of CH2M HILL, the Q22SC Technical Director, Yasir Al Jamal, said “We are delighted to enter into this partnership with CH2M HILL. Over the next six months we will be working together to develop our road map, which will provide us with delivery timelines for the projects that will occupy us in the coming ten years.” And in response, Lee McIntire, CH2M HILL’s Chairman and Chief Executive Officer, said “We are proud to contribute our global programme management experience to help deliver a landmark 2022 FIFA World Cup in Qatar. Our team brings a proven track record that will assist the WC22 Supreme Committee in delivering world-class facilities in a sustainable manner.”

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But Jacque knew Qatar was not the UK. Stakeholder management had been challenging in the London2012 programme, but handling of the stakeholders had been the responsibility of the ODA and its governance structure. This had enabled CLM to go on doing their job as programme and project manager. As one CH2M HILL senior director put it at the time ‘we were hired to be a bully, and that’s what we did’. Could this approach apply to the Qatar job? The gas-rich state was an autocratic state with an absolute monarch - only recently Qatar had set elections to a consultative council. And the Arab management style, characterised by acceptance of power and wealth within a rigid hierarchy, and strong patriarchal loyalty to the tribe and family, could raise issues with Western laws such as UK’s Bribery Act 2010. It was also unlikely the Q22 supreme Committee would have the technical and managerial capabilities of ODA. How could CH2M HILL best handle this job? To what extent should PMC recruit local people from Qatar’s pampered population to its top echelons? And how to deal with international criticism led by Human Rights Watch over ‘kafala’, the infamous system that governed the working lives of every foreigner employed in Qatar? The slate was clean. It was time to design the PMC organisation and recruit the senior management team.

Qatar

Qatar was a relatively small country with a population of 1.68 million, more than 85% of whom lived within a 20km radius of the capital Doha conurbation. The State of Qatar was a constitutional monarchy with the Emir Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani as Head of State. Qatar was one of the wealthiest countries in the world per capita, with oil and gas accounting for more than 50% of its GDP and roughly 85% of export earnings. Qatar’s 250,000 citizens were also among the world’s richest, with a gross national income (adjusted for relative purchasing power) about double the figure in the United States. Notwithstanding the large expatriate community employed in various sectors of the Qatari economy, Qatari law was guided by the principles in Sharia. This moral code and religious law of Islam built on two primary sources: the precepts set forth in Quran and the example set by the Islamic prophet Muhammad in the Sunnah, a normative way of life for Muslims. Typical of a desert climate, Qatar had very hot, sunny, humid, and long summers, and mild winters with scarce precipitation. Given Qatar planned to host the games during the summer, it was expected that average temperatures would seldom fall below 37C during the afternoon and seldom below

1 The Bribery Act 2010 which came into effect in July 2011 describes a crime of bribery as occurring when a person offers, gives or promises to give a “financial or other advantage” to another individual in exchange for “improperly” performing a “relevant function or activity”; The Act has a near-universal jurisdiction, allowing for the prosecution of an individual or company with links to the United Kingdom, regardless of where the crime occurred (Wikipedia)

31°C during the evening. The country had already staged the FIFA U-20 World Cup 1995, and other major international sports events such as the 2006 Asian Games.

**Qatari Labour law**

Over one million foreign workers — mostly poor Asians from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Indonesia and the Philippines — made up more than 90 percent of the labour force in Qatar. And another million was expected to arrive to help deliver the infrastructure for the World Cup. The New York-based campaign group Human Rights Watch had alerted, however, that foreign workers worked under ‘near feudal conditions’ not dissimilar to forced labour. Construction workers in particular faced serious abuses and were in some cases forced labourers in bondage to their employers. Qatari employers assumed legal responsibility for their employees in addition to providing them with a paid job, a work visa, housing and often food. But a worker was not allowed to change jobs, leave the country, get a driver’s license, rent a home or open a checking account without the permission of his or her employer-sponsor, or kafeel. And a kafeel, reportedly, could also withdraw sponsorship at almost any time and send the employee home.

Human Rights Watch was working on a report that would urge Qatar to overhaul some laws and better enforce others to prevent labourers being exploited on the building programme for the 2022 World Cup. The International Trade Union Confederation, which represented 175m workers, had also met Jerome Valcke, the FIFA general secretary, to demand that unless Qatar upheld workers’ rights, the movement would campaign against the World Cup taking place there. Under pressure from human rights and labour advocates, the government had promised to modernise the Qatari system, create a phone line for workers to anonymously report abuses, and a system of arbitrating labour disputes. The state was also working on a charter of workers’ rights. But commentators knew the challenge would be to enforce the new laws and establish a new work culture. Reforms were likely to happen very slowly.

**Qatar World Cup 2022**

On the 2nd December 2010, and with the eyes of the global football community looking on, the 22 FIFA (Fédération Internationale de Football Association) executive committee members made their eagerly anticipated decision as to who would host the World Cups of 2018 and 2022. FIFA president Sepp Blatter first announced that Russia were to host the 2018 tournament. Russia were accepted by many as the leading contenders for 2018. But it

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was Blatter’s second decision that took bookmakers around the world over by surprise. After fending off bids from Australia, South Korea, Japan and the USA, Qatar emerged as the surprise winner to host the tournament in 2022. This was a truly important day for Qataris. With this award, Qatar would become the first Middle Eastern country to stage a World Cup.

Qatar’s royalty had put a lot of time and effort to make this dream a reality. After all, the country had just recently lost the right to host the 2016 Olympics, and bidding for the World Cup was bound to be competitive as FIFA expected to receive nine bids. Sheikh Mohammed Bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani himself headed the bid committee as Chairman. Qatar’s strategy for the bid book had been to appeal to FIFA to break the mould. Qatar submitted the bid book in Zurich on 14 May 2010, after registering its expression of interest in bidding in March 2009. The Qatar delegation sent to Zurich included not only Sheikh Mohammed bin Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, but also Sheikh Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, the President of the Qatar Football Association, and Hassan Al Thawadi, the chief executive of the bid. In Zurich, Al Thawai said:

“Qatar’s FIFA World Cup legacy goes further. It would help build bridges between East and West... through a commitment to share our groundbreaking cooling technologies with the rest of the world and donate 170,000 stadium seats to developing countries at the end of the tournament, this is a bid for the region and for the world... a World Cup in Qatar will be a New World Cup, bringing people and different cultures together in the name of football.”

Qatar’s bid challenged FIFA to take the World Cup to a region where football was popular and was beginning to emerge as world player in global sport. As the bid chief executive, Hassan Al-Thawadi, said on the day of the award "We know it would be a bold gamble and an exciting prospect but with no risk...Heat is not and will not be an issue." Qatar promised carbon-neutral games through the use of sustainable technologies and groundbreaking cooling systems for stadiums, fan zones, and training grounds; fans, players and officials would be able to enjoy cool and comfortable open-air conditions, not exceeding 27 degrees Celsius. Commentators observed that the victory would be viewed as a triumph for Mohammed Bin Hammam, the FIFA executive member, and president of the Asia Football Confederation, who was the favourite to succeed Blatter.

The Qatar World Cup 2022 bid

Qatar secured the vote of FIFA after having undertaken two years of global campaigning led by campaign strategist, Mike Lee who had been behind the successful London 2012 and Rio 2016 Olympic bids [Exhibit 2]. The bid was delivered under the strap line “Expect


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Amazing*. Similar to the way that London and Barcelona had used Olympic bids as catalysts of urban regeneration projects, the Qatar bid proposed not only to deliver stadiums and associated sports infrastructure, but also to advance much of the “background” nationwide infrastructure necessary to stage an event of this size. It was anticipated that the hosting of the World Cup would accelerate and stimulate the implementation of infrastructure plans and major projects that had been sanctioned as part of the Qatar National Vision 2030 issued in 2008 [Exhibit 3]. Several characteristics of the bid contributed to make it unique. According to the 2022 FIFA World Cup™ Qatar Bid Evaluation Report, based on the Bid Book and clarifications received from the Bidder in September 2010, these characteristics included:

- **A compact World Cup.** The notion of compactness had first been used in the London2012 bid to describe the strategy of locating the Olympic village and park close to one another, and using temporary venues to maximise the number of events to take place in the Olympic park. This notion was recycled in the Qatar bid which promised a new and innovative type of World Cup™. It claimed a hosting concept that was truly compact, with all key event facilities and venues in a compact area within a radius of 60 kilometers, and twelve stadiums being no more than a 30 minute drive from Doha city centre.

- First completely carbon-neutral tournament. It committed to develop environmentally friendly air conditioning technology for use at the covered stadiums, fan zones, and training facilities that could keep players and fans in a created atmosphere of about 26-27 degrees, well below the expected temperature during the searing 50 degree summer temperatures. To convince FIFA of its commitment to a carbon-neutral tournament, Qatar established an Environmental Working Group to develop a Green Qatar 2022 plan.

- An emphasis on a lasting football legacy through the promotion of sustainable football and societal development in Qatar, the Middle East and the rest of the World. Legacy proposals included the donation of modular stadia for the World Cup 2022 in order to construct 22 stadiums around the world in developing nations post tournament.

- The bid proposed a USD 3 billion budget for stadium construction and renovation. The stadiums would take measures to reduce solar radiation and warm winds, and provide soft air conditioning. The bid also mentioned 84,000 rooms for accommodation across seven host cities, exceeding the FIFA’s minimum requirement of 60,000 rooms.

- The bid’s transport plan proposed over USD 13 billion to build the New Doha International Airport. Several billions more would be invested to deliver the transport
infrastructure based on a 2006 Transport Master Plan developed by the country’s Urban Planning and Development Authority [Exhibit 4]. Key features of the plan were:

- capital investment in two high-speed rail networks, one connecting Qatar to Bahrain, and another connecting Qatar to the Saudi rail network by 2017;
- a 340km-long metro network system connecting the seven host cities and serving all tournament stadiums;
- a USD 20 billion investment to expand the road system as part of an improvement to complete an extensive national expressway network linking Qatar to other Persian Gulf countries including Saudi Arabia, UAE, and Oman;
- a road tunnel under Doha Bay to connect Doha’s business district with the airport;
- a new port, the New Doha Port, to handle more freight tonnage and accommodate increasing numbers of cruise line arrivals.

• The bid proposed to host the FIFA headquarters at a 23,000 m² single competition-related event venue, the Doha Convention Centre Tower, which was already under construction and would easily meet FIFA’s office requirements of 8,000 m²; three neighboring hotels would be used for the FIFA delegation and VIP guests. At completion, the Doha Convention centre would have over 100,000 m² of space with a main hall of 34,000 m².

• As part of the Qatar National Broadband network, the bid proposed to build two major new-generation IP fibre-to-the-home (FTTH) networks far in advance of 2022 and consisting of over 25,000 kilometers of optic fibre cabling. The two networks would provide download speeds of 100 megabits per second and cover the entire state of Qatar.

The Qatar WC22 Governance
For overseeing the delivery of the Qatar WC22 programme, Qatar decided from the onset to adopt a governance structure similar to the structure that had been adopted for delivering the London2012 games. The state government established a Governing Council (GC22) to oversee the whole programme. It also created an independent public body to act as an agent on behalf of the Governing Council – the Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022 (QSC22) [Exhibit 5]. QSC22’s mission was to ensure “the successful delivery of a historic FIFA World Cup in alignment with national plans and with a lasting impact on the country and the world.” QSC22 had direct responsibility for building competition venues which included the proposed stadiums and training sites while maintaining a coordination role for non-competition venues required by FIFA, in addition to major infrastructure works such as the New Doha International Airport and the proposed nationwide metro network.
According to the Emiri Decree No.27 (2011) announced to the media in April 2011, the QSC22 would report to the Governing Council which included six royals holding higher office positions in government. The HH Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Crown Prince was appointed president of the Council and HH Sheikh Jassem bin Hamad Al Thani, the personal representative of Emir, was appointed vice president of the Council. Other members of the Governing Council included Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, Qatar’s Prime Minister and the Minister of Foreign Affairs; Yousef Hussain Kamal, Minister of Economy and Finance; HE Sheikh Abdul Rahman bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani, Minister of Municipality and Urban Planning, HE Sheikh Mohammed Bin Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani; and HE Sheikh Hamad bin Jabor bin Jassim Al Thani, Director General of the General Secretariat for Development. Q22SC in turn would be led by Hasan Al Thawadi (Secretary General) and comprising several departments [Exhibit 6].

Q22SC was tasked to send an annual report to HH the Emir on the progress achieved with the WC22 programme. But Q22SC lacked the in-house capabilities to manage a programme of this complexity alone. QSC22 was enthused by the London2012 approach. In this model, the UK government’s agent – the Olympic Delivery Authority (ODA) - remained a lean organisation. ODA outsourced programme and project management capabilities to CLM, the ‘delivery partner’. CLM was a consortium of three private firms, CH2M HILL and two UK-based firms, Mace and Laing O’Rourke. Hence, soon after winning the bid, the Q22SC issued a tender for a delivery partner, the so-called “Programme Management Consultant (PMC)”

The Qatar 2030 Vision

Providing a backdrop to the Qatar’s bid to host the World Cup 2022, there was the ambitious Qatar’s 2030 vision published in 2008. The QNV2030 aimed to “provide a framework within which national strategies and implementation plans could be developed” (QNV 2030 p6). It offered “a set of guiding principles that all national development must adhere to”, and it was based “on four fundamental pillars of human, social, environmental and economic development. The overall aim of the Qatar National Vision 2030 was to build a ‘bridge between the present and the future.’ The Vision envisaged:

“A vibrant and prosperous country in which there is economic and social justice for all, and in which nature and man are in harmony. We need to galvanize our collective energies and direct them toward these aspirations. Strong Islamic and family values will provide our moral and ethical compass.” (Qatar National Vision 2030 p3).

Observers estimated that the cost of delivering the infrastructure necessary to meet the 2030 Vision could reach over $149bn and further $126bn would have to be invested on housing.
schools, hospitals, shopping centres, and rail networks. With no end in sight for the great recession that hit most developed economies around the world after 2008, competition from international consortiums would be intense. Plans for the first phase of a new $40bn Doha metro - an urban underground/over ground city train system for Qatar’s capital - had attracted more than 60 expressions of interest. And there were rumours China Harbour Engineering Company had won an estimated $880m contract to design the first phase of the new Doha deepwater port with a bid up to 20 per cent lower than other international consortiums.

The 2030 vision did not seem to have the full backing of Qatari society as a whole, however. In his critique of QNV2030, Al Kuwari (2012) for example noted “the QNV is only expressive of the views of Qatari leadership and their desires” (2012, p. 88). He argued the framework contained “chronic deficiencies” (2012, p87) and failed to address key issues such as “the aggravated democratic deficiencies, political flaw in relations between the state and society and the absence of democracy” (2012, p87). Al Kuwari’s observations suggested the over arching strategy had been compiled in the absence of public consultation and failed to acknowledge political reform aimed at democratising the nation.

Controversy notwithstanding, many of the national infrastructure development projects conceived to deliver the Qatar’s National Vision 2030 would be fast-tracked to supplement and support the hosting of the 2022 World Cup. The various external stakeholders in charge of the development and delivery of the Non-World Cup Stakeholder Managed Projects bought in the importance of completing these projects before 2022. But to ensure they would get their act together was not trivial. Geoff Mee, CEO of Qatar Rail, for example, speaking at the Construction Week Infrastructure Qatar conference in 2012, stated that

“There needs to be a clear prioritisation for that which is required to meet the QNV 2030. We should keep our eye on the prize, which is not the World Cup. The World Cup is a milestone on the way to where we are trying to get the nation to, which is to be self-sustaining by 2030”.

The 2022 FIFA World Cup had become a catalyst to modernize and radically transform the infrastructure landscape of the country. As put in the Qatar National Development Strategy 2011-2012 (p61). “from a planning perspective, the World Cup is best considered within the broader framework of national development”. Aware of the importance of a collective effort in the delivery of the World Cup, and the need to align delivery strategies across the board, the Secretary General of Q22SC, Hasan Al-Thawdi, started to work on a number of co-

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operation agreements with key stakeholders, which he expected to be able to sign on the 7th October 2012. The agreements would be signed with Qatar Rail, Ashghal (Public Works Authority), Kahramaa (Sole National Power and Water provider), Aspire Zone Foundation (Sports Initiative body) and Qatari Diar (Prominent Quasi Governmental Real Estate Developer) – all entities with responsibilities and projects expected to play a key role in delivering the infrastructure required for the 2022 FIFA World Cup. The agreements would represent an attempt to unite the nation toward the common goal of staging the 2022 FIFA World Cup, and ultimately lay the principles for national goal congruence [Exhibit 7].

**CH2M HILL**

CH2M HILL had been ranked Number One in the world for both Programme Management and Environmental Management for eight years running by Engineering News Record (ENR) magazine. The 30,000-employee CH2M HILL had more than 300 offices globally, including a footprint of 2,000 staff in the Middle East, of which 200 were based in Qatar. The firm was a global leader providing full-service, strategic planning, consulting, design, construction, and operations. Furthermore, CH2M HILL provided programme management services in the sport, energy, water, transport, urban, environmental, nuclear and industrial sectors. The firm was having a major role in managing and delivering some of the most challenging and complex programmes in the world, including the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games, Masdar City Development, Panama Canal Expansion, Emirates Nuclear Energy Programme, UK Crossrail, and the Mumbai Airport Expansion. Overall CH2M HILL had worked on 6 Olympic Games and 1 Commonwealth Games over the last 15 years.

The Programme Management Consultants (PMC) consortium was led by CH2M Hill, and also included the UK design consultant Arup and cost consultant EC Harris. The PMC was expected to bring the requisite technical and programme and project management know-how to the table in order to help Q22SC deliver their objectives. The PMC would not have direct influence or control over external stakeholder delivered projects. PMC would also not have direct responsibility for delivering the nationwide infrastructure needed to host the World Cup tournament. But in a role that could be described as providing oversight, the PMC were contracted to monitor and put forward recommendations that ensured collective delivery of a portfolio of infrastructure projects delivered by other external stakeholders. And their responsibilities included stakeholder management and coordination, developing risk mitigation strategies, and preparing an engagement strategy with the private sector providers.

In satisfying these components of their service, the PMC was expected to report back to the Q22SC in the guise of advisor. Q22SC’s mandate in turn was to monitor, report, and where appropriate, recommend corrective action with respect to the external stakeholders to GC22. Likely, the GC22 could have to interfere to help Q22SC and PMC motivate other
stakeholders to commit to the WC22 programme. Commenting on the appointment of the CH2M HILL-led consortium in 2012, QS22 Secretary General, Hassan Al Thawadi said:

"Our work with CH2M HILL in delivering a successful World Cup will require cooperation with and assistance from local stakeholders and partners, from both the public and private sectors. The road ahead will be challenging. Today’s appointment is a key initial milestone on our journey... The appointment process for this contract began immediately after winning the bid in December 2010. We were cognizant of the importance of ensuring that the correct foundations were put in place at the start of our journey toward 2022. We studied all the proposals with the utmost care in order to ensure that we selected the right partner. .... We believe that CH2M HILL is the ideal partner.”

CH2M HILL’s role was expected to continue for two years after the tournament to ensure implementation of the Qatar 2022 Supreme Committee’s legacy commitments.

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The words of QS22 Secretary General, Hassan Al Thawadi were reassuring to Jacque. But given the experience with London 2012, the journey was not going to be easy. In London 2012, the incentives of ODA and the delivery partner were well aligned. Still, it took ODA and CLM almost a year to learn how to work together and trust each other, agree what each organisation was bringing to the process, and delineate clear boundaries around the different roles [Exhibit 8]. In this process, CLM had to change some senior people until the right chemistry surfaced. In the end, the London2012 job turned out a good job on all fronts. It had been very lucrative, and helped CH2M HILL firm up its reputation as a good delivery partner to the governments’ agents. With so many critical issues on the backdrop - engagement with external stakeholders, the Arab management style, and the Qatari labour laws - Jacque called a meeting with her senior team to design the delivery partner organisation and a recruitment strategy. Jacque wanted the key people to start mobilizing as soon as possible.
Exhibit 1 - Jacque Rast seals the CH2M HILL deal with WC22 Supreme Committee secretary general Hassan Al Thawadi (CH2M HILL press release)
Exhibit 2 – Renderings from Qatar’s Bid book for the FIFA 2022 World Cup
Exhibit 3 - The Four Pillars of Qatar’s National vision for 2030 (Source QNV2030)

**Pillars of Qatar National Vision 2030**

**Economic Development**
Development of a competitive and diversified economy capable of meeting the needs of, and securing a high standard of living for, all its people both for the present and for the future.

**Social Development**
Development of a just and caring society based on high moral standards, and capable of playing a significant role in global partnerships for development.

**Human Development**
Development of all its people to enable them to sustain a prosperous society.

**Environmental Development**
Management of the environment such that there is harmony between economic growth, social development and environmental protection.

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Exhibit 4 – National Transport Network (Source: FIFA Bid Evaluation report)

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Exhibit 5 – Qatar forms Supreme Committee (The Peninsula Qatar Opportunity 2022, 28 April 2011)

His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani, the Emir issued the Emiri resolution No. 27 of 2011 to establish the Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022. The resolution provided that the Governing Council of the Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022 consists of His Highness Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Crown Prince as president, HH Sheikh Jassem bin Hamad Al Thani, the personal representative of Emir as vice president and the membership of His Excellency Sheikh Hamad Bin Jassim Bin Jabr Al-Thani, prime minister and minister of foreign affairs. The new formation includes the following:
His Excellency Yousef Hussain Kamal, Minister of Economy and Finance as member, HE Sheikh Abdul Rahman bin Khalifa bin Abdulaziz Al Thani, Minister of Municipality and Urban Planning as member, HE Sheikh Mohammed Bin Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani as member and HE Sheikh Hamad bin Jabor bin Jassim Al Thani, Director General of the General Secretariat for Development Planning as member.

The resolution also specified that the term of membership of the council shall be for four years, renewable for a period or other similar periods. The resolution goes into force as of the date of its issuance and shall be published in the Official Gazette. His Highness Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani also issued the Emiri resolution No 29 of 2011 on the appointment of Mr Hassan Abdullah Al-Thawadi as Secretary-General of the Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022.

The committee aims to achieve the best conditions to organise and accomplish World Cup 2022 and it shall send an annual report to HH the Emir on the aspects of its activities, projects and progress of work. The Audit Bureau shall monitor and audit the accounts of the committee and send its annual report to His Highness the Emir and the committee shall develop strategies and general policy on World Cup 2022. Qatar plans to spend about US$ 100 billion on infrastructure projects.

The resolution goes into force as of the date of its issuance and shall be published in the Official Gazette.

We, Hamad Bin Khalifa Al-Thani, Emir of Qatar, after reviewing the constitution and the Emiri Decree No. (44) of 2008 following the comprehensive vision of development, “the Qatar National Vision 2030” and the proposal of the council of ministers, have decided the following:

Article (1) In the application of the provisions of this resolution the following words and expressions shall have the meanings assigned to them unless the context requires otherwise:

Committee: Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022
Governing Council: Governing Council of the Committee
General Secretariat: General Secretariat of the Committee
Secretary-General: Secretary-General of the Committee

Article (2) A committee called “Supreme Committee for Qatar 2022” is established and it shall have a moral character and a budget attached to the State budget. The committee shall be headquartered in Doha.

Article (3) The committee aims to achieve the best conditions to organize and accomplish World Cup 2022, which will enhance the overall development plans in the State in all areas and lead to find out a legacy of the State of Qatar that will go on after the tournament and through the generations.

Article (4) The committee as the competent higher authority of the World Cup 2022 shall exercise all the powers and competencies necessary to achieve its objectives and shall perform in particular the following:

1. To develop the strategies and policies of the State regarding the World Cup 2022 by preparing, following-up the implementation of development and economic plans and infrastructure of the country related to the World Cup 2022, adopting the plans and programs necessary to implement, supervising and monitoring their
implementation and linking with the Qatar National Vision 2030, taking into account the obligations of the State before the International Union for football “FIFA”.

2. To work on creating an enabling environment to organize and accomplish the World Cup 2022 in all legal, regulatory, physical, social and economic development aspects.

3. To determine the frameworks to support and promote various activities and events related to World Cup 2022.

4. To Follow-up, evaluate and issue the guidance on the activities related to the World Cup 2022.

5. To approve the projects for the World Cup, which shall be carried out directly by the committee as well as identify and follow up the implementation of the projects implemented by ministries and other governmental and non-governmental organisations.

6. To coordinate with ministries, other governmental and non-governmental organisations, international, regional and local committees and organizations, initiatives, activities and projects in all areas related to the World Cup 2022 to ensure integration of strategies, plans, resolutions, activities of the entities referred to and the national vision for the World Cup 2022 as well as the accomplishment of the same in the best way.

7. To propose the draft legislative instruments related to the World Cup 2022 and express an opinion on any draft legislative instruments that would affect the organisation and the completion of the World Cup.

8. To represent the State in all bodies, organisations, conferences and meetings and local, regional and international seminars on World Cup 2022.

9. Any other matters assigned by the Prince.

Article (5) The management committee shall be in charge of the Governing Council which shall consist of the Crown Prince as president, vice-president and the number of members from the concerned authorities and experts in the field of committee’s powers while an Emiri resolution shall be issued regarding their appointment and their compensations.

The Governing Council shall have a secretary who shall be selected by the president of the council and he shall specify his powers and financial rewards.

Article (6) The duration of the membership of the Governing Council shall be for four years, renewable for a period or other similar periods.

Article (7) The Governing Council shall take over all the powers and competencies necessary to achieve the objectives of the committee and it shall perform in particular the following:

1. To develop the strategies and general policies for the committee and oversee their implementation.

2. To adopt the organisational structure and technical regulations of the committee.

3. To determine the fees for services related to the activities of the World Cup 2022 or those provided by the Committee.

4. To approve the agreements, contracts and memorandums of understanding, etc in which the committee shall be a party.

5. To approve the establishment of companies solitarily or jointly with others and the establishment of projects or contribution in the existing companies and projects related to the World Cup 2022.

Article (8) The Governing Council shall meet at the invitation of the president or his deputy at least four times in the year and whenever the need arises.

The meeting of the Governing Council shall not be valid unless it is attended by the majority of its members including the president of the council or his deputy.

The resolutions shall be passed by a majority of the votes of the present members and in case of equal number of votes the president’s resolution shall be taken as final.

Article (9) The minutes of meetings of the Governing Council and its resolutions shall be recorded in a special register with page numbers and the same shall be signed by the president of the Governing Council and

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Article (10) The Governing Council may invite to attend meetings the ones who it deems fit from staff, experts and advisers of the Committee or other State employees or experts in the field of powers of the committee without giving them the right to vote.

Article (11) The Governing Council may establish the permanent or temporary committees and task forces from among its members or others to examine the topics referred to them by the Governing Council or perform the works assigned to them.

Article (12) The Governing Council may appoint a managing director or more from among the members of the Governing Council and define his powers and financial rewards.

Article (13) The president of the Governing Council shall have the right to sign on behalf of the Committee. The Governing Council can authorise the managing director or any member of the Governing Council or the Secretary-General or other staff of the committee the right to sign alone or together, pursuant to the resolution of the Governing Council.

Article (14) The stamp of the committee on its papers shall be valid only if they are signed by the president of the Governing Council or the person authorised to sign.

Article (15) The president of the Governing Council or his deputy or any member of the Governing Council or any employee in the committee cannot have any personal interest directly or indirectly in the contracts concluded with the committee or on its behalf or the projects or tenders or auctions done by the committee.

Article (16) The committee shall have a secretariat, headed by a Secretary-General. He shall be appointed by an Emiri resolution. The secretary general shall attend the meetings of the Governing Council without having the right to vote.

Article (17) The Secretariat shall be the executive body for the committee and it shall, under the supervision of the Governing Council and in the framework of general policy of the committee, take over all administrative, financial and technical activities of the committee according to the regulations of the committee within the limits of its annual budget.

Article (18) The Secretary-General shall supervise the Secretariat and manage its activities in the framework of general directions of the strategic policy approved by the Governing Council within the approved budget. It shall perform in particular the following:

1. To implement the resolutions of the Governing Council.
2. To supervise the administrative units of the Secretariat, coordinate between them and evaluate their work.
3. To propose strategies and policies for the World Cup 2022.
4. To propose draft legislative instruments related to the World Cup 2022.
5. To propose the technical regulations of the committee.
6. To prepare the draft of the estimated annual budget of the committee and its final account.
7. To coordinate between the ministries, other government agencies, bodies, public institutions, non-governmental bodies and local, regional and international committees and organizations to ensure the implementation of policies, plans and resolutions of the committee related to the World Cup 2022 and submit the periodic reports to the Governing Council on the completion of projects related to the World Cup 2022 along with its recommendations and proposals.
8. To prepare an annual report on the achievements of the committee and its programs.
9. Any other tasks assigned by the Governing Council in accordance with the provisions of this resolution.

Article (19) The Secretary-General shall represent the committee before the courts and in relations with third parties.

Article (20) A resolution of the president of Governing Council upon proposal of the Secretary-General shall be passed on the organizational structure of the Secretariat, departments and administrative units that make up the

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Secretariat, task forces and committees. The resolution shall be passed by the Secretary-General to establish the sections in the departments that make up the Secretariat as well as to specify its powers and modify the same.

Article (21) The committee shall have an annual estimated budget and it shall have also a special account in which it shall deposit its funds.

The fiscal year of the committee starts on first of April and ends at the end of March each year while the first financial year starts from the effective date of this resolution and ends at the end of March of the following year.

Article (22) The Audit Bureau shall monitor and audit the accounts of the committee and submit its annual report to the Emir. The committee, its contracts, auctions and agreements are exempted from the prior censorship of the Audit Bureau.

Article (23) The committee shall submit an annual detailed report to the Emir on the aspects of its activities, projects, progress of work and financial position in a period not more than three months from the date of the end of the fiscal year including its suggestions and recommendations.

Article (24) The Emir, at any time, can ask the committee to submit reports on the status of the administrative, financial and technical committee or any aspect of its activity or any related information. He may issue general guidance which the committee has to follow in the matters related to the public policy.

Article (25) The president of the Governing Council shall issue the resolutions necessary to implement the provisions of this resolution.

Article (26) All competent authorities, each within its own jurisdiction, shall have to implement this resolution and the same shall be effective from the date of issuance.

The resolution shall be published in the Official Gazette. Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani Emir of Qatar, Issued at the Emiri Diwan on: 17/05/1432m Corresponding: 21/04/2011

Exhibit 6 - Governance Structure of the Qatar’s 2022 FIFA World Cup programme

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Exhibit 7- Stakeholder Agreement Signing Ceremony, Oct 7th 2012 (Qatar Tribune 8th October 2012)
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