

## The Privatisation of Home and Hope: Return, Reforms and the Foreign Intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina

STEF JANSEN

*Social Anthropology, University of Manchester, Manchester, M13 9PL, UK (E-mail: stef.jansen@manchester.ac.uk)*

**Abstract.** Contextualising the foreign-imposed return policies in early post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina, this article argues that the return of the displaced – however important it was to many Bosnians – ultimately functioned as the self-perpetuating lynchpin of an externally generated framework for post-war reconstruction, often out of tune with the hopes of its intended beneficiaries. Rather than following conventional anthropological cultural relativist arguments, I propose a critique of the foreign intervention that places it in its social, political and economic context, drawing attention to patterns of longing and belonging in Bosnia-Herzegovina. I contrast the groundings and implications of intervention policies with the experiences and yearnings of displaced Bosnians and show that, while it was legitimised as the implementation of an ostensibly ideologically neutral human rights discourse, the foreign emphasis on property and safety rights over other concerns channelled the reconstruction of Bosnia-Herzegovina into a peculiar, normative trajectory of postsocialist neoliberalisation.

My objective in this article is to set out some critical lines of thought about early post-war transformations in Bosnia-Herzegovina. While grounded in long-term ethnographic research, detailed accounts of which are published elsewhere,<sup>1</sup> I consciously pitch my argument on a generalising polemical level. For an anthropologist, the most obvious route to formulate a critique of a project such as the foreign intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina is to draw attention to the importance of local cultural specificities. Despite the recent vogue of rhetorically incorporating ‘culture’ into global governance, the predominance of the human rights framework allowed the portrayal of those intervention policies as a neutral, technical toolkit for post-war recovery rather than as a Western-derived, historically specific process of societal transformation. And of course I agree, almost by professional default, with those who argue that such a blanket application of Western policy models is deeply problematic. This is not to say that

the 'indigenous' is always and everywhere superior, but rather that any policy should at least include an understanding of it. From my numerous encounters with employees of the Foreign Intervention Agencies<sup>2</sup> in Bosnia-Herzegovina, I came to consider the parameters within which they worked as constituting a self-perpetuating system that discouraged critical reflection on its own assumptions. To be fair, many of these individuals themselves attempted to reduce the degree to which their work implied submission to a pragmatic treadmill and thought it important to be as attentive as possible to local realities. Many others, however, did not even attempt to build a minimum of familiarity with the lives their activities were affecting dramatically. Much decision-making, particularly on the higher echelons, was characterised by a staggering absence of insight into the everyday lives of 'ordinary Bosnians'.<sup>3</sup> As many critics of the foreign intervention have pointed out, the resulting disregard for locally held sensitivities and priorities was bound to alienate intended beneficiaries and to generate resentment. Particularly since such non-engagement was often not even accompanied by an appropriately modest attitude, I found it only normal that many Bosnians, regardless of how they viewed the nationalist leaderships, retreated into a blanket perception of 'the foreigners' as arrogant at worst or ignorant at best.

Having said that, despite their continued validity, such cultural relativist criticisms of the policies of the Foreign Intervention Agencies are limited in scope and, more to the point, in the Bosnian case much of their critical power has been mortally discredited by their abuse in exclusivist nationalisms. The proponents of the latter invested much energy to ensure that the strictly national perspective on which they built their fortunes remained the only legitimate one to discuss all things Bosnian.<sup>4</sup> To a lesser extent, the Foreign Intervention Agencies too tended to reduce problems of legitimacy to national ones and institutionalise them as such, most notably through the consolidation of the country's division in entities. In this context, therefore, rather than merely following in the footsteps of generations of anthropologists who have relentlessly, and in my view largely correctly, deployed cultural relativism against the various dominant ethnocentrisms of the 20th century, I hope to go beyond this conventional route. The most urgent critique of the foreign intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina today, I argue in this text, includes sensitivity to cultural difference, but requires, first and foremost, an eye for socio-political contingency.

### **'Home', displacement and return in Bosnia-Herzegovina**

The 1990s violence in Bosnia-Herzegovina was legitimised with reference to the incompatibility of competing conceptualisations of 'home', understood as 'homeland'. Opposed nationalist discourses represented their military campaigns as defensive operations, protecting and/or creating a territory where their nationals would be 'at home'. For most leading Serbian and Croatian nationalist politicians in Bosnia-Herzegovina, this initially implied a preference to be part of the larger national unit represented by a neighbouring 'mother state'. Later many of them, to varying degrees, transferred their focus onto the smaller territorial units they dominated. In these nationalist discourses, then, being 'at home' meant living amongst members of one's own nation on one's own territory. The dominant Bosniac discourse was more complicated: the largest national group in Bosnia-Herzegovina (but not an absolute majority) and without a neighbouring 'mother state', Bosniacs were more likely to consider the whole state territory as their homeland. However, after the war the practical effects of these differences were limited by Dayton's *de facto* division of the state into separate national homelands: the two entities, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were founded on the expulsion and/or escape of over 90% of their inhabitants of undesired nationality, and the latter was itself largely unmixed into Croatian and Bosniac-dominated zones.<sup>5</sup> The project to un-mix the population was thus extremely effective, creating three more or less 'ethnically cleansed' territories, functioning as fiefdoms of their respective nationalist authorities.

In this context, the 1995 Dayton Peace Agreements contained a radical mission statement. In addition to a set of guarantees, its Annex 7 stipulated the right of refugees and displaced persons (DPs)<sup>6</sup> to 'freely return to their homes of origin', as opposed to the clauses of 'return to country of origin', more commonly used by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. The Foreign Intervention Agencies invested ample resources in the return process and, over time, local authorities were put under heavy pressure in order to secure its success. Return would reverse the residential patterns resulting from the 1990s post-Yugoslav military campaigns and, while this was not explicitly stated, the nationality/territory grid of 1991 thus came to function as a yardstick, with the Foreign Intervention Agencies working to recreate a population structure that resembled the pre-war one as closely as possible. Even though disputed – often in

incompatible ways – by both Bosnians and foreigners – return was treated, particularly in the early years, as *the* key to sustainable post-war recovery in Bosnia-Herzegovina.<sup>7</sup>

If Annex 7 stated that ‘early return was an important objective of the settlement of the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina’, it seems fair to say that it was particularly important for those who exercised control over the text. As in all ‘humanitarian’ campaigns, it would be naïve to see these policy choices in isolation from pragmatic domestic and geopolitical considerations of the intervening forces. While I am not in a position to analyse the latter,<sup>8</sup> it is clear that the interests of the North American and West European governments that shaped the intervention were largely compatible with a moral stance against ‘ethnic cleansing’. Their pro-return policies resonated with a legal human rights framework, particularly through its privileging of safety and property, and also linked in with a wider sedentarist discourse of rootedness and nationality.<sup>9</sup> If persons are conceptualised as collectively rooted in a particular place through culture, deriving their identity from this territorialisation, refugee return (i.e. re-allocation to territory) is seen to restore the ‘natural’ order of the world. This is not to say that personnel of the Foreign Intervention Agencies were explicitly motivated by a programmatic commitment to such a discourse, but rather that it coloured a set of assumptions that underpinned their actions. In any case, whatever the relative importance of moral, cosmological and interest factors in their making, intervention policies relied on return as a good thing: good for refugees (taking up their human right to go home), good for governments hosting them (another worry of their hands) and just plain good (the way the world should be). In the rhetoric of the Foreign Intervention Agencies, then, the message was clear: in order to re-make Bosnia-Herzegovina into a ‘home’ for all its citizens, these citizens first needed to ‘return home’.

Reflecting this emphasis, return statistics, regularly compiled by United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, featured heavily in media briefings and provided measurable benchmarks for the allocation of funds as well as keenly monitored performance indicators of the intervention itself.<sup>10</sup> By 2005 it was widely assumed that a saturation point had been reached with just over a million returnees, out of the estimated total displacement of almost 2.5 m. Some commentators consider this no mean feat, whereas others think it insufficient given the investments made. But few involved in the return process would deny that these figures represent an optimistic spin on the situation, since aggregate

statistics obscure nuances as well as diverging effects on national patterns of residence. The official tally of over a million returns should not be seen as so many reversals of 'ethnic cleansing'. The repatriation of refugees, for example, cannot be equated with return 'home', unless one conceptualises the entire state territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina as 'home' – a problematic suggestion after years of violent attempts to territorialise different national homelands. By 2000 at least half of those repatriated in host government programmes 'relocated' into internal displacement in areas dominated by political forces of their own nationality. This not only fails to reverse 'ethnic cleansing' but actually entrenches its results, since many of those repatriates occupied accommodation owned by displaced national Others. With only 60% of all reconstructed houses inhabited in 1999, the Foreign Intervention Agencies engaged in concerted efforts to invigorate DP 'minority return', earmarking reconstruction assistance for beneficiaries who had made a clear commitment to return to areas now controlled by national Others by already having attended to the site for clean-up visits, overnight stays, etc. In 2005, cumulative figures for minority returns amounted to almost 450,000.

Some organised minority return movements became attractive because they brought together political strategies of competing Bosnian political parties with concerns of safety and opportunity of the households in question.<sup>11</sup> Yet due to their concentration in particular places and their insertion into particular household strategies, even those registered minority returnees only contributed to the remaking of a 'mixed' Bosnia-Herzegovina in limited ways. Some became full-time returnees, but some tested the waters for potential return and others considered the restitution of their property as a form of compensation, aiming to sell it as soon as possible. As I have analysed in ethnographic detail elsewhere,<sup>12</sup> this involved intergenerational household strategies of inhabitation, commuting, continuing occupancy of property in displacement/relocation and rental or sale deals with national Others. Signing up for minority return often opened a route to reconstruction assistance, but many beneficiaries remained overwhelmingly oriented to what they now saw as 'their' entity in terms of administration, employment, education, health care, shopping and so on. This allowed the minimisation of safety risks and the impact of possible eviction, while it maximised room for manoeuvre within the narrow limits of post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unsurprisingly, then, given the experience of war and socio-economic crisis, there remained widespread reluctance to subject one's household to the precariousness associated with full-time minority return.

Still, the focus of the Foreign Intervention Agencies on return continued unabatedly, even though little was actually known about what Bosnians themselves wanted. The majority of the displaced voted with their feet and refrained from return. My ethnographic research findings on this issue are congruent with return statistics and poll findings.<sup>13</sup> By the turn of the millennium, very few Bosnian refugees in so-called third states (most of whom were Bosniacs from territories now part of Republika Srpska) were seriously considering actual return, even though quite a few were securing restitution of their property. In the Netherlands and in Australia, I found that many had obtained permanent residence and, often, citizenship. Those who had wished to repatriate, mainly elderly persons, had already done so, and many others had been forcibly repatriated by their host governments (both groups had often relocated). Closer to Bosnia-Herzegovina, patterns reflected the particular political strategies of the respective dominant parties: most displaced Bosnians in Serbia and in Republika Srpska have never displayed a desire to return to the Federation, while some remained undecided. Even so, by 2000, many were in practice engaged in the initial stages of repossession of their pre-war accommodation. Bosniac DPs in the Federation were much more active in calling for return, but even so, for them too stating such an interest was often the only route towards some form of compensation for war-time losses through exchange or sale.

Employees of the Foreign Intervention Agencies knew that such processes were at work behind their upbeat return statistics. There was also an awareness that homogenisation was actually continuing through relocation, a paucity of 'mixed' marriages and widespread attempts to emigrate to the West. Forced to work within the limits of their job descriptions, they relied on careful optimism and lowered expectations, within policies that increasingly focused on the restitution of property only, officially seen as 'a first step'.<sup>14</sup> With complete return deemed unfeasible, every single minority returnee was still represented as an accomplishment counting towards the laudable objective of holding up human rights, recreating a nationally mixed Bosnia-Herzegovina and delegitimising war-time 'ethnic cleansing' campaigns. In this sense, the Bosnian process was rather different from other return scenarios, such as the Guatemalan one,<sup>15</sup> where collective return was fashioned at least partly on the political terms of the refugees. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, matters were complicated by the two- or three-way nature of displacement as well as by the war gains and post-war aspirations of nationalist

leaderships. However, Bosnians increasingly found that their predicaments raised questions that could not be reduced to their 'post-war' character. In order to grasp these, we too need to broaden the scope beyond 'ethnic cleansing'.

### **Precariousness, 'home' and 'a normal life'**

The Foreign Intervention Agencies blamed the relative reluctance of displaced Bosnians to subject their households to the risks associated with full-time minority return mainly on political obstruction and related safety problems. And it is true that local authorities resisted return with discrimination, refusals to evict illegal occupants of the now dominant nationality, illegal fees for registration, insistence on the payment of energy bills run up by war-time occupants, organised yet 'spontaneous' demonstrations by DPs of the now dominant nationality, and so on. The response of the Foreign Intervention Agencies was robust, making great financial and political investments to create possibilities of safe return. This strategy was remarkably successful when considered on a comparative scale, but return still remained below the hoped-for levels. Why did not more people return? I found nuanced priorities amongst potential returnees including concerns about safety, but also about socio-economic security, infrastructure, health care and education in the place of return. There were differences along lines of age, gender, nationality, as well as trauma, but the key to understanding the reluctance to return amongst most displaced Bosnians, I argue, lies in their experience that displacement (and therefore possible return) was one dimension only of a wider battle with precariousness. And their concern was with that wider predicament.

'Precariousness' [*'neizvjesnost'*] was one of the terms people in Dayton Bosnia used most frequently to describe their lives. The late 1980s had already been marked by a socio-economic and institutional crisis, and the outbreak of war itself had been embedded in a period of chaos and uncertainty, but it had still taken many by surprise. Many Bosnians had initially believed that their displacement would be short-term but had found themselves thrown into seemingly endless limbo. In addition to their multiple experiences of loss, they were exposed to the contradictory discourses of nationalist leaders and spokespersons of the Foreign Intervention Agencies, and many had the impression that Bosnia-Herzegovina's institutional framework was shaky and possibly temporary (a feeling intensified by periodical debates on the

implications of events in Kosovo and Montenegro for its future). In fact, many of the structural arrangements conditioning their fate followed from their status as refugees or DPs as determined by the global policy regime of refuge and it was precisely the limbo of displacement that conveyed onto them a social position with its own characteristics, including some entitlements (e.g. humanitarian aid). In this context, some people, particularly the most disadvantaged, were reluctant to risk even the paradoxical certainty of *that* status.

Unsurprisingly, then, many of the displaced people I worked with were deeply disillusioned with the new Bosnian context, resulting in sometimes extreme detachment from any extra-household issues. Many felt that under Dayton 'normality' had been suspended until further notice. Nationalist discontent was only one part of this. While war-time 'ethnic cleansing' was, of course, called upon as the master explanation, the numerous experiences the displaced had in common with stayees served as the basis for a wider sense of loss of 'home'. It was common for people to exclaim that they would 'go back straight away if everything would be the same as before', thus coping with involuntary displacement through nostalgia and resignation. They yearned for the 'home' they had lost but it would be mistaken to conceptualise this 'home' in spatial terms only, leaving aside its important temporal dimension. Research findings amongst other refugee populations<sup>16</sup> shed a critical light on the tendency to understand this longing as a universal human trait, denoting a straightforward dream of return. Rather, such a 'myth of return'<sup>17</sup> denotes a continually reproduced 'home orientation' that fails to result in actual return due to practical obstacles in the life trajectories of the persons in question. Zetter has suggested that the phenomenon would be more accurately described as a 'myth of home' problematising the notion of 'home' itself and particularly the self-evidence with which it is territorialised in refugee studies and policies. Due to the emphasis on its geographical location 'home' is often represented as a timeless entity in an unchanging context of origin. This is particularly inappropriate if that context is one of radical transformation.

When working with those who were multiply victimised due to the combination of nationality, gender, health, age and socio-economic factors, one quickly realises that the women and men who lost out in Bosnia-Herzegovina during the 1990s did not only (or even necessarily) lose their house. Their predicament could not simply be understood as a consequence of their displacement. Rather, everything had changed, including they themselves. Displaced Bosnians remembered previous

*lives*, not just a previous place of residence. In this context, it is important to grasp the extent to which even the house or flat that awaited returnees often differed from the one they had left behind. In many cases it was a newly built structure, usually in-progress. Even if the building remained the same, the physical surroundings were often hardly recognisable due to the removal and addition of landmarks such as monuments, flags, factories, shops, churches or mosques. Much of the natural landscape had been modified, for example, due to war-time deforestation and road deviations reflecting the new political geography of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The human environment, of course, never reflected the pre-war situation: old neighbours had disappeared and new ones, themselves displaced, had moved in. If we conceptualise 'home' within the context of such experiences, the emphasis of the Foreign Intervention Agencies on safety in a localised bricks-and-mortar structure – itself the result of pragmatic policy making in a post-war context – was thus confronted with the socially constructed nature of 'home'. "Home", writes Zetter about Cypriot refugees, '(...) represents not just physically bounded space, but a living organism of relationships and traditions stretching back into the past'.<sup>18</sup> Displaced Bosnians knew, of course, that no return would be possible to such a 'home', for that would imply time-travel.

But what about the making of a new 'home'? In order to explore this issue, the remainder of this article introduces a second, often overlooked, strand to people's understandings of 'home': a future-oriented yearning for a 'normal life'. The centrality of this desire for a 'normal life' represents perhaps one of the greatest gaps between the policies of the Foreign Intervention Agencies and Bosnian everyday experiences. When the largely successful provision of safety proved insufficient to incite return movements on the desired scale, the former's continued (and laudable) commitment to redressing war theft and occupation was increasingly translated into the restitution of property only, regardless of actual return. But rather than being driven by a straightforward attachment to their pre-war place of residence, displaced Bosnians were overwhelmingly preoccupied with risk-minimisation and securing well-being, including, crucially, opportunities for the next generation.<sup>19</sup> Hence, a longing for 'home' inhabited in a 'normal life' combined an often knowingly desperate nostalgia for a lost set of localised social relations with a desire to overcome the current precariousness. Clearly, restitution of safety and property in people's pre-war place of residence by the Foreign Intervention Agencies provided a route towards fulfilling

at least some parts of both longings. In addition to a degree of localised 'homecoming', the ability to safely exercise ownership over a house represents a clear break with the precariousness of displacement. For some, mainly elderly persons, this was indeed sufficient enticement to actually return. However, most displaced Bosnians apparently found it lacking, particularly with regard to its future-oriented dimension. In response, many explored various routes simultaneously. First of all, they tried to resist eviction from the accommodation they occupied in the 'majority' entity. Secondly, they registered for return programmes, thus hoping to gain restitution of property and/or reconstruction assistance. Thirdly, many sought emigration to the West. Such activities represented situated coping mechanisms with prolonged precarious living conditions in an unstable institutional context, suspended between contradictory messages from local nationalist politicians and Foreign Intervention Agencies.

### **Experiences of forced displacement and forced transition?**

In order to understand such complex yearnings for 'home' amongst displaced Bosnians I believe it is crucial to contextualise their experience of precariousness not simply as a corollary of recovery from war and displacement, but also as conditioned by postsocialist political-economic 'transition'. This has been addressed all too rarely in studies of the post-Yugoslav region. In stating their commitments to Bosnia-Herzegovina, Foreign Intervention Agencies and Western mainstream media tended to emphasise issues of return and reconciliation built on a non-military solution for nationalist tensions, through rule of law, including the punishment of war crimes and the protection of minority rights, and through decentralised administration within the bounds of state sovereignty. There was, of course, a much broader political-economic agenda at work, aimed at integrating the whole post-Yugoslav region into Western geopolitical and economic spheres of influence,<sup>20</sup> but acts of intervention were legitimised predominantly as part of a 'neutral' human rights framework. In fact, while Bosnia-Herzegovina's post-war condition was continually evoked, its postsocialist transformations were rarely publicly debated. Instead, the introduction of capitalist economic models was embedded in a wider depoliticised discourse of 'reforms'. These were usually legitimised implicitly only, even though, alongside the master-narrative of war, references to socialism sometimes appeared as explanations for the slow pace of 'reforms',

attitudes towards public spending, the 'lack of entrepreneurial spirit' and what was perceived as an inherited, entrenched, unrealistic sense of entitlement amongst the population. However, as we shall see, when the past was evoked to exhort Bosnians to renew national coexistence, the socialist character of the configuration in which people had coexisted was edited out. The Foreign Intervention Agencies also tended to depoliticise the present and the future: the need for 'reforms' was not up for discussion. And, to crown the exercise of depoliticisation, the Foreign Intervention Agencies then depicted themselves, through their 'technical' human rights approach, as the only guarantee to lead Bosnia-Herzegovina from its (depoliticised) past to its (depoliticised) future.

It is important to realise the peculiar historical moment in which this dynamic took place: the early post Cold War era, characterised by a near-global movement towards the withdrawal of the state from a range of sectors of society. Alternatives, it seemed, had been successfully marginalised in the projection of a total consensus that neoliberalisation was the only possible trajectory for any political configuration. Through a rhetorical conflation of the 'good life' with particular forms of capitalism, largely ignoring the considerable elements of state intervention and welfare socialism in the Western European experience that was sometimes held up as an example, this denial of socio-political contingency is supremely summarised in the catch phrase 'it's the only game in town'. That game, however, can take rather different shapes in different contexts, as has been pointed out by a raft of studies of complex post-Cold War societal transformations.<sup>21</sup> The neoliberalising trajectory of Bosnia-Herzegovina was thus specific in that it submerged the projected 'end of history' in a technical human rights framework deployed by Foreign Intervention Agencies to end a war. As a result, the post-socialist dimension of transformations in the Bosnian case has largely, and misleadingly, remained invisible.<sup>22</sup> In other words, the (initial) 'transition' of Bosnia-Herzegovina occurred as an invisible part of a wider process of post-war reconstruction that was effectively under direct control of Western governments. My modest objective in this article is simply to undo the invisibility of such political-economic patterns, and to explain the context in which I believe it can be understood. In particular, I thus try to place return in the framework where it belonged for most Bosnians, even if this was not reflected in the policies of the Foreign Intervention Agencies.

Let me mention some indicators of these postsocialist transformations. While 1980s Yugoslavia had already been subject to restructuring

packages of the International Monetary Fund, it was in the post-war context that the capitalist model started making major in-roads. Throughout the first Dayton decade, Foreign Intervention Agencies enforced measures of so-called ‘structural market reforms’ – almost always referred to simply as ‘reforms’ – using both direct political intervention and conditional aid.<sup>23</sup> In late 2000, for example, the High Representative directly imposed new laws and amendments on issues such as taxation, benefit payments and privatisation. Post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina was deeply dependent on foreign aid and continues to be subject to a strict currency board regime operated by the Central Bank (foreign-headed up to 2004). This regime demands what is referred to as ‘prudent’ fiscal policies, debts servicing and cuts in public spending. For example, the International Monetary Fund stipulated a freeze on public-sector employment and salaries, and monthly limits on spending commitments in all ministry portfolios (a new pension and disability benefits law was introduced to prohibit payments until the budget had been adapted). In 2003, in response, there were large protests by public sector workers and pensioners in Republika Srpska who had to wait months on end for an average wage of under USD 150 or an average pension of about USD 60. When, for reasons of its own, the Republika Srpska government moved to meet some of the protestors’ demands, the Office of the High Representative, the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank and the European Commission reacted swiftly by threatening to withdraw funding for the next year. Policies were soon amended accordingly. Intervention policies included another constant of structural adjustment programmes across the globe: privatisation. Dissatisfied with progress on this issue, the Office of the High Representative launched two *Bulldozer* programmes in 2002 and 2003, ‘in an attempt to involve the business community more closely in designing the economic reform agenda’. The ‘business community’ agreed with another concern of the Foreign Intervention Agencies: ‘rapid real wage growth’. With the public sector still being the dominant employer, Bosnian governments have thus been forced not only to cut spending on the remaining welfare structures, but also to exercise ‘wage restraint’.

During my research in 2000–2001, production on Bosnian territory stood at just over a third of its pre-war figures. The average monthly wage was about USD 200 in the Federation and less than USD 150 in Republika Srpska. Registered unemployment figures – a rough indicator only due to a large informal economy and many workers on ‘paper’ contracts only – hovered around 40%, with higher proportions amongst

the youngest age groups and extremely high rates amongst returnees. Unsurprisingly, post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina had enormous health problems to deal with,<sup>24</sup> but medical institutions were deprived of even basic resources such as medicine due to their inability to pay their debts to pharmaceutical companies. Mines and other unexploded ordnances were an additional threat. Of course, the pains and gains of the 1990s were not evenly distributed. There was a strong overlap between the most successful war-profiteers, smugglers and black marketeers, and those holding positions of influence in the post-war political and economic order. They had succeeded in spreading their bets: they benefited from the black market trade *and* from most of the legal business, controlling some attractive new activities (e.g. up-market bars, restaurants and brothels servicing men working in the Foreign Intervention Agencies) and running the leftovers of pre-war firms. In the latter, they made the profit that was to be made and they vied for pole position to take private control of public assets. Hence, a newly emerged class fraction of warlords-politicians-tycoons (i.e. the much-coveted 'business community', which, à propos, was exemplary in its cross-national collaboration) had been extremely successful in positioning themselves favourably within the emerging post-war Bosnian economic order.<sup>25</sup> At the same time, in 2000 86.8% of the population received less than 4 USD per day and around a third lived in poverty according to World Bank indicators. Bosnian women were on the whole affected more by poverty than men,<sup>26</sup> and in combination with the gender factor, particularly hard hit were the lowly educated, the ill, disabled and elderly.<sup>27</sup> Republika Srpska inhabitants had substantially lower average living standards than those of the Federation and intra-entity divergences existed too, with a dramatic rise in social inequality also amongst those who shared a place of residence.<sup>28</sup> A 2003 UNHCR survey amongst DPs in the Tuzla area found that virtually no-one was permanently employed and only 24% had some form of steady work. Only 7% owned land and/or accommodation in their current place of residence, implying overwhelming dependence on the informal sector, meagre welfare benefits and some remittances. Displacement can thus be understood as one amongst a series of dimensions of disadvantage, with certain groups, such as displaced households headed by lowly educated women suffering multiple deprivation.<sup>29</sup>

'Reforms' in Bosnia remained woefully incomplete according to their advocates, but for the majority of the population, displaced or not, they further sharpened the experience of precariousness provoked by the war

(as illustrated by studies carried out by the very institutions that imposed the policies).<sup>30</sup> In this context, and to this degree, I believe it is correct to speak of an experience of ‘forced transition’ amongst the people I worked with, in addition to ‘forced displacement’. It is in the double context of post-war reconstruction *and* socio-political transformation from socialist self-management to capitalist neoliberalism, that we need to understand the small, late wages and pensions, the unreliable health care and the under-funded schooling system that plague Bosnia-Herzegovina (and, importantly, many other ‘transition’ states, with or without violent conflict). In such circumstances, many Bosnians engaged in informal economic activities that came to be eulogised as kernels of entrepreneurial development as well as labour flexibility.<sup>31</sup> In addition to some kind of *biznis*, some had obtained jobs with the Foreign Intervention Agencies, which, as we shall see, inadvertently contributed to the experience of precariousness. Of course, many also attempted to tap into reconstruction assistance, which brings us back to the issue of return.

### **Hope and political-economic transformation**

Displaced Bosnians were forced to make their decisions – including those on return – against a background of double rupture: post-war reconstruction and political-economic transformation. And while the ‘reforms’ from socialist self-management to neoliberal capitalism were implicitly presented to them as a self-evident part of a remedy for their predicament, most experienced them as further blows, contributing to the precariousness they so wished to overcome. The relative invisibility of the postsocialist dimension in the return policies of the Foreign Intervention Agencies should not distract us from the fact that, stripped to the bone, they revolved around a centrepiece of capitalism – private property.<sup>32</sup> If we understand people’s engagement with the future as ‘hope’, the early 1990s had seen a colonisation of hope by competing nationalist projects, the results of which are still looming large. The response of the Foreign Intervention Agencies was a near-total displacement of hope from the social level to the individual: a privatisation of hope. Non-national grievances tended to be swept under the post-war carpet or simply could not be heard due to the volume of nationalist voices and due to the absence of an institutional framework that could channel them.

The narrowing emphasis on the safe exercise of property reflected this process and further reinforced many people's experience of loss and regression in their life trajectories, as they felt dwarfed by large-scale changes beyond their control. Assessing their current well-being at least partly in terms of what they had known before, they were confronted with appeals to their memories of previous lives by the Foreign Intervention Agencies. But the focus here was squarely on national co-existence. Of course, Bosnians' remembered 'normality' was characterised by a context of nationally heterogeneous patterns of residence, or at least inter-national tolerance, but, unlike in the lyrical evocations of previous co-existence by the Foreign Intervention Agencies, it was *also* framed in a radically different political, social and economic configuration: developmentalist, modernising, socialist Yugoslavia. If people's sense of 'home' did not rely on an essential link between nation, self and territory, nor could it be explained solely on the premise of a desire to return safely to one's property in a pre-war, nationally mixed place of residence. A clearer picture of Bosnian yearnings for 'home' is obtained if we acknowledge that they were intimately related to a desired sense of worth, which in turn was embedded in a memory of and a longing for a 'normal life'.<sup>33</sup>

The 'normal life' that displaced Bosnians recalled, and the socially embedded security and dignity that they associated with it, was localised in a pre-war place of residence, but it also included health care, education, social welfare and – particularly – stable employment. However, there were deemed to be no grounds on which to reclaim such entitlements. Still, whatever people's assessment of Titoist politics, the Yugoslav modernising project had been the more or less self-evident context of everyday life and it was remembered as different – its difference lying in a much wider field of social organisation than simply in national co-existence. In fact, despite the fact that Yugoslavia experienced a major crisis in the 1980s, the vast majority of Bosnians I have come to know over the years remembered *better* lives. In a context of deprivation and precariousness, and with those lives irretrievably gone, they recalled some bad sides and many more good ones: relative wealth, well-being, security and opportunity within structures of welfare, employment, educational provisions and other entitlements. Studies amongst Bosnian refugees in the US have shown how the experience of socialist welfare policies has structured their appreciation of the host context: while generally relatively satisfied with their socio-economic conditions, respondents recalled the Yugoslav system to criticise US

health care in particular.<sup>34</sup> I found this discourse also, to a lesser extent, amongst Bosnian refugees in the Netherlands and Australia, where health care is also increasingly privatised. In Bosnia-Herzegovina itself a 1998 poll found that 55% of all respondents preferred a system with universal, state-organised health care, with almost all remaining ones favouring free care for certain social categories.<sup>35</sup> It would be too easy to reduce this simply to the phenomenon of Party faithfuls mourning the passing of socialism. In fact, many Bosnians had been rather disengaged from the previous political system, but it had still structured their everyday context up till 1991 and provided one of the few resources to sooth their current predicament and to imagine alternatives.

Previous labour market participation, locally and – often through Yugoslav socialist firms – abroad, had also been an important part of people’s insertion into processes that they associated with ‘a normal life’. Here again, military violence and neoliberal transformation amplified each other’s effects, as economic institutions, markets and infrastructure were dismantled physically and ideologically and workplaces set up as part of the Yugoslav socialist project were deemed non-viable from the post-war capitalist perspective. Even when reconstruction by the Foreign Intervention Agencies did include income generation initiatives, these often relied on self-employment through micro-credit schemes, craft, agriculture, etc – all aimed at encouraging entrepreneurialism and discouraging a sense of entitlement to employment. The fact that many of these projects tended to work through Non-Governmental Organisations reflected a wider substitution of unrepresentative and foreign donor-dependent agencies of so-called ‘civil society’ for a domestic social policy.<sup>36</sup>

Hence, while the Foreign Intervention Agencies’ references to Yugoslav times tended to reify national co-existence as a cultural trait and lifted it out of its socio-political configuration, Bosnians did not. Displaced Bosnians harboured yearnings for ‘home’ that included a desire to end precariousness and to create a basis from where to (re)build a ‘normal life’. For some, return to one’s pre-war place of residence provided such a promise, or a sufficiently positive step, or at least the least unattractive option. For others, it didn’t. Even when the crucial consideration of safety was largely successfully solved by the Foreign Intervention Agencies, most believed return would actually increase their *overall* precariousness (including matters of safety, livelihood, health care, education, infrastructure, and socially embedded ‘normal life’ opportunities – if not for them, then at least for the next

generation). Those who did return under those circumstances were overwhelmingly elderly persons, who would at least receive a pension, tiny and delayed as it may be. Particularly in rural areas, with no jobs to return to and, at best, a cow or a micro-credit scheme awaiting them, subsistence farming was not seriously considered by many others, even regardless of war-related considerations of nationality and safety.<sup>37</sup> In a climate of generalised precariousness they saw limited potential in agricultural self-employment, as land brought the dangers posed by mines and required the kind of long-term commitment that was typically considered risky. Moreover, at a time of intensified urbanisation and in a context long characterised by a strongly positive developmentalist discourse of modernisation,<sup>38</sup> most people deeply resented being thrown back onto what they perceived as premodern peasantry. In this context, many came to see restitution of their property in itself as the only tool on offer within Bosnia-Herzegovina for their struggle against precariousness. The narrowing focus of the Foreign Intervention Agencies on the safe restitution of property, portrayed as a technical human rights issue, thus effectively established a reliance on market mechanisms for post-war compensation.

However, the experience of Bosnian DPs and returnees was extremely contradictory, for it would be wrong to say that policies of the Foreign Intervention Agencies did not hold a promise of 'modernisation'. But this time it was capitalist modernisation that was projected and, as opposed to Titoist reconstruction after WWII, there was no matching commitment to entitlements and, particularly, employment. Due to the return/restitution emphasis, the only dimension of remembered 'modernising normality' effectively provided by Foreign Intervention Agencies was property. In an underhand way, though, many Bosnians – and particularly DPs and returnees – developed other forms of social and cultural capital to facilitate insertion into the new modernisation processes: jobs with the Foreign Intervention Agencies, foreign contacts due to refugee experiences, networks of relatives abroad and so on. Foreign Intervention Agencies provided many of the best remunerated jobs in the formal economy, even though they were considered politically sensitive (particularly amongst non-Bosniacs) and consolidated existing social inequalities as well as creating new ones.<sup>39</sup> While they provided essential income for households, they also invariably involved short contracts. Many local employees took these opportunities to build up language proficiency, social networks and finances in the hope of securing visas for Western

countries. Ironically, those individuals that the Foreign Intervention Agencies invested in as the key to Bosnia-Herzegovina's development seemed to be amongst the most likely to succeed in their visa applications. And this brings us to one of the most important vehicles for attempted re-launches of individual and household trajectories: the exact opposite of return, emigration.

An estimated 250,000 people left Bosnia-Herzegovina in the first five years *after* the war.<sup>40</sup> This phenomenon must be understood against the background of radical ruptures: for many, Bosnia-Herzegovina might have been the place where 'home' had been located before the war, but that 'home' had been irretrievably lost. So why not try to rebuild a 'normal life' in a context where precariousness was less dramatic? When explaining the reasons for their desire to emigrate, people almost invariably said: *nema perspektiva* ['there are no prospects']. More often than not this was accompanied by a sweeping gesture and a desperate yet resigned appeal to empathy: 'Look around... There's nothing here for us.' I believe that these words, and the gaze and gesture in which they were embedded, are key to understand the experiences of Bosnians in the first post-Dayton decade. Very large numbers of people expressed a desire to leave and build a 'normal life' elsewhere and even those who didn't still acknowledged it as an option. Successive surveys by the United Nations Development Programme<sup>41</sup> found that a majority of Bosnians under 50 would emigrate if given the chance. Strict visa regimes in Western states have prevented us from finding out whether they would indeed do so. Still, we should be cautious here not to counter the Foreign Intervention Agencies' 'non-political' politics with another, equally problematic reductionism that would portray Bosnians as straightforward economically driven rational individuals. Certainly, many Bosnians desired many of the trappings that were at once held out in front of them and denied to them. But the 'normality' of the life they so ardently yearned for was less a matter of financial gain than a feeling of socially-embedded security, worth and recognition. The overwhelming preoccupation with children's well-being and opportunities was central to this yearning and this is how we can understand how emigration had come to function as one of a series of central instruments in household attempts to get life trajectories on track again. The track was characterised typically as one that led to 'normality', allowing some degree of control over one's individual and collective future, which in itself had become a central axis of a struggle to create the conditions for hope.

## Conclusion

This text has aimed to make visible the double nature of Bosnian experiences of precariousness in the early post-war years, highlighting the postsocialist neoliberalisation that is all too often drowned out by a presumably neutral master narrative that combines recovery from nationalist war with the unspoken 'end of history'. With many Bosnian political discourses monopolised by nationalism, the Foreign Intervention Agencies legitimised their interventions by depoliticising the socialist Yugoslav past and reducing it to co-existence, by depoliticising the liberal-democratic, capitalist European future as 'the only game in town', and by portraying itself as the neutral, depoliticised guarantor of depoliticised neoliberalising 'reforms'. In line with this approach, and as the result of pragmatic decision-making, the remaking of 'home' in Bosnia became ever more reduced to mere restitution of private property, embedded in a 'technical' human rights discourse. The Yugoslav socialist context was surgically removed from romanticised foreign representations of past Bosnian multiculturalism, except as a nemesis to be erased in 'transition' – thus detaching national co-existence from other dimensions of remembered everyday experience. As a result, Bosnians experienced a sharp distinction between the Yugoslav Bosnia-Herzegovina of their memories and the state that now existed in the same geographical location. The denial of socio-political contingency further marginalised mundane imaginings of a Bosnian 'home' for the majority of Bosnians, as imposed neoliberalising 'reforms' reinforced their sense of precariousness. The privatisation of hope through what could be seen as an experience of 'forced transition', added to the damage of war and forced displacement, resulted in a deeply contradictory situation. On the one hand, the Foreign Intervention Agencies invested much in condemning and counter-acting those who built their political and economic capital on nationalist war. On the other hand, the neoliberal tendency to make politics invisible left no effective channels for non-national grievances, which tended to be explained away as 'growing pains' and therefore consolidated the near-monopoly of nationalist resentment as an avenue of political action.

## Notes

<sup>1</sup> See e.g. Stef Jansen, "Troubled locations: return, the life course and transformations of 'home' in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Focaal* 49 (2007 forthcoming); Stef Jansen, "Remembering with a difference: clashing memories of Bosnian conflict in everyday life," in *Bosnia: the new mosaic?*, eds. Xavier Bougarel, Ger Duijzings & Elissa Helms

(London: Ashgate, 2007); Stef Jansen, "Why do they hate us? Everyday Serbian nationalist knowledge of Muslim hatred," *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 13:2 (2003): 215–237. I carried out fifteen months of ethnographic research (2000–2001) amongst displaced and returned Bosnians of various nationalities in North-East Bosnia, in Serbia, in the Netherlands and in Australia (as part of a project developed with Andy Dawson and supported by the Toyota Foundation and the Leverhulme Trust) but also rely on over a decade of ongoing field research in Croatia, Serbia and Kosovo. I thank Dina Haynes, Tim Waters and the anonymous reviewers for very useful constructive criticism.

<sup>2</sup> I coined the blanket term Foreign Intervention Agencies to refer to inter-governmental structures such as the Office of the High Representative (OHR), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE), the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the various armed forces, as well as to major other so-called non-governmental organisations involved in reconstruction, most of which are dependent on the same governments. I focus on the conglomerate of intervening actors under the dominant US/West-European/Japanese umbrella and leave aside the specific role played by certain others, such as Gulf State governments and religious organisations. While using a monolithic term may fail to convey the variety within and between those organisations, this does reflect representations amongst both Bosnians and representatives of Foreign Intervention Agencies. The latter prefer the even more problematic term 'International Community', as do the mainstream media. Except in more or less formal contexts controlled by precisely those Foreign Intervention Agencies, I have rarely ever heard Bosnians using this term. Instead they equally sweepingly referred to '*stranci*' ('the foreigners'), sometimes specifying which state a particular organisation originated from: e.g. 'the Italians', 'the Danes', etc.

<sup>3</sup> I use the term 'Bosnian' non-nationally, standing for 'Bosnian-Herzegovinian'.

<sup>4</sup> See Stef Jansen, "National numbers in context: maps and stats in representations of the post-Yugoslav wars," *Identities: Global Studies and Power and Culture* 12:1 (2005): 45–68.

<sup>5</sup> Xavier Bougarel, *Bosnie: anatomie d'un conflit* (Paris: La Découverte, 1996).

<sup>6</sup> Following local usage, I use the term DP to refer to the category of Internally Displaced Persons.

<sup>7</sup> Sophie Albert, "The return of refugees to Bosnia-Herzegovina: peacebuilding with people," *International Peacekeeping* 4:3 (1997): 1–23; Richard Black, "Conceptions of 'home' and the political geography of refugee repatriation: between assumption and contested reality in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Applied Geography* 22:2 (2002): 123–138; Caroline Phuong, "'Freely to return': reversing ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 13:2 (2000): 165–183.

<sup>8</sup> English-language starting points for a wider discussion on foreign policy making with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina include Sumantra Bose, *Bosnia after Dayton: nationalist partition and international intervention* (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002); Steven Burg & Paul Shoup, *The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina: ethnic conflict and international intervention* (Armonk: ME Sharpe, 1999); David Campbell, *National deconstruction: violence, identity and justice in Bosnia* (Minneapolis: Minnesota UP, 1998); David Chandler, *Bosnia: faking democracy after Dayton* (London: Pluto Press, 1999); Gerald Knaus & Felix Martin, "Travails of the European raj," *Journal of Democracy* 14:3 (2003): 60–75; Gearóid Ó Tuathail, "Between a holocaust and a quagmire: 'Bosnia' in the US

geo-political imagination,” in *Critical geopolitics* (London: Routledge 1996); Gearóid Ó Tuathail, “Embedding Bosnia-Herzegovina in Euro-Atlantic structures: from Dayton to Brussels,” *Eurasian Geography and Economics* 46:1 (2005), 51–67; Žarko Papić, ed., *Policies of international support to South-East European countries: lessons (not) learnt from Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: Open Society Institute, 2001).

<sup>9</sup> Stef Jansen & Staffan Löfving, eds., *Struggles for home: violence, hope and the movement of people* (Oxford: Berghahn, forthcoming).

<sup>10</sup> See Jansen, “National numbers”. Unless otherwise stated, all figures are taken from United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees statistics on www.unhcr.ba.

<sup>11</sup> Jansen, “Troubled locations”, “Remembering with a difference”, “Why do they hate us?”. See also Ayaki Ito, “Politicisation of minority return in Bosnia-Herzegovina- the first five years examined,” *International Journal of Refugee Law* 13:1/2 (2001): 98–122; Lisa D’Onofrio, “Welcome Home? Minority Return in South-East Republika Srpska,” *Sussex Migration Working Paper* No. 19 (2004); Sophie Albert, “The Return of Refugees”.

<sup>12</sup> Jansen, “Troubled locations”, “Remembering with a difference”, “Why do they hate us?”.

<sup>13</sup> E.g. Vesna Lukić & Vladimir Nikitović, “Refugees from Bosnia and Herzegovina in Serbia: a study of refugee selectivity,” *International Migration* 42:4 (2004): 102. UNHCR/CRPC, Return, relocation and property rights: a discussion paper (Sarajevo: UNHCR/CRPC, 1997); UNHCR, *Survey on DPs in Tuzla Canton from the Podrinje Area* (Tuzla: UNHCR, 2003).

<sup>14</sup> Charles Philpott, “Though the dog is dead, the pig must be killed: finishing with property restitution to Bosnia-Herzegovina’s IDPs and refugees,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 18:1 (2005): 14.

<sup>15</sup> Finn Stepputat, “Repatriation and the politics of space: the case of the Mayan diaspora,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 7:2/3 (1994): 175–185.

<sup>16</sup> E.g. Madawi Al-Rasheed, “The myth of return: Iraqi Arab and Assyrian refugees in London,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 7:2/3 (1994): 199–219; Roger Zetter, “Reconceptualizing the myth of return: continuity and transition amongst the Greek-Cypriot refugees of 1974,” *Journal of Refugee Studies* 12:1 (1999): 1–22.

<sup>17</sup> Muhammad Anwar, *The myth of return: Pakistanis in Britain* (London: Heinemann, 1979).

<sup>18</sup> Zetter, op. cit.: 12.

<sup>19</sup> See UNHCR, *Returnee monitoring study: minority returnees to Republika Srpska* (Sarajevo: UNHCR, 2000); World Bank, *Bosnia-Herzegovina: local level institutions and social capital study (Vol. 1)* (Washington: World Bank, ECSSD, 2002). Similar priorities seem to be prevalent amongst ‘actual’ Sarajevo returnees, see Anders Stefansson, “Sarajevo suffering: homecoming and the hierarchy of homeland hardship,” in Fran Markowitz & Anders Stefansson, eds., *Homecomings. Unsettling paths return* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2004): 54–75.

<sup>20</sup> Don Kalb “Afterword: globalism and post-socialist prospects,” Chris Hann, ed., *Postsocialism: ideals, ideologies and local practice* (London: Routledge, 2002).

<sup>21</sup> E.g. Chris Hann, ed., *Postsocialism: ideals, ideologies and practices in Eurasia* (London: Routledge, 2002); Roland Paris, *At war’s end: building peace after civil conflict* (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004); Staffan Löfving, “Liberal emplacement: violence, home, and the transforming space of popular protest in Central America,” in

Stef Jansen & Staffan Löfving, eds., *Struggles for home*; David Harvey, *Spaces of hope* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh UP, 2000). For a critique contextualising these processes in East/West and development debates, see Elizabeth Dauphinée, "Faith, hope and neoliberalism: mapping economies of violence in the margins of Europe," *Dialectical Anthropology* 27 (2003): 189–203.

<sup>22</sup> Cf. Andrew Gilbert, "The past in parenthesis: (non)post-socialism in post-war Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Anthropology Today* 22:4 (2006): 14–18. Even many critiques of the Dayton project rely precisely on the neoliberal aversion to politics as a society-making project, as highlighted by Gearóid Ó Tuathail G. & Carl Dahlman, "The effort to reverse ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the limits of returns," *Eurasian geography and economics* 45:6 (2004): 439–464.

<sup>23</sup> Unless otherwise indicated, all figures in this section are taken from the impeccably 'pro-reforms' Economist Intelligence Unit [www.eiu.com].

<sup>24</sup> *Oslobodenje*, "Doktori liječe nezaposlenost" 17 March 2001.

<sup>25</sup> Peter Andreas, "The clandestine political economy of war and peace in Bosnia," *International Studies Quarterly* 48:1 (2004): 29–51; Michael Pugh, "Post-war political economy in Bosnia-Herzegovina: the spoils of peace," *Global Governance* 8:4 (2002): 467–482; Michael Pugh, Neil Cooper & Jonathan Goodhand, *War economies in a regional context: challenges of transformation* (Boulder: Lynn Rienner, 2004); Carl-Ulrik Schierup, ed., *Scramble for the Balkans: nationalism, globalism and the political economy of reconstruction* (Basingstoke: MacMillan, 1999).

<sup>26</sup> Michael Lokshin & Thomas A. Mroz, *Gender and Poverty: a life cycle approach to the analysis of the differences in gender outcomes* (World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 3151, 2003).

<sup>27</sup> In 2000, average monthly pensions were under USD 90 (Federation) and under USD 60 (RS). Even in the richer Federation, half of all pensioners received less than USD 75 (*Oslobodenje*, "Penzija ni pola plaće", 30 October 2000). Due to extremely irregular payments of wages and benefits, the term 'monthly' should not be taken literally here.

<sup>28</sup> Marcelo Bisogno & Alberto Chong, "On the determinants of inequality in Bosnia-Herzegovina," *Economies of Transition* 10:2 (2002): 311–337; "Poverty and inequality in Bosnia-Herzegovina after the civil war," *World Development* 30:1 (2002): 61–75.

<sup>29</sup> UNHCR, *Extremely vulnerable individuals* (Sarajevo: UNHCR, 1999); *Daunting prospects. Minority women: obstacles to their return and integration*. (Sarajevo: UNHCR, 2000).

<sup>30</sup> World Bank, *A social assessment of Bosnia-Herzegovina* (Washington: World Bank, ECSSD, 1999); *Bosnia-Herzegovina poverty assessment (Vol. II): data on poverty* (Washington: World Bank, 2003).

<sup>31</sup> Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Profiles/Reports Bosnia-Herzegovina* (London: The Economist, 2002/2003/2004).

<sup>32</sup> Cf. Kalb, "Afterword", 320. Note that in Yugoslavia, in 1991, 20% of all flats, particularly in the cities, were socially owned and allocated with long term, inheritable leases [*stanarsko pravo*, 'right to residence'], usually organised through the workplace.

<sup>33</sup> Jansen, "Troubled locations"; Stef Jansen, *Antinacionalizam: etnografija otpora u Zagrebu i Beogradu* (Beograd: XX Vek, 2005); Stef Jansen, "Who's afraid of white socks? Towards a critical understanding of post-Yugoslav urban self-perceptions," *Ethnologia Balkanica* 9 (2005), 151–167.

<sup>34</sup> Judith Owens-Manley & Reed Coughlan, "Adaptation of refugees during cross-cultural transitions: Bosnian refugees in Upstate New York," *Levitt Report*, Hamilton University (2000); H. Russell Searight, "Bosnian immigrants' perceptions of the US health care system: a qualitative interview study" *Journal of Immigrant Health* 5:2 (2002): 87–93.

<sup>35</sup> From the entity Ministries of Health's 1999 *Health Expenditures and Perceptions Surveys* [both available on [www.wordbank.org](http://www.wordbank.org)].

<sup>36</sup> Paul Stubbs, "'Social sector' or the diminution of social policy? Regulating welfare regimes in contemporary Bosnia-Herzegovina," In Žarko Papić, ed., *Policies of international support to South-East European countries: lessons (not) learnt from Bosnia and Herzegovina* (Sarajevo: Open Society Institute, 2001): 95–107; Paul Stubbs, "Globalisation, memory and welfare regimes in transition: towards an anthropology of transnational policy transfers," *International Journal of Social Welfare* 11 (2002): 321–330.

<sup>37</sup> See Jansen, "Troubled locations"; Stef Jansen "The violence of memories: local narratives of the past after ethnic cleansing in Croatia," *Rethinking History* 6:1 (2002): 77–93; Stef Jansen, "The (dis)comfort of conformism: post-war nationalism and coping with powerlessness in Croatian villages," in Ton Otto, Henrik Thrane & Helle Vandkilde, eds., *Warfare and society* (Aarhus: Aarhus UP, 2006). See Lukić & Nikitović, op. cit.

<sup>38</sup> I use the term 'modernisation' here not as a normative social theoretical paradigm but as an emic term for a future-oriented sense of improvement and progress (cf. Jansen, "Who's afraid"; *Antinacionalizam*).

<sup>39</sup> Cf. Marta Bruno, "Playing the co-operation game: strategies around international aid in post-socialist Russia," in Sue Bridger & Frances Pine, eds., *Surviving post-socialism* (London: Routledge, 1998): 170–187; Paul Stubbs, "NGO work with forced migrants in Croatia: lineages of a global middle class?," *International Peacekeeping* 4:4 (1997): 50–60.

<sup>40</sup> BHT Dnevnik (evening TV news), 09 February 2001; Vedrana Seksan, "Ostati ovdje?," *BH Dani* 19 January 2001.

<sup>41</sup> UNDP, *Early warning, quarterly report* (Sarajevo, Jan–Mar 2004): 54.