Online appendix for "Political motivations and electoral competition"*

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This appendix provides supplementary material for the paper "Political motivations and electoral competition: Equilibrium analysis and experimental evidence" by Michalis Drouvelis, Alejandro Saporiti and Nicolaas J. Vriend, published in *Games and Economic Behavior* (forthcoming).

The appendix contains disaggregated data as well as econometric analysis corresponding to the experimental section of the paper referred to above. Table 1 shows for each of the seven treatments for each period the mean position as well as the standard deviation for the Left players and for the Right players. The table also reports the average absolute distance from the Nash equilibrium as well as the standard deviation. For Treatment 6 with a mixed strategy equilibrium, it reports the distance from the support as well as the distance from the entire equilibrium distribution. The table also provides averages of these statistics for selected intervals of the 60 periods.

Table 2 complements the information provided by Table 1 by showing for each treatment for selected intervals the average position of the Left and of the Right player for each matching pair.

Table 3 displays for each treatment the average payoff of the Left and of the Right player for each matching pair over the 60 periods.

Table 4 displays the ordinary least square regressions corresponding to the learning analysis found in Section 6.2 of the paper.

Finally, this appendix concludes with providing a set of instructions received by the subjects in one the experimental treatments as well as the control questionnaire.

period(s)	position Left		position Right		avg. distance from NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	35.4	14.6	61.8	21.2	17.1	12.2
2	40.0	13.6	52.2	17.2	11.8	9.2
3	40.7	12.8	57.9	10.2	9.0	10.0
4	45.9	11.7	61.0	16.1	9.2	11.8
5	48.7	18.1	59.8	10.6	9.6	9.6
6	44.9	8.9	58.6	15.0	7.6	9.3
7	45.4	7.5	53.4	10.2	5.5	7.1
8	45.0	22.4	52.1	19.1	12.4	13.1
9	42.3	12.4	53.9	7.9	6.6	8.4
10	45.3	12.7	54.0	8.4	5.5	9.6
11	44.2	11.9	52.8	4.8	4.3	8.0
12	52.4	11.6	55.8	7.8	4.9	7.7
13	47.1	6.1	52.8	5.2	3.1	5.1
14	53.2	14.4	52.7	5.5	3.7	7.4
15	45.2	12.7	54.5	11.3	5.0	11.8
16	49.8	13.4	54.6	11.3	5.2	11.0
17	45.4	11.3	55.8	9.1	5.3	7.9
18	47.8	4.5	54.6	8.2	3.6	5.5
19	47.8	6.1	56.1	12.2	5.0	6.6
20	50.5	1.4	53.5	6.9	2.4	3.4
21	47.8	13.8	55.5	11.7	5.7	8.6
22	47.7	8.3	53.5	15.7	5.2	9.9
23	46.5	16.5	53.6	9.8	6.2	10.5
24	46.5	8.5	54.2	8.7	4.0	7.8
25	45.3	9.6	52.0	6.9	3.3	7.1
26	48.8	5.8	52.3	4.9	2.6	4.7
27	47.5	6.2	48.1	8.5	2.8	4.9
28	52.6	14.7	55.6	12.0	5.6	12.7
29	53.6	14.0	52.3	4.0	3.3	8.2
30	43.0	14.9	51.1	2.5	4.1	7.8
31	41.2	16.2	56.8	11.7	8.6	10.1
32	46.3	8.5	57.3	13.0	6.4	9.2
33	47.7	5.6	54.8	11.9	3.6	8.6
34	47.2	8.5	47.3	14.5	4.7	10.3
35	47.0	9.7	54.1	11.0	3.6	10.3
36	47.2	18.3	54.2	11.1	6.6	10.0
37	43.8	14.0	52.8	8.8	5.6	8.8
38	48.1	19.1	55.4	13.3	8.3	10.2
39	45.1	18.1	52.8	6.6	7.1	9.8
40	49.3	15.1	51.4	3.0	4.2	7.2
41	49.5	1.4	52.2	6.5	1.8	3.2
42	50.5	6.1	53.8	11.2	3.2	6.5
43	51.8	13.8	52.3	8.3	4.1	9.0
44	51.5	12.8	53.8	9.6	4.3	10.4
45	51.2	12.9	54.4	9.6	4.7	7.7
46	50.0	4.1	51.4	3.0	1.5	3.0
47	49.6	1.4	51.9	5.6	1.2	3.0
48	50.2	2.2	49.6	1.4	0.7	1.5
49	50.2	0.6	52.3	4.4	1.2	2.2
50	48.6	3.3	54.6	9.7	3.2	6.2
51	46.9	7.8	51.5	3.8	2.3	5.7
52	48.8	4.2	51.5	5.5	1.3	4.9
53	49.2	1.9	49.9	0.3	0.4	1.0
54	49.9	0.3	49.6	1.4	0.2	0.8
55	48.8	10.4	50.0	0.0	2.1	4.8
56	48.5	5.5	54.6	11.3	3.1	6.6
57	48.8	4.2	50.8	2.8	1.0	3.5
58	49.2	2.8	50.8	2.8	0.8	1.9
59	48.4	5.5	50.0	0.0	0.8	2.8
60	47.8	8.3	53.1	11.1	2.7	6.6
1-10	43.4	13.5	56.5	13.6	9.4	10.0
11-20	48.3	9.3	54.3	8.2	4.2	7.4
21-30	48.0	11.2	52.8	8.5	4.3	8.2
1-30	46.5	11.3	54.5	10.1	6.0	8.6
31-40	46.3	13.3	53.7	10.5	5.9	9.5
41-50	50.3	5.9	52.6	6.9	2.6	5.3
51-60	48.6	5.1	51.2	3.9	1.5	3.9
31-60	48.4	8.1	52.5	7.1	3.3	6.2
1-60	47.5	9.7	53.5	8.6	4.6	7.4

(a) Treatment 1.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium.

period(s)	position Left		position Right		avg. distance from NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	37.5	15.1	64.1	29.3	15.6	10.1
2	33.5	13.0	60.2	20.7	11.2	7.9
3	39.7	10.0	59.6	10.6	6.5	6.6
4	43.2	6.1	60.3	9.9	4.8	4.2
5	39.0	8.4	59.4	7.6	4.8	4.6
6	39.5	9.6	59.8	8.2	4.5	7.0
7	42.0	5.1	61.4	5.6	3.3	4.4
8	40.8	3.3	61.2	6.7	2.2	3.9
9	41.6	5.8	57.5	4.2	3.1	4.0
10	40.5	4.4	57.7	5.6	3.4	3.7
11	41.2	3.2	60.2	4.8	1.7	3.3
12	39.6	6.6	59.0	3.9	2.7	4.2
13	40.5	3.7	58.9	3.8	1.7	3.3
14	38.4	10.5	58.9	7.4	3.8	7.4
15	41.2	3.2	59.0	3.2	1.1	3.1
16	41.3	3.2	60.3	0.9	0.8	1.8
17	40.4	3.7	61.1	3.1	1.4	2.7
18	40.6	3.5	59.9	2.1	1.2	1.9
19	40.5	3.7	61.3	2.8	1.4	2.4
20	37.4	10.4	62.4	9.9	4.1	6.2
21	39.6	6.0	59.0	3.2	1.8	4.1
22	40.6	3.5	59.7	1.8	1.1	1.8
23	41.2	3.2	61.6	3.5	1.4	2.3
24	39.8	0.6	59.8	0.6	0.2	0.6
25	40.4	4.3	59.2	1.8	1.4	2.4
26	40.7	3.4	59.6	1.3	0.9	1.8
27	40.9	3.2	59.6	1.3	0.8	1.7
28	40.1	0.3	60.5	1.6	0.3	0.8
29	40.5	3.7	59.0	3.2	1.3	2.7
30	40.6	3.5	61.0	3.2	1.2	2.6
31	42.0	7.9	59.7	4.1	2.9	5.2
32	42.1	6.3	58.9	3.1	1.6	3.3
33	40.5	1.6	59.3	3.4	0.9	1.9
34	39.8	0.6	59.4	3.5	0.8	1.8
35	39.7	0.9	58.6	3.3	0.9	1.8
36	39.9	0.3	60.2	4.8	1.2	2.1
37	39.8	0.6	59.8	4.3	1.0	2.1
38	40.3	0.9	58.8	3.2	0.8	1.7
39	40.2	0.6	58.7	3.2	0.8	1.7
40	39.9	0.3	59.6	1.6	0.4	0.8
41	39.8	0.6	59.0	3.2	0.6	1.6
42	40.0	0.0	58.7	3.2	0.7	1.6
43	39.9	0.3	58.9	3.1	0.6	1.6
44	40.0	0.0	59.5	3.7	0.8	1.7
45	40.3	0.9	59.3	3.4	0.8	1.8
46	40.1	0.3	59.2	3.3	0.7	1.6
47	40.2	0.6	58.8	3.2	0.7	1.6
48	40.0	0.0	58.9	3.1	0.6	1.6
49	37.0	9.5	59.0	3.2	2.0	4.8
50	39.8	0.6	59.2	3.3	0.7	1.6
51	39.7	0.9	58.7	3.2	0.8	1.8
52	39.8	0.6	59.4	3.5	0.8	1.8
53	39.9	0.3	59.1	3.2	0.6	1.6
54	40.1	0.3	58.8	3.2	0.7	1.6
55	40.1	0.3	58.7	3.2	0.7	1.6
56	40.2	0.6	58.9	3.1	0.7	1.6
57	40.0	0.0	59.2	3.3	0.6	1.6
58	39.9	0.3	59.2	3.3	0.7	1.6
59	40.0	0.0	59.0	3.2	0.5	1.6
60	40.0	0.0	58.8	3.2	0.6	1.6
1-10	39.7	8.1	60.1	10.9	5.9	5.6
11-20	40.1	5.2	60.1	4.2	2.0	3.6
21-30	40.4	3.2	59.9	2.1	1.0	2.1
1-30	40.1	5.5	60.0	5.7	3.0	3.8
31-40	40.4	2.0	59.3	3.4	1.1	2.2
41-50	39.7	1.3	59.1	3.3	0.8	1.9
51-60	40.0	0.3	59.0	3.2	0.7	1.6
31-60	40.0	1.2	59.1	3.3	0.9	1.9
1-60	40.1	3.3	59.6	4.5	1.9	2.9

(b) Treatment 2.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium (continued).

period(s)	position Left		position Right		avg. distance from NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	38.2	16.0	53.1	18.8	14.6	8.2
2	47.8	7.5	53.3	15.4	6.8	6.1
3	46.3	13.1	50.8	4.5	4.4	6.0
4	44.0	13.1	53.1	4.6	5.1	7.0
5	50.4	1.7	50.2	2.2	1.0	1.5
6	49.8	0.8	51.8	4.7	1.1	2.3
7	47.9	4.5	50.4	1.6	1.4	3.0
8	45.8	12.6	49.9	6.1	3.6	7.7
9	48.0	4.0	51.3	2.5	1.7	2.6
10	48.5	2.8	50.6	1.9	1.1	2.2
11	50.4	1.4	51.0	2.8	0.9	2.0
12	49.4	1.6	50.1	4.7	1.4	2.1
13	50.0	0.0	50.9	2.8	0.5	1.4
14	50.0	0.0	50.9	2.5	0.5	1.3
15	49.8	0.6	51.0	2.8	0.6	1.4
16	49.7	0.7	50.1	0.3	0.2	0.3
17	49.4	2.0	50.5	1.8	0.9	1.4
18	49.2	2.5	49.5	1.6	0.8	2.0
19	49.9	0.3	53.4	13.1	2.5	6.3
20	49.0	3.2	49.9	0.3	0.6	1.6
21	49.0	3.2	53.4	13.0	2.8	7.8
22	49.0	3.2	49.3	1.9	0.9	1.7
23	49.0	3.2	52.0	6.3	1.5	3.4
24	49.5	1.3	55.5	15.7	3.0	7.8
25	48.9	3.1	50.0	0.0	0.6	1.6
26	49.9	0.6	50.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
27	49.9	0.6	50.0	0.0	0.2	0.2
28	50.1	0.3	50.9	2.8	0.5	1.4
29	49.9	0.3	50.1	0.3	0.1	0.3
30	50.0	0.0	50.1	0.3	0.1	0.2
31	49.3	3.7	52.4	7.9	2.2	4.1
32	49.5	1.6	46.6	13.4	3.1	6.2
33	50.2	1.9	47.0	9.5	1.9	4.7
34	50.0	0.0	48.0	6.3	1.0	3.2
35	50.0	0.0	52.5	4.2	1.3	2.1
36	49.6	3.7	52.0	4.8	1.9	3.5
37	50.5	1.6	53.6	8.1	2.1	4.8
38	50.6	1.6	53.5	9.4	2.1	4.7
39	50.5	1.6	52.5	6.3	1.5	3.2
40	49.5	1.6	51.5	3.4	1.0	2.4
41	49.5	1.3	49.5	3.7	1.0	2.2
42	49.5	1.6	50.4	1.6	0.6	1.2
43	49.5	1.6	50.6	1.6	0.6	1.6
44	50.0	0.0	51.5	3.4	0.8	1.7
45	50.0	0.0	50.5	1.6	0.3	0.8
46	50.0	0.0	49.5	3.7	0.8	1.7
47	50.3	1.3	51.5	3.4	1.0	2.1
48	50.1	0.3	50.4	1.6	0.4	0.8
49	49.9	0.3	50.0	0.0	0.1	0.2
50	50.0	0.0	49.4	1.6	0.3	0.8
51	50.0	0.0	50.0	0.0	0.0	0.0
52	49.5	1.6	50.4	1.6	0.6	1.0
53	49.5	1.6	49.8	0.4	0.4	0.8
54	49.5	1.6	52.0	6.0	1.3	3.8
55	49.7	0.9	49.9	0.3	0.2	0.6
56	50.0	0.0	49.8	0.6	0.1	0.3
57	49.5	1.6	50.0	0.0	0.3	0.8
58	49.8	0.6	46.0	12.6	2.1	6.3
59	48.7	3.2	46.0	12.6	2.7	6.3
60	49.5	1.6	50.1	0.3	0.3	0.9
1-10	46.7	7.6	51.5	6.2	4.0	4.7
11-20	49.7	1.2	50.7	3.3	0.9	2.0
21-30	49.5	1.6	51.1	4.0	1.0	2.5
1-30	48.6	3.5	51.1	4.5	2.0	3.0
31-40	50.0	1.7	51.0	7.4	1.8	3.9
41-50	49.9	0.6	50.3	2.2	0.6	1.3
51-60	49.6	1.3	49.4	3.5	0.8	2.1
31-60	49.8	1.2	50.2	4.3	1.0	2.4
1-60	49.2	2.3	50.7	4.4	1.5	2.7

(c) Treatment 3.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium (continued).

period(s)	position Left		position Right		avg. distance from NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	37.4	3.7	62.2	8.7	5.0	3.0
2	44.3	6.5	57.1	5.5	4.8	3.6
3	47.9	10.0	59.8	4.7	6.1	4.9
4	40.1	5.2	62.9	3.2	3.5	1.8
5	38.5	14.2	59.9	2.4	3.8	6.3
6	46.8	15.3	59.1	3.2	5.1	8.0
7	37.2	12.8	60.0	2.6	3.2	7.0
8	41.2	4.2	60.2	2.6	2.2	2.1
9	42.7	5.6	61.1	3.2	2.8	2.7
10	38.4	2.7	60.6	1.1	1.2	1.6
11	38.7	3.1	60.1	2.8	2.0	2.1
12	39.9	3.1	60.8	1.9	1.2	1.4
13	38.3	8.4	61.5	2.3	2.7	3.6
14	39.4	2.3	61.6	3.3	1.9	2.1
15	40.0	2.7	59.7	3.2	2.0	1.5
16	39.6	2.4	60.6	2.1	1.1	1.4
17	39.4	2.5	60.3	2.1	1.2	1.2
18	39.6	2.3	61.6	2.8	1.4	1.4
19	39.9	2.5	61.2	2.0	1.4	1.2
20	39.7	2.1	59.9	2.6	1.1	1.3
21	39.6	3.0	60.3	2.1	1.4	1.3
22	38.8	2.0	60.7	2.2	1.2	1.4
23	38.5	3.0	60.0	2.5	1.4	2.0
24	39.3	3.2	60.0	2.4	1.5	1.9
25	39.3	2.2	59.9	2.8	1.3	1.4
26	39.2	2.5	61.1	2.2	1.4	1.4
27	39.2	3.3	60.8	1.9	1.3	1.5
28	40.0	3.7	60.4	2.1	1.3	1.9
29	40.3	0.7	60.9	2.1	0.7	1.1
30	39.7	2.1	60.4	2.2	1.0	1.3
31	40.0	4.9	62.1	3.5	2.6	3.0
32	41.6	7.1	60.2	3.0	2.7	3.3
33	38.9	3.5	60.3	2.4	1.5	2.2
34	40.5	1.3	60.5	2.5	1.0	1.4
35	40.9	1.7	60.5	2.0	0.9	1.2
36	39.8	0.6	60.9	1.9	0.7	0.9
37	39.8	0.6	60.6	1.3	0.4	0.7
38	42.2	6.3	60.7	2.0	1.6	3.1
39	40.4	1.0	61.2	2.0	0.8	1.3
40	39.8	0.4	61.2	2.1	0.7	1.1
41	40.1	0.3	60.0	2.4	0.6	1.0
42	40.0	0.5	58.8	6.2	1.3	2.9
43	39.3	1.9	60.3	2.2	0.8	1.3
44	40.1	0.3	61.2	2.5	0.7	1.2
45	39.8	0.4	58.7	7.2	1.6	3.5
46	39.3	1.9	61.5	3.6	1.2	2.6
47	39.3	1.9	60.6	1.9	0.7	1.2
48	40.1	0.3	60.8	1.9	0.5	1.0
49	36.8	11.6	60.8	1.9	2.5	5.6
50	40.0	0.9	60.9	2.2	0.8	1.1
51	40.1	0.3	60.6	2.0	0.5	1.0
52	39.9	0.3	60.3	2.2	0.5	1.0
53	39.9	0.3	60.6	1.9	0.4	0.9
54	41.5	4.7	61.0	3.2	1.4	2.8
55	40.0	0.0	60.6	1.9	0.3	0.9
56	40.0	0.5	61.1	2.3	0.7	1.2
57	40.2	0.6	61.1	5.5	1.2	2.6
58	40.3	0.9	61.0	2.8	0.7	1.9
59	40.4	1.0	60.3	2.2	0.7	1.2
60	40.0	0.5	58.8	6.2	1.3	3.0
1-10	41.5	8.0	60.3	3.7	3.8	4.1
11-20	39.5	3.1	60.7	2.5	1.6	1.7
21-30	39.4	2.6	60.5	2.2	1.2	1.5
1-30	40.1	4.6	60.5	2.8	2.2	2.5
31-40	40.4	2.7	60.8	2.3	1.3	1.8
41-50	39.5	2.0	60.4	3.2	1.0	2.1
51-60	40.2	0.9	60.5	3.0	0.7	1.7
31-60	40.0	1.9	60.6	2.8	1.0	1.9
1-60	40.1	3.2	60.5	2.8	1.6	2.2

(d) Treatment 4.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium (continued).

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period(s)	position Left		position Right		avg. distance from NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	22.2	9.1	68.8	23.8	27.2	7.9
2	24.0	7.7	71.6	13.3	9.7	4.8
3	21.6	3.7	76.8	10.5	4.8	3.9
4	31.7	21.4	76.0	8.1	8.4	10.2
5	18.2	4.7	78.6	6.3	4.1	3.3
6	28.1	23.6	78.0	5.8	7.5	11.9
7	22.8	8.0	78.1	7.9	5.0	4.8
8	25.2	23.1	77.8	7.7	7.0	12.5
9	21.2	6.1	77.7	6.6	3.9	3.7
10	21.7	4.3	80.0	9.9	3.8	5.0
11	19.8	3.8	81.0	3.6	1.9	2.1
12	24.5	9.9	80.7	3.9	3.9	5.1
13	21.1	3.7	81.0	3.2	1.6	2.0
14	19.7	3.1	78.2	7.6	2.8	3.4
15	26.6	22.5	77.7	6.7	5.8	10.8
16	19.2	3.5	80.0	2.4	1.5	1.7
17	20.0	3.3	81.0	4.8	2.4	2.3
18	19.7	2.0	78.3	8.2	2.9	4.0
19	19.0	2.1	80.9	6.1	2.3	3.0
20	22.8	10.0	81.4	3.7	3.0	5.5
21	20.5	1.6	80.9	3.3	1.1	1.9
22	19.9	4.5	81.4	3.4	2.0	3.4
23	20.7	5.3	82.1	4.8	2.4	4.6
24	18.7	3.4	79.9	2.1	1.3	2.1
25	19.4	2.0	73.9	22.7	4.6	11.9
26	19.0	4.2	82.3	5.3	2.5	3.9
27	26.0	19.3	80.2	2.6	4.4	9.2
28	19.9	2.8	80.6	2.0	1.2	1.7
29	19.4	3.4	82.3	5.0	2.1	3.3
30	20.0	4.1	82.8	5.0	2.6	4.0
31	27.1	22.0	81.3	4.4	5.5	10.6
32	26.1	19.1	79.9	2.2	4.1	9.2
33	20.3	2.7	80.3	1.8	1.1	1.5
34	21.3	2.5	80.6	3.5	1.5	2.5
35	21.4	2.1	80.2	2.4	1.3	1.8
36	20.5	2.1	80.7	3.2	1.4	1.9
37	19.7	1.9	79.8	0.6	0.6	0.9
38	21.8	4.4	81.8	3.8	2.0	3.4
39	20.2	3.9	80.5	2.8	1.7	2.2
40	21.8	10.3	80.9	3.8	3.1	5.1
41	21.4	6.7	81.9	3.1	2.3	3.4
42	21.4	6.8	80.5	2.7	1.9	3.2
43	22.1	7.6	79.1	3.3	2.7	3.9
44	21.3	7.7	80.1	4.5	3.1	5.1
45	22.7	7.0	80.5	2.4	2.1	3.5
46	21.1	6.9	80.6	1.7	1.9	4.0
47	22.9	9.5	80.3	0.9	1.7	4.7
48	23.1	6.9	79.5	1.6	2.1	3.4
49	21.4	8.1	80.4	1.2	2.5	3.6
50	21.6	7.0	80.6	2.4	1.8	3.3
51	22.0	7.1	80.3	0.9	1.5	3.5
52	22.6	7.2	80.0	0.5	1.4	3.6
53	20.9	8.7	81.1	3.6	2.7	4.5
54	22.9	8.0	80.3	0.7	1.8	3.9
55	21.9	8.6	81.2	2.4	2.3	4.8
56	18.6	3.5	79.5	2.0	1.3	2.3
57	22.2	10.1	80.4	1.3	2.2	4.9
58	22.8	9.6	80.2	1.4	2.0	4.7
59	22.8	9.7	79.6	1.8	2.2	4.6
60	21.3	12.0	80.7	2.0	3.1	5.8
1-10	23.7	11.2	76.3	10.0	8.1	6.8
11-20	21.2	6.4	80.0	5.0	2.8	4.0
21-30	20.4	5.1	80.6	5.6	2.4	4.6
1-30	21.8	7.5	79.0	6.9	4.4	5.1
31-40	22.0	7.1	80.6	2.9	2.2	3.9
41-50	21.9	7.4	80.4	2.4	2.2	3.8
51-60	21.8	8.5	80.3	1.7	2.0	4.3
31-60	21.9	7.7	80.4	2.3	2.1	4.0
1-60	21.8	7.6	79.7	4.6	3.3	4.6

(e) Treatment 5.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium (continued).

period(s)	position Left		position Right		average distance from support of NE		average distance from distr. NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	36.5	19.3	68.3	16.1	25.2	31.9	14.9	12.2
2	42.4	12.9	61.3	6.8	6.6	5.8	7.1	5.6
3	52.6	7.1	62.3	7.7	3.8	2.7	4.6	2.3
4	41.8	12.5	57.7	5.0	5.8	6.5	6.9	6.1
5	49.5	15.2	59.4	6.2	4.5	6.6	5.4	6.6
6	55.3	7.3	59.4	6.8	2.9	2.7	4.0	2.8
7	54.5	4.7	54.5	6.0	1.7	1.5	4.1	2.0
8	50.5	6.5	59.3	4.4	2.1	2.7	2.4	2.5
9	53.6	3.7	63.9	14.1	3.8	6.6	4.7	6.4
10	50.4	8.7	53.6	16.5	5.2	7.7	6.3	7.7
11	48.7	13.5	58.3	4.3	3.8	5.6	4.9	5.1
12	51.3	8.4	61.3	8.0	3.3	4.3	3.8	4.2
13	51.4	8.4	59.0	2.4	1.8	3.3	2.4	3.1
14	51.2	9.1	58.5	3.2	2.2	3.4	3.1	3.0
15	52.4	4.4	58.6	4.2	1.3	1.4	1.8	1.6
16	52.9	6.0	57.8	4.4	1.6	2.0	2.9	1.4
17	54.8	3.9	57.3	3.3	0.8	0.9	2.2	1.1
18	54.7	4.4	60.9	10.5	2.2	4.8	3.7	4.7
19	53.4	3.5	61.7	10.2	2.2	4.9	2.9	4.7
20	55.6	2.7	63.3	9.2	2.1	4.6	3.6	4.4
21	54.1	5.7	62.6	7.4	2.7	5.0	3.9	4.5
22	56.8	2.9	62.3	10.4	2.3	4.8	3.8	5.1
23	52.5	6.5	61.4	10.8	4.3	4.1	5.3	3.6
24	53.6	6.3	61.3	3.8	2.0	2.2	3.2	2.2
25	56.2	3.3	60.4	6.7	1.7	2.6	3.4	2.5
26	58.2	3.9	60.5	6.3	2.0	3.1	4.1	2.9
27	55.6	3.6	61.2	7.2	1.7	3.2	3.2	3.1
28	55.8	3.8	60.4	7.4	2.0	2.7	3.4	2.3
29	54.9	3.1	58.9	2.5	0.7	0.6	1.6	0.6
30	54.2	3.3	58.3	3.2	0.8	0.8	1.9	1.0
31	49.8	12.2	62.0	10.7	4.9	6.1	5.8	5.8
32	51.1	7.9	61.9	13.1	4.7	6.9	5.7	6.4
33	50.6	6.7	60.2	14.6	5.4	6.6	6.5	6.1
34	50.9	8.0	60.5	8.0	3.6	3.9	4.6	3.3
35	52.6	6.0	59.8	6.3	2.5	3.5	3.3	3.1
36	52.8	4.2	58.3	5.7	1.6	2.1	2.6	1.7
37	54.9	3.6	62.3	8.7	2.3	4.0	3.3	3.7
38	55.7	3.1	61.5	6.7	1.5	3.4	2.9	3.2
39	56.1	2.5	60.4	5.6	1.3	2.4	2.9	2.3
40	55.3	4.3	58.6	5.0	1.1	1.8	3.0	1.6
41	55.0	3.6	59.2	12.2	2.6	4.8	4.2	4.8
42	53.0	4.3	57.2	4.5	1.2	1.6	2.5	1.5
43	55.2	2.7	58.4	3.6	0.7	0.7	1.9	1.2
44	54.9	3.0	59.0	2.7	0.6	0.8	2.0	0.7
45	54.9	3.2	58.2	4.5	0.8	1.1	2.1	1.2
46	53.4	3.6	58.0	4.6	1.1	1.3	2.1	1.1
47	53.9	4.2	60.1	3.0	1.2	1.7	2.2	1.5
48	55.4	2.7	60.7	2.5	0.8	1.1	2.2	1.1
49	55.7	2.6	61.2	5.6	1.3	2.4	2.7	2.4
50	56.9	3.5	57.1	6.7	1.3	2.4	3.3	2.4
51	55.0	4.4	59.3	6.6	1.8	2.2	2.7	2.0
52	54.9	4.0	60.6	4.2	1.3	1.8	2.4	2.2
53	55.9	4.7	59.6	6.3	1.6	2.5	2.9	2.9
54	54.8	3.4	59.7	5.2	1.2	1.7	2.1	1.8
55	55.5	3.3	60.1	4.0	0.9	1.6	2.0	2.1
56	55.8	3.1	61.0	5.9	1.2	2.8	2.7	3.0
57	54.2	3.6	60.4	6.7	1.4	2.9	2.2	3.2
58	54.7	3.2	61.7	7.5	1.8	3.3	2.6	3.1
59	54.7	3.0	56.4	4.2	0.5	0.5	2.3	1.1
60	55.3	3.2	57.4	3.9	0.7	0.9	2.5	0.8
1-10	48.7	9.8	60.0	9.0	6.1	7.5	6.0	5.4
11-20	52.6	6.4	59.7	6.0	2.1	3.5	3.1	3.3
21-30	55.2	4.2	60.7	6.6	2.0	2.9	3.4	2.8
1-30	52.2	6.8	60.1	7.2	3.4	4.6	4.2	3.8
31-40	53.0	5.9	60.6	8.4	2.9	4.1	4.0	3.7
41-50	54.8	3.3	58.9	5.0	1.1	1.8	2.5	1.8
51-60	55.1	3.6	59.6	5.5	1.2	2.0	2.4	2.2
31-60	54.3	4.3	59.7	6.3	1.7	2.6	3.0	2.6
1-60	53.2	5.5	59.9	6.7	2.6	3.6	3.6	3.2

(f) Treatment 6.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium (continued).

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period(s)	position Left		position Right		avg. distance from NE	
	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.	mean	st. dev.
1	32.9	19.3	77.1	14.6	19.2	8.5
2	41.9	17.4	76.2	8.3	11.6	7.8
3	42.1	18.1	74.0	21.4	14.0	16.8
4	46.6	16.6	73.4	22.9	14.6	15.2
5	46.9	16.1	75.1	10.4	10.8	11.0
6	55.7	6.4	68.2	20.7	9.7	9.9
7	54.8	10.2	72.7	12.0	8.2	7.5
8	48.7	15.1	70.0	10.8	10.8	10.7
9	49.9	14.2	68.9	20.2	12.8	14.8
10	50.1	13.0	76.7	11.1	8.0	8.9
11	49.2	15.8	72.8	11.2	9.8	9.3
12	54.2	6.3	69.9	17.5	8.6	8.5
13	54.9	6.0	72.0	10.6	7.0	6.3
14	53.6	10.6	74.8	14.9	7.9	9.0
15	53.0	12.2	76.3	14.1	7.6	11.2
16	56.5	6.8	75.2	14.6	7.8	7.0
17	54.8	7.5	72.6	18.9	7.6	9.8
18	53.9	8.1	75.1	10.5	6.8	6.7
19	55.7	6.1	69.4	17.0	8.7	9.0
20	56.7	9.1	78.8	8.7	5.9	4.9
21	55.9	4.5	76.9	10.5	5.3	6.0
22	55.9	9.6	79.3	7.0	5.2	5.8
23	54.8	9.5	81.7	7.7	4.8	6.0
24	54.6	13.7	71.3	19.9	8.4	10.9
25	55.9	10.4	78.3	9.9	5.6	6.6
26	56.1	8.3	77.5	9.3	5.1	6.9
27	56.2	9.2	78.1	7.1	4.3	5.8
28	57.5	8.3	78.9	10.0	5.7	5.6
29	55.7	10.7	76.6	10.3	6.7	6.8
30	55.7	10.0	77.9	8.6	5.2	7.3
31	45.0	21.3	76.3	8.6	10.3	12.0
32	50.0	15.5	75.5	10.3	8.2	9.7
33	54.1	13.9	76.1	6.9	6.3	7.2
34	53.4	10.3	75.3	10.5	6.3	7.6
35	51.3	13.8	75.7	8.4	6.5	9.7
36	53.1	11.2	76.8	8.9	5.8	8.7
37	56.8	8.7	74.7	10.3	5.9	7.1
38	54.4	7.5	71.7	11.4	7.0	8.4
39	54.5	8.1	74.1	10.9	6.0	7.9
40	52.4	12.3	78.7	8.1	5.8	7.4
41	53.0	15.5	79.0	3.2	4.1	8.0
42	55.4	10.3	79.7	4.0	3.3	6.4
43	59.3	12.6	77.1	10.3	4.2	7.6
44	56.5	12.4	77.1	6.4	4.2	7.1
45	57.3	4.4	73.2	10.1	4.8	5.9
46	56.0	6.4	74.7	10.7	6.0	6.9
47	55.3	14.2	72.0	12.1	7.8	8.6
48	53.0	11.4	75.7	9.7	6.7	6.8
49	50.3	15.1	75.0	8.0	7.3	9.2
50	54.4	6.8	77.3	9.1	5.2	5.9
51	55.3	8.1	75.5	9.5	5.3	5.8
52	55.7	6.8	77.9	7.2	3.9	3.9
53	55.4	8.3	72.9	11.3	6.0	7.0
54	54.9	8.0	76.7	10.7	4.7	6.7
55	55.9	6.7	75.3	9.6	4.5	6.8
56	57.5	4.2	80.3	4.6	2.3	3.2
57	58.5	5.6	75.4	10.5	3.8	6.8
58	56.3	7.1	74.3	9.6	5.2	7.1
59	55.4	8.7	77.2	6.5	4.0	5.1
60	52.5	16.5	77.9	6.1	5.7	8.7
1-10	47.0	14.6	73.2	15.2	12.0	11.1
11-20	54.3	8.8	73.7	13.8	7.8	8.2
21-30	55.8	9.4	77.7	10.0	5.6	6.8
1-30	52.3	11.0	74.9	13.0	8.5	8.7
31-40	52.5	12.3	75.5	9.4	6.8	8.6
41-50	55.1	10.9	76.1	8.4	5.4	7.2
51-60	55.7	8.0	76.3	8.5	4.6	6.1
31-60	54.4	10.4	76.0	8.8	5.6	7.3
1-60	53.4	10.7	75.4	10.9	7.0	8.0

(g) Treatment 7.

Table 1: Players' positions and distance from the Nash equilibrium (continued).

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	41.2	56.6	47.9	57.0	44.6	56.8
2	49.3	52.0	50.0	50.0	49.7	51.0
3	49.3	53.0	49.2	50.7	49.3	51.9
4	47.3	55.7	43.3	50.0	45.3	52.8
5	46.7	53.0	58.8	54.8	52.8	53.9
6	48.8	52.0	50.0	50.0	49.4	51.0
7	49.9	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.0
8	47.2	56.3	51.5	52.1	49.3	54.2
9	45.5	55.0	49.7	51.0	47.6	53.0
10	48.5	51.2	50.0	50.0	49.3	50.6
11	50.0	50.2	50.0	50.0	50.0	50.1
12	50.3	55.6	41.5	52.4	45.9	54.0
13	31.0	68.5	37.5	64.5	34.3	66.5

(a) Treatment 1.

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	38.7	61.0	40.0	60.0	39.3	60.5
2	41.3	61.5	40.0	60.0	40.7	60.8
3	49.4	58.1	40.7	50.2	45.0	54.1
4	40.3	60.3	40.0	60.0	40.2	60.2
5	38.2	59.8	40.0	60.0	39.1	59.9
6	34.1	59.1	40.3	60.3	37.2	59.7
7	40.8	60.4	40.0	60.0	40.4	60.2
8	40.0	57.8	40.0	60.0	40.0	58.9
9	39.5	59.9	40.7	60.0	40.1	59.9
10	38.7	62.5	38.7	60.6	38.7	61.6

(b) Treatment 2.

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	48.8	52.9	50.0	50.0	49.4	51.5
2	48.9	50.9	50.0	50.0	49.4	50.5
3	44.9	52.7	50.0	50.0	47.5	51.4
4	50.0	50.3	49.4	46.5	49.7	48.4
5	49.0	51.0	49.7	49.8	49.4	50.4
6	48.6	51.1	49.4	52.0	49.0	51.6
7	50.0	50.2	49.7	50.0	49.9	50.1
8	49.5	50.5	50.2	50.0	49.8	50.2
9	48.0	50.7	49.6	53.1	48.8	51.9
10	48.5	50.8	50.1	50.8	49.3	50.8

(c) Treatment 3.

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	40.2	60.6	39.7	60.2	39.9	60.4
2	40.8	59.5	40.0	60.2	40.4	59.9
3	39.8	63.9	40.0	60.0	39.9	61.9
4	40.6	59.5	39.5	60.0	40.1	59.8
5	40.2	59.7	40.7	60.0	40.4	59.8
6	43.0	59.4	41.0	59.6	42.0	59.5
7	39.3	60.4	39.6	59.9	39.4	60.2
8	40.2	59.9	40.0	60.1	40.1	60.0
9	34.6	61.5	40.0	65.7	37.3	63.6
10	42.3	60.6	40.0	60.0	41.1	60.3

(d) Treatment 4.

Table 2: Players' average positions in the matching pairs.

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	19.8	76.6	37.9	79.8	28.8	78.2
2	21.0	79.6	20.0	80.0	20.5	79.8
3	22.0	77.1	15.5	84.1	18.8	80.6
4	20.5	77.3	20.0	80.0	20.3	78.7
5	20.5	79.4	22.0	80.0	21.3	79.7
6	23.5	81.3	20.9	80.5	22.2	80.9
7	30.3	85.0	22.3	80.0	26.3	82.5
8	19.2	80.0	20.0	79.9	19.6	79.9
9	20.0	76.8	20.4	80.0	20.2	78.2
10	20.6	77.3	20.0	80.0	20.3	78.7

(e) Treatment 5.

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	52.0	57.7	53.0	57.1	52.5	57.4
2	54.2	58.1	55.3	59.5	54.7	58.8
3	52.8	59.5	54.2	59.0	53.5	59.3
4	52.7	62.5	53.9	67.5	53.3	65.0
5	47.0	56.2	53.8	56.5	50.4	56.3
6	51.1	56.3	59.0	59.9	55.1	58.1
7	54.4	61.3	50.8	58.7	52.6	60.0
8	56.7	62.0	57.2	58.6	57.0	60.3
9	50.6	62.5	49.9	59.7	50.3	61.2
10	50.3	65.1	55.9	60.3	53.1	62.7

(f) Treatment 6.

matching pair	periods					
	1-30		31-60		1-60	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	55.8	80.2	60.0	80.0	57.9	80.1
2	52.5	80.8	60.5	77.0	56.5	78.9
3	51.7	71.3	53.3	79.0	52.5	75.2
4	49.9	76.9	49.4	68.4	49.7	72.7
5	58.0	76.8	56.7	70.5	57.4	73.7
6	61.5	78.3	56.6	72.5	59.0	75.4
7	51.0	80.0	60.7	80.0	55.8	80.0
8	56.1	74.4	44.3	80.5	50.2	77.5
9	51.3	64.5	52.2	76.0	51.7	70.1
10	51.6	73.3	54.5	73.9	53.1	73.6
11	56.8	80.3	60.0	80.0	58.4	80.2
12	43.5	66.8	57.7	80.0	50.6	73.4
13	49.3	70.7	38.5	77.1	43.9	73.9
14	58.2	80.7	60.0	80.0	59.1	80.3
15	38.0	68.2	52.2	64.6	45.1	66.4

(g) Treatment 7.

Table 2: Players' average positions in the matching pairs (continued).

matching pair	Treatment 1		Treatment 2		Treatment 3		Treatment 4		Treatment 5		Treatment 6		Treatment 7	
	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right	Left	Right
1	548.0	552.0	549.7	550.3	704.8	695.2	790.8	789.1	537.9	562.1	1018.56	579.00	1063.10	654.05
2	554.2	545.8	549.9	550.1	700.1	699.9	789.9	790.1	549.8	550.2	1011.79	593.54	1036.22	649.31
3	548.4	551.6	555.9	544.1	698.0	702.0	791.9	788.1	546.8	551.5	1038.82	584.29	1037.62	619.52
4	540.0	560.0	550.0	550.0	724.2	675.8	785.2	794.8	551.5	548.5	1134.99	570.56	1009.15	612.47
5	539.2	560.8	546.4	553.6	694.7	705.3	788.7	790.9	544.7	555.3	978.97	576.58	1011.44	640.75
6	554.6	545.4	545.6	554.4	706.2	693.8	787.7	791.9	554.7	543.4	1071.76	596.91	1022.92	656.99
7	551.5	548.5	550.4	549.7	701.7	698.3	790.5	788.0	514.6	585.4	1053.54	579.34	1042.02	651.31
8	550.5	549.5	552.8	547.2	698.0	702.0	790.0	790.0	549.7	550.3	1093.64	600.36	1033.48	621.18
9	554.2	545.8	555.1	544.9	701.0	699.0	778.5	799.6	557.3	542.7	1039.88	578.34	1009.20	607.85
10	555.0	545.0	550.5	549.5	713.7	686.3	788.5	790.9	552.2	547.8	1084.54	587.46	1009.16	621.70
11	550.8	549.2											1062.18	658.20
12	548.4	551.6											1053.37	612.65
13	584.2	515.8											999.90	590.45
14													1065.33	659.91
15													963.76	586.71

Table 3: Players' average payoffs in the matching pairs.

			position Left		position Right		avg. distance NE	
			Coeff.	t stat	Coeff.	t stat	Coeff.	t stat
treat1	1-30	Intercept	48.475	75.539	53.415	95.008	4.041	10.240
		Slope	-14.483	5.232	8.418	3.471	14.631	8.594
	31-60	Intercept	49.510	137.199	51.677	117.054	2.297	5.430
		Slope	-8.202	5.269	6.222	3.267	7.573	4.151
treat2	1-30	Intercept	40.686	119.715	59.597	222.063	0.811	3.748
		Slope	-4.452	3.037	3.330	2.876	16.211	17.365
	31-60	Intercept	39.687	282.685	59.028	718.785	0.575	8.756
		Slope	2.599	4.291	0.617	1.742	2.076	7.324
treat3	1-30	Intercept	50.063	174.333	50.741	162.951	0.089	0.403
		Slope	-10.807	8.724	2.721	2.026	14.000	14.704
	31-60	Intercept	49.843	541.038	50.166	110.982	0.733	4.495
		Slope	-0.276	0.694	0.483	0.248	2.291	3.255
treat4	1-30	Intercept	39.864	73.908	60.472	259.823	1.459	6.495
		Slope	1.747	0.751	0.137	0.137	5.464	5.638
	31-60	Intercept	39.955	193.912	60.423	372.260	0.740	6.456
		Slope	0.587	0.661	1.127	1.609	2.081	4.211
treat5	1-30	Intercept	21.259	30.350	80.803	196.757	1.318	3.418
		Slope	3.711	1.228	-13.536	7.641	23.396	14.068
	31-60	Intercept	21.208	72.428	80.341	569.673	1.741	10.139
		Slope	5.246	4.153	0.642	1.055	3.046	4.112
treat6	1-30	Intercept	54.854	91.656	59.214	105.804	2.660	10.595
		Slope	-20.077	7.777	6.829	2.829	11.371	10.499
	31-60	Intercept	55.233	214.370	59.255	180.738	2.365	14.051
		Slope	-7.029	6.324	3.289	2.326	4.797	6.607
treat7	1-30	Intercept	55.817	103.139	74.854	94.680	6.548	14.957
		Slope	-26.060	11.163	0.031	0.009	14.378	7.613
	31-60	Intercept	55.881	128.415	75.989	159.904	4.797	18.131
		Slope	-10.818	5.763	-0.133	0.065	5.868	5.141

Table 4: OLS regressions $y = a + b \cdot 1/t$.

Instructions

All participants in this session have the following identical instructions

Introduction

- Welcome to this session, and thank you for participating in this experiment. The instructions for this experiment are simple, and if you pay attention, you can gain some money that will be paid to you <u>in cash</u> at the end of the experiment. From now on till the end of this experimental session you are not allowed to talk to each other. If you have a question, please raise your hand.
- The experiment involves playing games with another participant. To form pairs of players, each player will be randomly and anonymously matched to another player. Note that you will never know the identity of the person you are matched with, nor will (s)he be aware of yours. Nor will you be told the payoffs of other players.
- The payoffs in this experiment are expressed in points. The total points earned in the experiment will be exchanged into Pound Sterling at the end of the session using the following exchange rate: £ 0.45 per 1000 points.
- In the following pages we describe the experiment in detail. At the end of these instructions we ask you to do several control exercises which are designed to check that you have understood the decision situation.

Experiment

- <u>The basic game:</u>
  There are two candidates (called "A" and "B") competing in a local election. In each basic game, **each of you will play the role of one of these candidates**. These roles will be assigned to you by the experimenter. The issue at stake is the location of a new post office. There are 101 possible locations on the high street, numbered from 0 to 100. Each candidate independently and simultaneously proposes a location. The citizens in town vote for either of the two candidates, and the post office will be built at the location that had been chosen by the winning candidate. A candidate wins the election if he gets more than half of the votes. If both candidates get the same number of votes, the winner will be determined by a random draw (fair coin toss).

- <u>Citizens:</u>
  All citizens live on the high street, and they are evenly (uniformly) spread along the high street. Each citizen is expected to vote for the proposed location that is closer to his own position. The following graph illustrates this.

Thus, given a pair of proposed locations, the candidates, knowing that citizens are uniformly distributed and that they vote for the alternative closer to their own position, have a good idea of the percentage of votes that each of them can expect. However, they are not perfectly sure about these percentages. The reason is that, besides distance, there are additional, unknown factors determining the preference of the voters as well. More precisely, if we denote by X the expected percentage of votes for a candidate, then the actual percentage for that candidate will be somewhere between X-15 and X+15, with each value within that range of values being equally likely (and, of course, the actual percentage of votes cannot be lower than 0% or higher than 100%). This uncertainty about the behaviour of the voters applies to each round, independently from what happened in other rounds.

- Payoffs for candidates:
  When deciding upon their location, there are two payoff considerations for each candidate.
  First, each candidate has his own preference for the location of the post office, no matter which of the two candidates is the actual winner of the election. The ideal post office location for candidate "A" is 34, whereas the ideal location for "B" is 66. A post office at the ideal location would give a candidate a *'location payoff'* of 900 points. However, as the distance between the actual location and his ideal location increases with one unit, the location payoff diminishes at a constant rate of 10 points. Thus, for example, if the eventual location of the post office has a distance of 17 unit steps to the candidate's ideal location, then the location payoff of this candidate is 900 - 17 * 10 = 730 points.
  Second, each candidate receives a payoff simply from winning the election, independent of the location of the post office. For candidate A this payoff of winning as such is 100, and for candidate B it is 100. There is no additional payoff for the candidate that loses the election.

- Rounds:
  You will play 30 rounds of the same game, playing the same role, against the same other player. All payoffs in all rounds will be accumulated.
  After 30 rounds, the two roles will be swapped. The "A" candidate becomes the "B" candidate, and the "B" candidate becomes "A". You will play, then, another 30 rounds with these new roles, all the time against the same other player, and again all payoffs in all rounds will be accumulated.

- **Interface:**
  You will face two different screens.

  The first screen is a <u>decision screen</u> as shown in the following screenshot:

  In the top half you will find an expected payoff calculator. This will allow you to try out different combinations of locations for the other candidate and for yourself, with your resulting expected payoff shown once you press the 'calculate' button. These are just imaginary choices and you can try as many as you want.
  On the bottom half of this screen you must also choose your actual proposal. Once you have entered it you must press the OK button using the mouse. After you have done this, your decision can no longer be revised. There is no time limit for your decisions.

  After all participants have made their choices, in each round you will find a <u>feedback screen</u> with your chosen location, the location chosen by the other candidate and your resulting payoff.

- **Logsheet:**
  We recommend that you transcribe the results of each round from the feedback window on the logsheet provided.

Do you have any questions?

Control questionnaire

1)   After how many rounds will the roles of the two candidates be swapped?   ....

2)   If the expected proportion of votes for a candidate is 40%, then, because of the uncertainty of voter behavior, what is the maximum proportion of voters that the candidate could get?   ....

3)   If the expected proportion of votes for a candidate is 40%, then, because of the uncertainty of voter behavior, what is the minimum proportion of voters that the candidate could get?   ....

4)   What is the ideal post office location for candidate A?   ....

5)   Suppose that the post office is located at location 30. What is, then, the distance from the ideal post office location for candidate A?   ....

6)   What is the *'location payoff'* that candidate A derives from the post office being located at location 30?   .... points

7)   What is the ideal post office location for candidate B?   ....

8)   Still supposing that the post office is located at location 30, what is the distance from the ideal post office location for candidate B?   ....

9)   What is the *'location payoff'* that candidate B derives from the post office being located at location 30?   .... points

10)   What is the payoff of winning as such for candidate A?   .... points

11)   What is the payoff of winning as such for candidate B?   .... points